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Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays in econometrics. The first part of the
thesis, consisting of chapters one and two, treats novel estimators aiming
at distributional effects. In the first chapter, I introduce a methodology to
estimate the joint distribution of multiple outcome variables. The second
chapter incorporates censoring, a prevalent challenge when analyzing du-
ration data, into distribution regression methods. Finally, the third chapter
analyzes a reform in the health care sector.
Chapter 1 introduces Multivariate Distribution Regression (MDR), a
semi-parametric approach to model the joint distribution of several out-
come variables. Typically, researchers are interested in the effects on mul-
tiple outcomes when the latter are correlated (see Patton, 2012, for an
overview). For instance, this is the case for the impact of a crisis on asset
prices. Asset prices co-move tightly as they depend on common factors
such as market cycles. A shock on one price index may thus affect many
other indices. In addition, the effect could vary across the distribution of
the prices - a peculiarity that MDR accounts for. Essentially, MDR estimates
the impact of interest at every point of the outcome’s distribution.
MDR’s most obvious advantage is its flexibility. Existing methods, such
as copula models, typically impose a parametric form of the dependence
structure across outcomes (i.e. Klein et al., 2019). In contrast, MDR does
not require equally restrictive, parametric assumptions. Thus, the effects
estimated using MDR describe the underlying mechanisms more accurately.
Further, MDR generalizes two well-known estimators: (i) the empirical
multivariate cumulative CDF by allowing for covariates and (ii) univariate
Distribution Regression (DR) by considering multiple outcomes. Building
on earlier work in the field (Chernozhukov et al., 2013), I establish that MDR
consistently estimates the regression coefficient process. Further, I show
that coefficients are well-behaved and converge to a Gaussian process, with
the bootstrap being a consistent tool to assess the asymptotic distribution.
To illustrate the usefulness of MDR, I estimate the effect of disability
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insurance benefits on labor supply responses among Swiss households.
Generally, receiving these benefits is related to lower incentives to supply
labor (i.e. Autor et al., 2016). Autor et al. (2019) find that spouses increase
their labor supply once their partner is disabled. My results indicate that
spouses of low-income partners do respond as suggested by Autor et al.
(2019). Yet, among average to high-income households, the need to com-
pensate for the financial loss appears less immediate.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Blaise Melly, we incorporate censoring
into the univariate DR model. The resulting estimator, censored distribution
regression (CDR), allows studying how the covariates’ effects vary over
time. From a theoretical perspective, CDR represents a generalization of
three existing estimators. In particular, CDR simplifies (i) to the Kaplan-
Meier estimator in the absence of covariates Kaplan and Meier (1958), (ii)
to distribution regression in the absence of censoring, and (iii) to Cox’s
proportional hazard estimator in the absence of heterogeneity (Cox, 1972).
As our main results, we establish weak convergence of the coefficient
process to a Gaussian process.
The standard tool to analyze duration data is Cox’s proportional haz-
ard model, which assumes time-constant effects. On many occasions, this
assumption seems too restrictive. For instance, job search behavior differs
during unemployment. In this context, we apply the CDR estimator to
estimate the effect of potential benefit duration (PBD) on unemployment
spells. Search models suggest that faced with the upcoming exhaustion
of benefits, individuals intensify their search efforts and lower their target
wages (Krueger and Mueller, 2016; Marinescu and Skandalis, 2021). Our
results indicate that PBD has a negligible effect for short-term unemployed
but a strong and significant effect for the long-term unemployed. This is in
line with an increased likelihood of finding a job once the benefits are close
to exhaustion.
In Chapter 3, co-authored with Tamara Bischof, we address how physi-
cians respond to changes in their financial incentives. We exploit plausibly
exogenous changes in the fee structure for medical services in the outpa-
tient sector. The tariff partners, the health care providers and insurances,
failed to reach an agreement on how to reform the outdated tariff scheme
TARMED. In response, the federal government set the new fees, causing a
revenue loss of up to 40% for single physicians. Previous research suggests
that physicians may respond in two different ways: Faced with a revenue
loss, physicians can (i) substitute from low-paying to more attractive ser-
vices and (ii) increase their overall health care supply (i.e. Clemens and
xiii
Gottlieb, 2014; McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Yip, 1998). Our main goal is to
disentangle these two channels and to quantify their relative importance.
Our results are threefold. (i) We find that providers raise (lower) the
volume of services that have become relatively more (less) attractive. (ii)
Physicians increase their overall volume of services and treat more patients
when they lose a significant share of their revenue. (iii) Finally, a compar-
ative exercise indicates that volume expansions are far more important
than substitution responses. In particular, a revenue loss of 5% leads to an
increase in the overall supply of roughly 3% whereas we do not observe
a significant rise in substitution responses. Concerning policy implica-
tions, our results suggest (i) that gradual fee changes may prevent strong
and costly reactions due to more considerable revenue losses. (ii) Further,
policy-makers could directly incentivize physicians to provide services that






This paper introduces multivariate distribution regression (MDR), a semi-
parametric approach to estimate the joint distribution of outcomes. The
method allows studying complex dependence structures and distributional
treatment effects without making strong parametric assumptions. I show
that the MDR coefficient process converges to a Gaussian process and that
the bootstrap is consistent for the asymptotic distribution of the estimator.
Methodologically, MDR contributes by offering the analysis of many func-
tionals of the CDF. For instance, this includes counterfactual distributions.
Compared to copula models, MDR achieves the same accuracy but is (i)
more robust to misspecification and (ii) allows to condition on many co-
variates, thus ensuring a high degree of flexibility. Finally, an application
analyzes shifts in spousal labor supply in response to a health shock. I find
that if low-income individuals receive disability insurance benefits, their
spouses respond by increasing their labor supply. Whereas the opposite
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University of Bern for instructive comments. Explicitly, the remarks of Tamara Bischof,
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holds for high-income households, likely because they are well insured and
can afford to work fewer hours.
1.1 Introduction
Researchers often aim to estimate the effect of covariates on the joint dis-
tribution of outcomes (see Patton, 2012, for an overview). Such situations
arise in settings where observables affect the dependence between out-
comes. For instance, this is the case for the division of labor supply within
households. The rising correlation between spouses’ incomes depends on
the allocation of housework and is an important driver of inequality (Hys-
lop, 2001; Schwartz, 2010). The allocation of labor, in turn, is a function of
parenthood, bargaining power and norms (e.g. Kleven et al., 2019; Kühhirt,
2011). Another example are equity price dynamics in multiple markets.
The co-movement of asset returns depends on a list of factors such as the
degree of financial integration, market cycles or country specific charac-
teristics (e.g. Aloui et al., 2011; Christoffersen et al., 2012). In both cases,
explicitly allowing the dependence structure to vary with the regressors
may provide additional insights that univariate approaches would miss.
In this spirit, this paper derives a flexible estimator of the multivariate
cumulative distribution function (CDF) conditional on a set of covariates.
Multivariate Distribution Regression (MDR) generalizes two well-stud-
ied estimators: (i) the empirical multivariate CDF by including covariates
and (ii) univariate Distribution Regression (DR) by considering multiple
outcomes. In its simplest form, MDR only includes a constant as a regres-
sor. In this case, MDR reduces to the empirical multivariate CDF as the
CDF is approximated separately in each cell. In contrast to univariate DR,
MDR provides information on the dependence structure, i.e. the correlation
matrix. Considering the general case, the theoretical contribution of this
paper is threefold. I show (i) that the MDR coefficient process converges
to a mean-zero Gaussian process, (ii) that the corresponding variance is
consistently estimated by a bootstrap technique, and (iii) that functionals
of the fitted CDF are consistently estimated by the functional delta method.
The last result is of great relevance from a methodological point of view. Es-
sentially, MDR contributes by offering many novel possibilities to analyze
the joint CDF. For instance, this includes quantile functions of one outcome
conditional on others, unconditional distributions, and counterfactual dis-
tributions. In the following, I sketch the concept of the latter to highlight
the additional value for applied research.
In the context of MDR, a counterfactual is a CDF modified by one of two
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types of hypothetical changes: (i) a change in the distribution of covariates
or (ii) the conditional distribution itself. To illustrate the former, suppose
the researcher is interested in the effect of a binary treatment. Intuitively,
the counterfactuals answers to questions as ”How would the CDF look
like if all (no) observations were treated?”. Comparing the CDFs then
identifies the distributional treatment effect, provided that the treatment is
randomly assigned. Note that the distributional treatment effects may vary
with the level of the outcomes, which introduces a natural way to address
heterogeneity. The second type of changes refers to questions as ”How
would the CDF for treated units look like if the covariates had the same
effects as for untreated units?”. Asking such questions enables comparisons
between subgroups of the data.
I illustrate the model in an application to the division of labor supply
within Swiss households. More precisely, I estimate how household labor
income changes after one member newly receives Disability Insurance Ben-
efits (DIB). Generally, receiving DIB is associated with a lower labor supply
(e.g. Autor et al., 2016). Due to fiscal debates on who should be subsidised,
this effect has drawn a lot of attention in recent years.1 Motivated by the
study of Autor et al. (2019), I expect that spouses expand their labor supply
and partly compensate for the loss of household income. MDR enables to
analyze these shifts separately at all parts of the bivariate distribution of
labor earnings. I find that the spouses’ response crucially depends on the
income of their partner. If low-income main earners are hit by the shock,
spousal labor supply increases to compensate for the financial loss of the
household. In contrast, spouses of high-income individuals reduce their
labor supply. Likely, these individuals take care of their partners and the
household chores as they can afford to work fewer hours.
The estimator builds on the theory of univariate distribution regression
initially introduced by Williams and Grizzle (1972) and applied to ordered
outcomes by Jung (1996). Foresi and Peracchi (1995) were the first to es-
tablish pointwise convergence at a finite number of thresholds. Building
on these results, Chernozhukov et al. (2013) proved that a functional cen-
tral limit theorem holds for univariate conditional CDFs estimated with
DR. This paper departs from the setting in Chernozhukov et al. (2013).
Yet, I take a different approach when proving consistency and asymptotic
normality.2 Related developments in the field include the possibility to in-
1For instance, changing the rules on eligibility of DIB was a much disputed topic in
Britain (Walker and Elgot, 2017). Recently, in relation to Covid-19, Canadian politicians
disagreed over emergency DIB (Canadian Press, 2020).
2Using theorems for approximate Z-estimators, Chernozhukov et al. (2013) derive the
asymptotic distributions for functionals of quantile and distribution regression based
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troduce two-way fixed effects into DR models (Chernozhukov et al., 2020a)
or the estimation of structural functions in nonseparable triangular models
(Chernozhukov et al., 2020b).
As an alternative to MDR, researchers may consider quantile regression
(QR) as a tool to model the conditional distribution of an outcome. Since
the seminal paper by Koenker and Bassett (1978), QR has developed into a
standard method to analyze heterogeneity. Several authors extended the
principles to the multivariate case. However, this is a non-trivial exercise
due to the lack of canonical ordering in higher dimensions. In search of
a unified approach, Zuo and Serfling (2000) introduced desirable prop-
erties of statistical depth functions. Recently, Chernozhukov et al. (2017)
extended the QR framework to the multivariate setting and provided re-
sults on multivariate quantiles. Compared to QR, DR naturally generalizes
to multivariate tasks and neatly handles mixed or discrete outcomes (Cher-
nozhukov et al., 2019). For instance, wages or labor market participation
are typically non-continuously distributed. Thus, researchers may favour
DR in such applications.
More broadly, the derived estimator fits in a literature concerned with
the convergence of empirical processes. Dudley (1966) has been the first
to derive a theory on multivariate empirical distributions and numerous
authors extended this result to more involved settings (e.g. Delattre and
Roquain, 2016). Focusing on conditional processes, recent studies tackled
the issue using copula models (Fermanian and Lopez, 2018; Portier and
Segers, 2018). In general, copulas are commonly used to model multivariate
CDFs (e.g. Patton, 2012). Copula models are attractive due to the possibility
to separately specify the marginals and the dependence structure, the
copula itself, ensuring a high degree of flexibility. Yet, the assumption on
the copula is crucial and may be too restrictive (Ho et al., 2015; Zimmer,
2012). Possibly, the issue may be solved by nonparametric estimates of the
copula (Gijbels et al., 2011). However, as the number of regressors increases,
these models are infeasible in practice because they suffer from the curse of
dimensionality (Fermanian and Lopez, 2018). Similarly, the non-parametric
approach of Bouzebda and Nemouchi (2019) using U-processes is likely
to suffer from the same drawback. Klein et al. (2019) proposed a setting
where the estimation of the conditional CDF is replaced by the estimation
of a monotonically increasing transformation function. This simplifies
the estimation and the derived inference theory. Still, the choice of the
transformation function remains specific to the case at hand. In contrast to
estimators simultaneously. The present proofs are based on theorems regarding exact
Z-estimators as quantile regression methods play no part in this analysis.
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MDR, this model does not simplify to empirical multivariate CDF in the
absence of covariates. Thus, the approach imposes additional assumptions
on the joint distribution. Further, MDR is more general in the sense that the
choice of the link function, the analogue to the transformation function, is
less likely to affect the results. In a simplistic simulation setting, I show that
MDR outperforms copula models even in cases with only one regressor.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 in-
troduces the model and outlines two typical settings where MDR and
counterfactual CDFs may be advantageous. Section 1.3 derives the asymp-
totic theory of the estimator. A simulation example is set up in section 1.4.
Section 1.5 presents the application and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Concept and Examples
This section introduces the approach of MDR by first presenting the model
of the multivariate CDF and then focusing on desired functionals of the
CDF, primarily counterfactual distributions. At the end of this section, I will
sketch two examples to illustrate the wide range of potential applications.
At the core of the model, MDR estimates the joint CDF of multiple
outcomes. Considering a bivariate case, denote the outcomes by Y1 and
Y2. The joint CDF is the probability of Y1 and Y2 being smaller than some
specified values, say t1 and t2. Formally, this is FY(t) = P(Y1 ≤ t1, Y2 ≤ t2),
where t is the vector of thresholds. Equivalently, FY(t) is the expected value
of the binary variable E[1(Y1 ≤ t1, Y2 ≤ t2)]. Most applied research is
interested in how regressors affect this probability. A natural possibility to
model E[1(Y1 ≤ t1, Y2 ≤ t2)|X] is to use a binary regression such as a logis-
tic or probit model. In the following, denote the value of the conditional
CDF at t1 and t2 by FY|X(t|X). Essentially, the MDR estimator models this
conditional expectation at a large number of thresholds. The resulting coef-
ficients on Xi, β(t), are allowed to vary with t which ensures a high degree
of flexibility. This modelling approach entails several attractive features.
First, each individual regression is tractable and offers various forms of
well-known results such as marginal effects. Second, the estimator is trivial
to implement. Third, the obtained fit of the CDF can be used to estimate
any feature of the joint distribution. Among others, this includes averages
and variance-covariance matrices. Further, taking all outcomes but one
to the limit, one can derive the marginal CDF which, in turn, implies the
marginal PDF. The quantile function can be obtained by taking the left
inverse of the marginal CDF. Taking derivatives, the multivariate PDF is
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implied, too.3 Note that the PDF is consistently estimated but converges
at a lower rate than the distribution itself (Rothe and Wied, 2020). Finally,
it is feasible to derive the marginal CDF conditioning on values of the
other outcomes.4 Taken together, the multivariate CDF fully describes the
statistical properties of the outcomes.
Prior to addressing potential applications, I show how the estimated
CDF can be used to answer specific questions. For this purpose, I will
focus on counterfactual distributions as an example of the functionals that
are implied by the joint CDF. These distributions describe how the CDF
depends on two types of hypothetical changes. On one hand, changes in
covariates could result in a new shape of the CDF. On the other hand, the
effects of the covariates may be altered, this is changing the conditional
distribution itself. To illustrate the former case, suppose we are interested
in the effect of a binary variable Di which is included in Xi. A natural
choice of two counterfactuals would be the CDF in the presence or absence
of Di, i.e. Di = 0 or Di = 1. Intuitively, this provides an answer to ”How
would the CDF look like if everyone (no one) was treated by the effect
of Di?”.5 The comparison of these two CDFs has a causal interpretation,
provided that the treatment is randomly assigned once conditioned on
the covariates. Similarly, we can target any unit change of a discrete or
continuous variable in Xi. Extending this idea, the whole distribution
of covariates may be altered. More specifically, in a model for men and
women wages, questions like ”How would the CDF look like if women
had the characteristics of men?” could be answered. The second type of
modifications is concerned with the CDF for different subgroups too. Again
referring to men and women, it could be analyzed how women’s outcome
distribution would look like if the covariates had the same effects on wages
as for men. Formally, this consists in changing FY|X(t|X). Finally, note that
both types of modifications may be considered simultaneously. Next, the
application of MDR is sketched in two typical examples.
Example 1.Bivariate Labor Supply Family labor supply has gained a lot of
attention due to its relevance for intra-family and aggregate inequality (Eika
et al., 2019; Hyslop, 2001; Schwartz, 2010). Consider two spouses who both
3These approximations rely on numerical derivatives. Thus, it is crucial that a fine
enough grid of t × t thresholds has been used to estimate the model.





5Formally, these CDF’s are FY⟨·|D=0⟩(t) =
∫
Xi FY|Xi (t|X)dFXi,Di=0(X) and FY⟨·|D=1⟩(t) =∫
Xi FY|Xi (t|X)dFXi,Di=1(X) where · indicates that the conditional distribution did not
change.
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participate in the labor market. Let Y1 and Y2 denote labor income of the
woman and man, respectively. Notably, labor income depends on a number
of factors such as gender, age, education, parenthood, origin or industry
(see e.g. Blau and Winkler, 2018, for an overview). Further, in response to
persistent wage shocks, family labor supply may act as insurance (Blundell
et al., 2016) and the response depends on the complementarity of leisure
time and the substitutability of childcare (Blundell et al., 2018). In fact, the
presence of children crucially determines the spousal labor supply response
(Halla et al., 2020). Thus, spouses’ bivariate distribution of labor supply is
likely to be a function of household characteristics. The latter should be
included as regressors to avoid misspecification.
Researches may be interested in the effect of women’s level of educa-
tion on the joint distribution of earnings. Using counterfactuals, the CDF
could be modelled for every level of education. For instance, suppose we
only care about the correlation of male and female’s labor income. Com-
paring the counterfactual distributions, the correlation could be viewed
as a function of women’s level of education. As shown by Goussé et al.
(2017), education induces assortative mating.6 This finding can be tested
by treating a positive correlation of spousal income as a sign of assortative
mating. MDR could extend this analysis by considering more complex
measures such as tail dependences.
One could aim at estimating the causal effect of a binary income shock
on the bivariate distribution of labor income. For instance, a tax reform or
winning the lottery may serve as treatment variables. Assuming that the
treatment is randomly assigned conditional on the included covariates, the
counterfactual distributions in the presence (absence) of the shock have
a causal interpretation.7 Cesarini et al. (2017) find that winning the lot-
tery modestly reduces labor supply for winners. The reduction is smaller
for spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household models. Using
MDR, modelling the multivariate labor supply response could reveal that
the impacts depend on the initial earnings of both partners. Thus, while
the average effects are small, individuals at the bottom of the distribution
may experience considerable changes. In the context of tax reforms, it is of
interest how households would react to a change from joint to individual
taxation for married couples. This is currently discussed in Switzerland.8
6Note that in their work, Goussé et al. (2017) analyze exogenous variations in education.
7For a detailed discussion on when counterfactuals do have a causal interpretation, see
Chernozhukov et al. (2013, section 2.3).
8Married couples pay up to 10% more in taxes than their single counterparts (Peters,
2014). Due to this inequality, there have been numerous attempts to reform the tax system
(e.g. Schöchli, 2019). Yet, the political parties have not reached an agreement (CH Media,
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Considering 17 European countries and the US, Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2017) show that married women would increase their hours worked by
10% if they were taxed individually. Drawing on these implications, the
MDR estimator could answer whether the potential increase in female labor
supply differs across the spouses’ distribution of earnings. Other applica-
tions could focus on the effect of a health shock, job loss or retirement.
Example 2.Asset Prices The interdependence of asset prices in multiple
markets has long been recognized (e.g. Aloui et al., 2011; Chavas, 2020;
Christoffersen et al., 2012). In short, positive correlations of asset prices
arise across countries and markets. These correlations depend on numerous
factors such as market cycles and the type of the goods and the stage
of development of the economy. The resulting linkages are crucial for
returns as they determine diversification benefits and portfolio allocations.
Typically, empirical studies estimate the joint distribution of equity price
indices of numerous countries (Christoffersen et al., 2012).
In the following, consider price indices of different countries as outcome
variables. Further, suppose that the regressors include market and country
variables as well as specifics of the underlying goods. In this context, the
MDR estimator provides two appealing features. First, we can account for
the apparent nonlinear dependencies and the asymmetric tails by including
a potentially large number of regressors. In addition, the coefficients are
allowed to vary across the distribution of prices, which introduces further
flexibility and ensures that the CDF is well approximated. Second, consid-
ering treatment effects of price shocks, counterfactual correlation matrices
could be defined. This abstract exercise could compare the CDF and its
implied correlations in the presence or absence of an economic shock. Thus,
correlation patterns may differ depending on whether the shock affects the
industry, the country or global markets. Examples of shocks on asset prices
include the great recession, monetary policy decisions or non-financial
shocks as the COVID-19 pandemic. The MDR estimator may contribute to
the literature on the great recession as it improves upon copula approaches
since the latter are likely to be misspecified (Zimmer, 2012). Alessi and
Kerssenfischer (2019) show that large-scale dynamic factor models are able
to indentify monetary policy shocks, once the regression includes many
observables. As MDR allows for the inclusion of large number of covariates,
the model fits well into this framework and represents an alternative to
existing approaches. Finally, Caballero and Simsek (2020) find that COVID-
19 reduced asset prices through different channels. In this setting, MDR
could show how the raising pandemic in one region affects the price indices
2020).
1.3. ASYMPTOTIC THEORY 9
of another region. Rodriguez (2007) analyzed financial contagion using
copula models. Replicating the same study using MDR may contribute by




This section introduces and discusses the assumptions on the underlying
data and the model. Let FYi|Xi(t|Xi) be the multivariate CDF of the d-
dimensional response vector Yi = (Y1,i, .., Yd,i), where t ∈ T = Rd is a
vector of thresholds and Xi is a set of K regressors.
Assumption 1.Data The data Yi, Xi is i.i.d with bounded support.




where β(t) is a K × 1 function-valued coefficient vector and P(Xi) is a 1 × Kp
matrix of regressors. The link function Λ is assumed to be either a linear, probit,
logistic, complementary log-log or cauchit function. Let β0(t) denote the true
parameters.
Assumption 1 is standard for DR models. Note that Assumption 1 can be
relaxed as consistency and convergence of Z-estimators are more general
(e.g. Kosorok, 2008, p. 246). The model introduced in assumption 2 is
semi-parametric in the sense that it requires a parametric link function
while allowing the coefficients to vary flexibly with the thresholds. The
choice of the link function should be viewed in the light of two arguments.
First, in the absence of covariates, the link function does not affect the
results and the model generalizes to the non-parametric estimate of the
empirical distribution function. Second, if P(Xi) is rich enough, the CDF is
approximated arbitrarily well and the parametric form of the link function
is irrelevant too.9 Additional remarks should be made with respect to
assumption 2. First, the estimator for β0(t) defined in equation (1.3.1) is
9Following the argument in Chernozhukov et al. (2013, p. 2217), let P(X) consist of




∈ L2(X , P)
and λ(z) = ∂Λ(z)∂z is bounded above by λ̄. Define the squared misspecification
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a Z-estimator and can be interpreted as a pseudo maximum likelihood
estimator because it provides the best approximation of the CDF given a
specific link function. Second, the model in equation (1.3.1) may be mis-
specified, yet consistent results can still be obtained under mild regularity
conditions (see Theorem 2 in Wald, 1949; White, 1982) as the estimator sets
in a pseudo MLE framework. Third, P(·) indicates that the model allows
for the inclusion of a wide range of functionals of Xi. In the remainder
of the paper, P(Xi) is denoted by Xi with dimension N × K for simplicity.
Finally, the distribution function equation (1.3.1) does not to be continuous
and the model also captures the discrete outcome variables.10
The objective function is defined as an approximate zero of a function
Ψ(β, t) between two normed spaces. More precisely, Ψ(β, t) : M× Θ 7→ Θ
where M is an open set containing T and Θ = RdK is the parameter space
which contains β. I define the corresponding norms to be Euclidean norm
|| · || and the infinity norm || · ||∞. By Assumption 1 and since the binary
regressions are based on MLE, Ψ(β, t) = Pψβ,t, where P is the probability




















where λ(·) denotes the derivative of Λ(·). Accordingly, let Ψn(β, t) =
Pnψβ,t be the sample estimator, where Pn is the empirical measure. The
subsequent assumption is concerned with the properties of Ψ(β, t) itself.
Then, assumption 4 introduces the requirements for the bootstrap to be a
valid tool to do inference.
Assumption 3.Identifiability At the true values β0 ∈ Θ, Ψ(β0, t) = 0. Further,
assume that both, Ψ(β0, t) and Ψ(β, t) : M× Θ 7→ Θ are one-to-one maps.
Assumption 4.Bootstrap Let β̂n be an approximate zero of Ψn and β̂◦n be a mini-
mizer of supt∈T |Ψ◦n(β, t)| where Ψ◦n(β, t) = P◦nψβ,t, and P◦n f =
error δp = E
[









Then, it can be shown that δp → 0 as p grows. Thus,
E
[





FYi |Xi (t|X)− Λ(P(X)
′β(t))
]′
≤ λ̄δp → 0 by weak
concavity of Λ.
10To see this, suppose that the true CDF FYi |Xi (t|Xi) is discrete or mixed. As the approx-
imation is done pointwise at the thresholds t, discrete or mixed outcomes can easily be
handled by the binary regressions. In this case, estimating the model in equation (1.3.1)
reveals several times the same coefficient vector. This is equivalent to estimating the model
at a finite number of thresholds. Thus, the coefficient vector is consistently estimated and
jointly normally distributed with known variance.




f (Xi) denotes the non-parametric or multiplier bootstrap where ξ̄ =
n−1 ∑ni=1 ξi. Assume that ξ1, ..., ξn are i.i.d positive weights with 0 < µ =
Eξ1 < ∞. In the case of the multiplier bootstrap, additionally assume that
0 < τ = var(ξ1) < ∞ and ||ξ1||2,1 < ∞.
Assumption 3 requires the objective function to be zero only at the true
values β0(t). Thus, assumption 3 ensures that the true parameters are
identified. Note that the condition on the maps being one-to-one is stronger
than what is needed (Kosorok, 2008, p. 244), however, the assumption
simplifies the proofs. In most cases, assumption 3 is seen as a technical
requirement which is likely to be met.
With respect to assumption 4, two comments should be made. First,
theoretically, the only requirement is that the bootstrapped estimator is an
approximate zero of the bootstrapped estimating equation. This allows
for numerous forms of bootstraps. The multiplier bootstrap and non-
parametric bootstrap with multinomial weights are shown to provide valid
results as they capture two important cases in practice. Second, as Ψ(·)
can be shown to be strong Glivenko-Cantelli, other designs such as the
exchangeable bootstrap would be applicable too.
Before addressing uniform convergence of MDR, note that pointwise
convergence is established by the means of maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE). To see this, note that the model in equation (1.3.1) is estimated
as single regressions at every entry of t. For a given t, yi(t) = 1(Y1,i ≤
t1, ..., Yd,i ≤ td) is regressed on Xi, for instance using a probit model. Thus,
at a finite number of t, maximum likelihood estimation ensures that β0(t)
is consistently estimated. Further, the estimator of β0(t) is
√
n-consistent
and asymptotically normally distributed with a known expression for the
variance which only depends on the chosen link function. Finally, note
that a finite number of MDR estimators at a finite number of thresholds
are jointly normally distributed. Yet, in contrast to Foresi and Peracchi
(1995) and following Chernozhukov et al. (2013), the asymptotic theory of
this paper aims at establishing the convergence of the continuum of these
binary regressions.
Note that no additional assumptions are needed to establish the con-
sistent estimation of counterfactual distributions. Assumptions 1 to 3 are
sufficient for the application of the functional delta method on βn(t). Simi-
larly, other functionals of the multivariate CDF such as averages, quantile
functions or variance-covariance matrices will be consistently estimated.
Corollary 1 in the following section establishes the applicability of the func-
tional delta method, section 1.3.3 then builds on this result and formally
introduces the counterfactual framework.
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1.3.2 Results
Based on the assumptions in the previous section, this section presents
the main theoretical results. First, Theorem 1 establishes consistency, con-
vergence, asymptotic normality and equicontinuity of the MDR estimator.
Thereafter, Theorem 2 is concerned with the validity of the bootstrap. Hav-
ing established the validity of the MDR estimator, Corollary 1 states that
functionals of the estimator are consistently estimated. In particular, this
includes counterfactual distributions in the spirit of Chernozhukov et al.
(2013). The corresponding proofs can be found in Appendix 1.A.
Theorem 1.Asymptotic Distribution Let Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Then, the
MDR estimator β̂n(t) of β0(t) in equation (1.3.1) satisfies
√
n(β̂n(t)− β0(t))⇝
Ψ̇−1β0,tZ, where Z ∈ ℓ
∞(T ) is the tight, mean zero Gaussian limiting distribution
of
√
n(Ψn − Ψ)(β0, t).
Theorem 1 states the main result of the theoretical analysis by establishing
the asymptotic behaviour of the MDR estimator. Remarkably, the proof
of Theorem 1 includes an argument showing that {ψβ,t : ||β(t)− β0(t)|| <
δ, t ∈ T } is a Donsker class. This allows for the application of a wide range
of theoretical results (e.g. see Kosorok, 2008, Chapter 8.4). Further, note
that the proof of Theorem 1 provides sufficient conditions for Ψ̇−1β0,t to be
smooth and invertible at β0(t) such that the asymptotic distribution is well
defined. In particular, β 7→ Ψ(β, t) is shown to be Fréchet-differentiable
which implies Hadamard differentiability.
Corollary 1.Applicability of the Fuctional Delta Method Consider the MDR
estimator of β0(t) defined in equation (1.3.1). Recall, that Ψ(β, t) : Θ 7→ L where
Θ = RdK and the norms of Θ 7→ L are || · || and || · ||L, respectively. As a result
of Theorem 1,
√
n(β̂n(t)− β0(t)) ⇝ Ψ̇−1β0,tZ with Z ∈ ℓ
∞(T ) being the tight
process. Let ϕ : Θϕ ⊂ Θ 7→ L. By Theorem 2.8 in Kosorok (2008), for any






Z). By Theorem 2.9 in Kosorok (2008), the bootstrap is applies to
ϕ(β̂n(t)).
Corollary 1 establishes that functionals of the estimated CDF are consis-
tently estimated as long as they are Hadamard-differentiable. Further, the
bootstrap is applicable to these functionals too. Note that if ϕ is chosen
to be Ψ, it directly follows that ϕ satisfies the requirements of Corollary 1.
This implication will be useful for the consistency of counterfactual distri-
butions. Whilst it is possible to draw inference based on the asymptotic
variance derived in Theorem 1, the following result establishes the validity
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of the bootstrap. For the practitioner, this may be valuable tool as bootstrap
techniques are flexibly implemented. Theorem 2 establishes the validity of
the multiplier and the multinomial bootstrap.
Theorem 2. Validity of the Bootstrap Let Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Denote
the multiplier or multiplier bootstrapped estimator of β̂n by β̂◦n. Then, the MDR
estimator β̂n(t) of β0(t) in equation (1.3.1) satisfies
√
n(β̂◦n − β̂n)⇝ k0Z, where
Z ∈ ℓ∞(T ) is the tight, mean zero Gaussian limiting distribution of
√
n(Ψn −
Ψ)(β0, t) and k0 = 1 for the multinomial bootstrap and k0 = τµ in the case of the
multiplier bootstrap.
Based on the result in theorem 2, I provide an algorithm to obtain valid
confidence bands for the CDF. Algorithm 1 below is closely related to
algorithm 1 in Chernozhukov et al. (2019) and outlines how confidence
bands can be obtained in applied settings.
Algorithm 1.Confidence Bands for joint CDF
1. Draw many bootstrap samples of the data indexed by j = 1, ..., B. Use
either the multinomial or multiplier bootstrap as outlined in theorem
2.
2. For each draw, obtain an estimate of the joint CDF F̂jYi|Xi(t|Xi).
3. For each t ∈ T , compute the robust standard errors by
ŝ(t) = (Q̂(.75, t)− Q̂(.25, t))/(Φ−1(.75)− Φ−1(.25)),
where Q̂(α, t) is the empirical α-quantile of the bootstrap sample of
the CDF F̂jYi|Xi(t|Xi) at t. Φ
−1 denotes the inverse of the standard
normal distribution.
4. Define the critical value to be







where F̂Yi|Xi(t|Xi) denotes the point estimate of the CDF at t.








To draw uniform inference on functionals of the estimated CDF, I propose
to use an analogue procedure as outlined in algorithm 3 in Chernozhukov
et al. (2013).
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1.3.3 Counterfactual Distributions
This section formalizes the framework outlined in section 1.2 and builds
on the previously derived results. Counterfactual distributions provide a
flexible and tractable tool to analyze how regressors affect the joint distri-
butions of the outcomes. While it is feasible to draw conclusions based on
the estimated coefficients in (1.3.1), yet, they depend on the link function
which complicates the interpretation. Instead, counterfactual distributions
directly connect to potential changes of the multivariate CDF. As outlined
in Chernozhukov et al. (2013, section 2.2), there are three types of coun-
terfactuals: (i) one can either modify the covariate distribution, (ii) the
conditional distribution or (iii) both. This is done by using the conditional
distribution of subgroup I, FYI |XI (t|X) which is modelled by (1.3.1), and
integrating it over the covariate distribution of subgroup J, FXJ (X). Thus,
FY⟨I|J⟩(t) represents the conditional distribution of subgroup I assuming




FYI |XI (t|X)dFXJ (X). (1.3.3)
Crucially, it has to hold that XJ ⊆ XI , i.e. the support of covariates for
subgroup J includes the support of covariates for subgroup I. First, con-
sider modifications of the covariate distribution. In the simplest case, one
may abstract from different subgroups and only be interested in a unit
change of a specific covariate. In this context, the assumption on the com-
mon support can be dropped because the conditional CDF in (1.3.3) is
integrated over all observation. Similarly, an empirical approach could
focus on the causal effect of a binary treatment Di where Xi,Di=0 and Xi,Di=1
represent the accordingly modified covariate matrices. Using equation
(1.3.3), the CDF FY⟨·|D=0⟩(t) =
∫
X FY|X(t|X)dFXi,Di=0(X) can be interpreted
as the distribution conditional on nobody being treated. Note that the
symbol · refers to the fact that the conditional distribution has not been
altered. Conditional on Xi, suppose that D is randomly assigned.11 Then,
the difference of the counterfactual CDF’s, FY⟨·|D=0⟩(t)− FY⟨·|D=1⟩(t), has a
causal interpretation.
Next, consider changing the covariate distribution, i.e. the second type
of counterfactuals. In practice, one takes the estimated coefficients for
subgroup I and the covariate distribution of subgroup J and plug them into
the model derived in equation (1.3.1). Intuitively, this answers ”How would
11Formally, this is Di|Xi ⊥ A where ⊥ denotes independence and A is an indicator for
being assigned to the treatment.
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the CDF of subgroup J look like if the regressors had the same effects as for
subgroup J?” In every of these cases, the counterfactual CDF is a functional







dFXJ (X). If Λ [·] is is Hadamard-differentiable and Xi
has bounded support, then
∫
XJ Λ [·] dFXJ (X) satisfies the requirements of
Corollary 1. The condition on the support of Xi is met by assumption 1.
Further, Hadamard-differentiability of the link functions in assumption
2 is shown to hold in the Proof of Theorem 1.12 Thus, counterfactual
distributions are consistently estimated by the sample analogue of equation
(1.3.3) and the bootstrap is a valid tool to do inference.
1.3.4 Testing
This section outlines a testing framework to serve three purposes. First, one
may be interested in whether the effect of a specific covariate is constant
across all thresholds t ∈ Rd. More precisely, this amounts to testing the
null hypothesis H0 : β̂ j(t) = β̂ j(Q50(Y)) against H1 : β̂ j(t) ̸= β̂ j(Q50(Y)),
where j identifies the regressor Xj and β̂ j(Q50(Y)) denotes the coefficient
on Xj at the median of all outcomes Y, Q50(Y). Of course, other refer-
ence values than the median can be chosen. Second and with respect to
counterfactual distributions, it is natural to test whether multiple CDFs
are sufficiently different. While it is possible to test multivariate CDFs, I
propose to directly test the marginal CDF’s of the outcome. As argued by
Fermanian (2005), all approaches to test the former entail certain drawbacks.
In most cases, they require a distributional assumption. Instead, it is valid
to test the marginal CDF’s as these are consistently estimated. This type of
tests may be executed by the well known two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Third and in the same spirit, one may directly target summary statis-
tics of multivariate distributions such as averages, variances or correlations.
Having established that these statistics are consistently estimated, they
can be tested using t-test over bootstrap draws again in the spirit of a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
As outlined in Chernozhukov and Fernández-Val (2005), these Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov tests rely on bootstrap draws to form the corresponding
test statistics. To illustrate the procedure, I outline the first type of the
aforementioned tests in the following. Denote the test statistic for the point
estimates at threshold t by T(t) and the corresponding statistic of each
12Note that the proof of Theorem 1 includes showing that the listed link func-
tions are Fréchet-differentiable which is an even stronger statement than Hadamard-
differentiability.
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bootstrap draw by Tb(t). To test whether the coefficient β̂n,j of variable Xj
is constant across the distribution, I make use of the test statistics T(t) in
equation (1.3.4). Note that the bootstrapped statistic in equation (1.3.5) is




∣∣β̂ j(t)− β̂ j(Q50(Y))∣∣





∣∣β̂b,j(t)− β̂b,j(Q50(Y))− (β̂ j(t)− β̂ j(Q50(Y)))∣∣
s.e.(β̂b,j(t)− β̂b,j(Q50(Y))
, (1.3.5)
where N denotes the number of observations M is the number of observa-
tions for each draw from the bootstrap. Note that M does not need to de-
viate from N. Further, define T⋆ = max
t∈Rd
T(t) and T⋆b = max
t∈Rd
Tb(t). Finally,
the p-value is computed as the number of cases in which the bootstrapped
statistic is larger than the one of the point estimates: 1B ∑
B
b=1 I(T
⋆ ≤ T⋆b ),
where B is the number of bootstrap replications.
1.4 Simulations
The simulation study compares the MDR estimator to comparable copula
models. For this, it suffices to take the simplest case of a bivariate distri-
bution of outcomes where only the covariance depends on an observable
regressor. Denote the outcomes by Y1 and Y2 and the regressor by X. I will
assume the outcomes to be standard normally distributed with the covari-
ance 2 · Φ(X′β)− 1. Without loss of generality, I will assume β = 2.13 Note
that in general the distribution of X is unrestricted. In the following, I will
consider the case of X ∼ N(0, 1) as this produces approximately uniformly








1 2 · Φ(2x)− 1
2 · Φ(2x)− 1 1
))
.
The resulting process will be estimated in R (R Core Team, 2020) using
10’000 replications and three different data sizes with 100, 1’000 and 10’000
observations respectively. Including only a constant, the MDR estimator
should provide similar results to a unconditional copula model. Thus, this
13Only β = 0 would affect the results as then X would be irrelevant.
14In Appendix 1.B, I consider a case where the correlations have higher probability to
lie at -1 or 1. Then, MDR is clearly outperforming the copula models.
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section compares the performances of a correctly specified copula model
and the simplified MDR estimator. Moving on towards conditional models,
a nonparametric as well as a parametric copula model are estimated and
compared to the MDR estimator, all using just X and an intercept as regres-
sors. Both copula models are specified in Derumigny and Fermanian (2017)
and implemented in the R package CondCopulas (Derumigny, 2020).15 For
the nonparametric estimation, a Gaussian kernel is used and the bandwidth
is chosen to be .35. For the conditional copula model, the corresponding
value is .175.16 The performances are evaluated using an integrated mean















where C is the number of cells which is used to estimate the CDF, N is
the number of observations in a cell j, F̂Y|X(t|X)i,j is estimated CDF of
Y for one observation at threshold t given X in cell j and FY|X(t|X)j is
the average true value of the corresponding CDF in cell j. At threshold
t, the CDF is a Bernoulli ranodon variable with variance p(1 − p), i.e.
FY|X(t|X)j(1 − FY|X(t|X)j). I divide the MSE by the variance to rescale the
deviations at the limits of the CDF. At these limits, the estimated CDF will be
close to zero or one regardless which estimator is chosen. Thus, dividing by
a large variance at the limits I scale the errors to be comparable.17 Assuming
that the true value is constant in each cell, the IMSE can be decomposed
in a variance and bias term for each cell. Then, I will take the average
over all cells to compare the performances. In the following, all copula
models are correctly specified by assuming a normal copula. In contrast,
the MDR estimator does not require such an assumption. Appendix 1.B.1
provides simulation results where the copulas are misspecified. Further,
the accuracy of the MDR estimator can improved by considering a richer
P(X). The corresponding results are included in Appendix 1.B.2.18 For the
15The nonparametric estimator is defined on page 158 above equation (4) whereas
the parametric estimator θ̂ is specified on page 163. Further, note that the latter is not
parametric in the strict sense as the estimation involves kernel smoothing.
16Note that there are no theoretical justification for the choice of the bandwidths. In the
current setting, a simulation exercise which can be found in Appendix 1.B.3 suggests that
for most bandwidths, the accuracy is about constant.
17Dividing by the variance of the estimator amounts to be an advantage for copula
models. The distributional assumption of the copula models improves the accuracy at
the tails which is where the mentioned division matters most. Table 1.4 in Appendix 1.B
provides the results of Table 1.1 without dividing by the variance.
18Note that to capture the advantage of a rich set of covariates, the data generating
processes Y1 and Y2 are too simplistic. Still, there is an improvement if the data size is
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MDR estimator I use a grid of 25× 25 thresholds, the nonparametric copula
estimator employs a grid of 25 × 25 pseudo observations and both copula
models predict the CDF based on a grid of 25 × 25 values.19 The results of
the simulation study are presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: IMSE for Copula and DR models
Obs. Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100 IMSE 323.3603 267.5490 1505.5859 104.0488 115.8119
IVAR 0.0006 0.0011 0.0388 0.0012 0.0083
IBIAS 323.3597 267.5479 1505.5471 104.0476 115.8037
1000 IMSE 9.9369 7.8331 0.4628 0.5062 0.2353
IVAR 0.0009 0.0040 0.0179 0.0156 0.0151
IBIAS 9.9361 7.8291 0.4449 0.4906 0.2203
10000 IMSE 0.0433 0.0530 0.0318 0.0297 0.0286
IVAR 0.0010 0.0025 0.0273 0.0292 0.0194
IBIAS 0.0422 0.0505 0.0045 0.0005 0.0092
Notes: The values represent averages over 10’000 replications. (1): Unconditional Normal
Copula Model, (2): MDR including only a constant, (3): Nonparametric Copula Model, (4):
Parametric Normal Copula Model, (5): MDR. The statistics are averages over the 25 × 25
cells.
Naturally, the average IMSE is higher for the unconditional models in
columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.1 as they disregard the importance of X.
Nevertheless, the MDR estimator in (2) slightly outperforms the correctly
specified and unconditional copula model. The assumption on the copula
only pays off with a large dataset, where the copula model performs better.
For samples up to 1’000 observations, the DR model in column (5) is clearly
outperforming the other conditional models in (3) and (4). In the limit,
all three models produce an equal fit to the data. However, Table 1.5 in
Appendix 1.B shows that under misspecification, the IMSE increases for
the copula models up to a factor 12. For all models, the IMSE is decreasing
with the size of the data. Mainly, because the average bias over the cells
decreases as the estimation is more precise. In contrast, the average variance
has no clear trend. Overall, Table 1.1 indicates that in small samples the
MDR models outperform the copula models. Considering large data, the
choice of the model is less important.
fairly large.
19Note that the performance only marginally improves by considering a finer grid
compared to this specification. Due to the distributional assumptions, the copula model
do not require a comparably fine grid as the MDR estimator.
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1.5 Application to Household Labor Supply
The division of labor within households has been studied for a long time
(e.g. Bianchi et al., 2000; Fuwa, 2004; Shelton and John, 1996) and relates
to intra-household decision making (e.g. Ashraf, 2009). The traditionally
asymmetric distribution of labor supply may depend on childbirth (Kleven
et al., 2019), tax incentives (Borella et al., 2019), norms (Evertsson, 2014),
education, bargaining power (Moeeni, 2019) as well as other factors. I will
consider the labor supply adjustments of households in response to one
spouse newly receiving DIB. Due to this shock, the incentives to supply
labor change in opposite ways for the spouses. Due to disability, individu-
als may no longer be able to work full-time, which reduces working hours.
Generally, receiving DI payments reduces the incentives to earn income
for the handicapped (Autor et al., 2016; Leisibach et al., 2018; Marie and
Castello, 2012). In the same spirit, losing disability insurance (DI) eligibility
and the corresponding payments increase household earnings (Deshpande,
2016). However, Autor et al. (2019) find no reduction in income for the
disabled but a significant increase in spousal labor supply. Likely, the latter
response intends to secure the economic stability of the household. Lee
(2020) finds substantially lower labor supply responses, mainly because
spouses spend many hours taking care of their disabled partners. Note
that I do not intend to comprehensively analyze the socio-economic circum-
stances driving labor supply; the application rather analyzes a shift in the
division of labor.
I argue that MDR identifies the causal effect of newly receiving DIB
for three reasons. First, I control for potential confounders by including
age, gender, education, health indicators and children as regressors into
the model. The amount of DIB is correlated with these socio-demographic
factors. Thus, including these variables is crucial for the identification of the
treatment effect. In a similar setting, French and Song (2014) find that once
covariates are included, the difference between ordinary least square and
instrumental variable estimates is negligible. Second, it rarely happens that
both partners are hit by the shock.20 This ensures that the treatment effect
is not jeopardized by a common shock on both spouses. Third, institutional
features introduce considerable randomness into the process determin-
ing who will receive payments. A law passed in 2012 assigns the claims
randomly to the authorized institutions, similar to the Norwegian setting
(Autor et al., 2019; Dahl et al., 2014).21 Generally, the physicians granting
20In particular, receiving DIB is uncorrelated within households (correlation of 0.057).
21The Article 72 of the IVV (Verordnung über die Invalidenversicherung) instructs the
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the DI requests differ substantially with respect to their leniency (Barth et
al., 2017). In fact, for Switzerland, the average approval rate of DI claims
ranges from 22% to 58% depending on the advisory institution.22 Conse-
quently, this law introduces further exogenous variation into the process.
Further, the decision of the DI offices regarding eligibility usually takes a
long time. Thus, the exact moment of receiving money is unanticipated,
even in terms of years.23 Due to these institutional factors, individuals can
hardly anticipate whether and when their DI request is approved. Taking
together these arguments, the treatment is likely to be randomly assigned
once controlled for covariates. Therefore, as outlined in section 1.3.3, the
comparison of counterfactual distributions has a causal interpretation. In
what follows, I will apply the derived methods to the bivariate distribution
of labor income of the two main earners in the household.
1.5.1 Data
I will use annual survey data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) from
2004 to 2018. The data contains a sample of roughly 1,500 households with
two or more individuals per year and incorporates individual-level infor-
mation on socio-demographics, health indicators, working hours, income as
well as social security benefits. Individuals can be matched to households
and vice versa. For the purpose of this analysis, I only keep individuals
between 18 and 65 years living in households of two or more persons.24
Further, I only keep the two biggest contributors to the household’s aggre-
gate income.25 Ranking the individuals by their aggregate income provides
officials opening a request to randomly assign the case to one of 29 advisory institutions.
These institutions have to meet requirements of the case such as employing physicians
speaking the language of the request or having the demanded physician specialty. Teams
of social workers, physicians, lawyers and administrative personnel will then coordinate
decisions on DI claims.
22The weighted average of the approval rate is 44% (BSV, 2014). These are the latest
statistics for 11 of the 29 advisory institutions. Note that several institutions do not publish
those statistics, despite they are obliged to.
23Individuals are eligible to receive DIB if they have been unable to work more than
60% of a 42-hours week over the course of one year. The eligibility starts six months
after the completion of this year. However, several reasons may extend this waiting time.
For instance, individuals working 30 consecutive days lose their eligibility. Note that
individuals have to submit a claim to get payments, there is no automatic process to kick
off the process.
24Note that single households may respond differently, however, the focus lies on the
common response within households.
25Aggregate income is defined as the sum of labor income, private pension income,
retirement pension, unemployment benefits, disability benefits and welfare benefits.
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the opportunity to separately analyze whether the response is different
depending on who bears the shock. For the remainder of this section, I
will refer to these two individuals as main earner and second earner. On
average, the main earner gains 104’143 CHF per year. The second earners
contribute considerably less (41’063 CHF). Overall, a fraction of 1.9% of all
main earners receive DIB. If so, individuals receive on average 17’247 CHF
of DI payments. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 as well as Figure 1.3 in Appendix 1.C
provide a detailed description of the variables and a plot of the marginal
distributions of labor income, respectively.
1.5.2 Model
As labor supply may depend on a long list of factors. Thus, it is crucial
to include demographic variables in the distribution regression model.
Similarly, individual labor supply may be constrained by poor labor market
positions for older or low skilled individuals. Probably, households with
children or located far from city centers have fewer options to increase
their labor supply. Hence, X includes the following regressors: gender, age,
education, self-rated health status, number of days in the hospital over the
last 12 months, an indicator for chronic diseases, the number of children
living in the household, an indicator for living in a center or suburban
area and a treatment indicator for receiving DI benefits.26 Apart from the
number of children and the residence indicator, the variables vary across
spouses.
The household’s response likely depends on the amount of DIB. To
account for this, I define three different treatments by two equal splits in
the distribution of DIB. Specifically, the treatments are newly receiving (i)
less than 12’000 CHF, (ii) between 12’000 CHF and 24’000 CHF and (iii)
above 24’000 CHF for the main earner.27 As a results, I will include three
different treatment dummy variables, T1, T2, T3, in the regression model.
Importantly, these dummies only switches to one (and remains one) if an
individual newly starts to receive DIB. Subsequently, I will refer to these
treatments as receiving low, average or high DIB. Using these treatment
dummies, one can define four counterfactual distributions to evaluate how
DI benefits affect the bivariate distribution of labor income. In particular,
the covariate matrix is modified to have either all entries of a treatment
26Education is measured in years and income is measured in CHF. Unfortunately, the
data contains a lot of missings with respect to the health variables. Leaving out these
covariates almost doubles the number of observations up to 43’637. Table 1.12 shows that
the results do not crucially depend on these variables.
27The corresponding values for the second earner are 13’100 CHF and 23’800 CHF.
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dummy equal to zero or one. By only varying the covariate distribution and
leaving the conditional distribution constant, the resulting counterfactuals





where T takes on a value between 0 or 3 referring to no, low, average or high
DIB. Note that the support condition is trivially fulfilled as only a binary
variable is modified. The comparison of the counterfactuals and their
implied characteristics may be viewed as a ceteris paribus change of the
treatment. In what follows, I will focus on the treatment of the main earner,
arguably the most substantial shock to the household.28 In particular, it
is constructive to look at the conditional quantile function of the second
earner, provided that the main earner is at a specific quantile of labor
earnings. Formally, the CDF of the second earner at the median of the main




the left inverse of this CDF yields the conditional quantile function. I use
the logistic link function and a grid of 25 × 25 thresholds as a benchmark.
1.5.3 Results
Table 1.2 presents a summary of the average treatment effects. These aver-
ages are directly implied by the CDFs presented in Figure 1.2 in Appendix
1.C. The main earner entering DIB reduces both, the main earner’s and
the second earner’s income. The magnitude of the effects is sizeable: A
reduction in labor income up to 68’341 CHF for the main earner and up to
15’591 CHF for the second earner. Considering the main earner, this result
confirms existing findings for Spain and the US (Autor et al., 2016; Gelber
et al., 2017; Marie and Castello, 2012). Note that the estimates in Table 1.2
do not directly translate to elasticities of labor supply as the treatment does
not reflect a marginal change. Further, the average effects show that second
earners do not compensate for the loss in household income as suggested
in Autor et al. (2019). Possibly, instead of raising labor supply, second
earners spend an increased amount of time taking care of their spouses
(Lee, 2020). Another explanation could be that the average household is
well insured by the social security system and thus no compensation is
needed. In either case, average effects are potentially misleading as DIB
may be of greater importance for low-income individuals. To see this, note
28The corresponding results regarding the treatment of the second earner as well as
various robustness checks can be found in Appendix 1.C.
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Table 1.2: Disability Main Earner, Average Treatment Effects
No DIB Low DIB Avg DIB High DIB
(CHF) (∆ CHF) (∆ CHF) (∆ CHF)
ME: Mean 98748 -11969⋆ -68341⋆ -63276⋆
(831) (16069) (3897) (10116)
ME: SD 55214 26607⋆ -22037⋆ -19275⋆
(1590) (25424) (4920) (6878)
SE: Mean 39156 -66 -15020⋆ -15591⋆
(633) (7408) (3703) (5397)
SE: SD 33322 6079 -7433⋆ -5433⋆
(458) (9286) (2694) (2810)
Corr 0.361 0.26 -0.737⋆ -0.486⋆
(0.017) (0.403) (0.239) (0.514)
Notes: N = 21’943. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. The stars represent
significance on the 5%-level. The standard errors have been estimated using a clustered
bootstrap technique with replacement and 500 draws. Apart from the correlation, the
values represent amounts in CHF.
that in Switzerland DI benefits depend on previous income only up to a
degree (Leisibach et al., 2018, figure on p. 49). Figure 1.4 in Appendix
1.C presents the treatment effects across the distribution of labor income.
Remarkably, the absolute treatment effects are close to being constant across
the univariate income distribution of main and second earners. Thus, in rel-
ative terms, low-income individuals face a substantially higher reduction of
labor income. Finally, we take the correlation between the main and second
earners income as a simplistic measure of the dependence structure. Table
1.2 indicates that the latter changes substantially across the counterfactual
distributions. Mainly, this change is explained by the large drop of the
main earner’s income for recipients of above-average DIB.
Digging deeper into the behaviour of second earners, Figure 1.1 presents the
quantile function of the second earners, conditional on the main earner’s
quantile of labor income. For most second earners, the quantile function is
shifted to the right, which reflects a negative impact on labor income. How-
ever, the left panel of Figure 1.1 suggests that the partners of low-income
main earners extend their labor supply in response to the treatment. In
particular, this is true for households who receive the lowest amounts of
DIB because the dark blue quantile function (low DIB) is well above the
black line (no DIB). Likely, the low payments do not cover the financial loss
incurred by the shock. Thus, second earners increase their labor supply to
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Figure 1.1: Quantile Function Second Earner































(a) Quantile ME: 0.1































(b) Quantile ME: 0.5































(c) Quantile ME: 0.9
Notes: N = 21’943. All panels present conditional quantile functions of the second earner
depending on how the main earner is treated. The dotted lines represent uniform 95%-
Confidence bands computed according to Algorithm 1 in Chernozhukov et al. (2019).
secure the financial stability of the household. Spouses of average or high-
income individuals respond differently. Presumably, these households own
sufficient assets to bear the shock without having to work more hours. The
middle and right panel of Figure 1.1 indicate that this relationship holds
irrespective of benefit size. As suggested by Lee (2020), it could be that
spouses take care of their disabled partners and the household and thus
reduce their labor supply. Taking together, only spouses of low-income
earners that receive little DIB seem to respond as suggested by Autor et al.
(2019). Considering all the evidence, the present application confirms pre-
vious findings and contributes to the literature with two insights: Spouses
labor supply response crucially depends on (i) the main earner’s income
and (ii) on the amount of received DIB. Further, the results relate to the
on-going debate on how the poor are exposed to economic shocks and the
marginal propensity to consume (e.g. Blundell et al., 2016; Kaplan et al.,
2020; Misra and Surico, 2014).
1.6 Conclusion
The present paper introduces a novel tool to analyze the multivariate
distribution of outcomes. Compared to similar approaches in the literature,
the practical advantages of MDR are threefold. First, there is no necessity
to parametrically specify marginal distributions or dependence structures.
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This constitutes a major advantage to copula models, which have been
widely used to estimate multivariate distributions. In the case of MDR, I
show that the assumption on the link function has a negligible effect on
the results. MDR thus substantially lowers the risk of misspecification
and the ensuing errors. Second, in terms of accuracy, MDR performs
slightly better than the copula models. Third, MDR provides a natural
framework to study how regressors affect the distribution of outcomes.
Making use of counterfactual theory, treatment effects may be defined in a
flexible manner. As suggested in section 1.2, this is potentially beneficial
to study the dynamics of equity prices or the allocation of labor within
households. Finally, the application in section 1.5 illustrates that MDR is
able to deepen established findings by analyzing specific quantiles of the
outcome distribution.
The framework of MDR offers various avenues for future research.
For instance, the theoretical results in section 1.3 rely on the simplifying
assumption of i.i.d. data. Note that the results could be strengthened as
the corresponding theorems in Kosorok (2008) hold in more general cases.
There are several additional challenges which could be incorporated into
MDR models. For example, future research may tackle the endogeneity of
the regressors. Further, one could extend the sample selection setting of
univariate DR (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) to the multivariate case. Finally,
fixed effects similar to the model in Chernozhukov et al. (2018) could be
included.
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1.A Theoretical Results
1.A.1 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
The proof of theorems 1 and 2 relies on the master theorem for Z-estimators
outlined in Kosorok (2008, p. 247, theorem 13.4). Note that both theorems
are direct consequences of the following six conditions of the master theo-
rem. Thus, it suffices to verify that the conditions hold. In the following,
denote the parameter space by Θ = RdK . In general, Ψ(β, t) maps to a space
L with norm || · ||L. In the case of MDR, I will consider the infinity norm for
space L. Further, let β̂n be an approximate zero of Ψn and β̂◦n be a minimizer






denotes the non-parametric or multiplier bootstrap where ξ̄ = n−1 ∑ni=1 ξi.
In the following, (...|Xn) states that we condition on the data. By Assump-
tion 1, Ψ(β, t) = Pψβ,t, where P is the probability measure and ψβ,t is the




















where λ(·) denotes the derivative of Λ(·) and yi(t) = 1(Y1,i ≤ t1, ..., Yd,i ≤
td). Thus Ψ(β, t) can be derived by integrating over the probability measure,
i.e.














β 7→ Ψ(β, t) satisfies ||Ψ(βn, t)||L → 0 implies ||βn(t)− β0(t)|| → 0 for any
{βn(t)} ∈ Θ.
Condition 2.Glivenko-Cantelli
{ψβ,t; β ∈ Θ, t ∈ T } is P-Glivenko-Cantelli.
Condition 3.Donsker Class
Fδ in Fδ ≡ {ψβ,t : ||β(t)− β0(t)|| < δ, t ∈ T } is P-Donsker for some δ > 0.
Condition 4.Equicontinuity
supt∈T P(ψβ,t − ψβ0,t)2 → 0, as β(t) → β0(t).
Condition 5.Approximate Zeros
||Ψn(β̂n, t)||L = oP(n−1/2) and P
(√
n||Ψ◦n(β̂◦n, t)||L > η|Xn
)
= oP(1) for
every η > 0.
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Condition 6.Smoothness and Invertibility of the Derivative
β 7→ Ψ(β, t) is Fréchet-differentiable at β0(t) with continuously invertible deriva-
tive Ψ̇β0,t.
Proof. Condition 1. Using the infinity norm, identifiability is given by
the fact that ||Ψ(β, t)||∞ → 0 implies that Λ [P(Xi)′βt] → FY|X(t) which is
||βn − β0||∞ → 0. Condition 2 and 3. I verify that {ψβ,t : ||β(t)− β0(t)|| <
δ, t ∈ T } is P-Donsker in with the following argument. First, note that
{P(Xq) : q = 1, ..., dx}, F1 = {X′β : β ∈ Rdx} and F2 = {1(Y1,i ≤
t1, ..., Yd,i ≤ td) : t ∈ T } are VC classes of functions. In particular, the multi-
variate indicator functions, F2, are shown to be VC-classes by van der
Vaart and Wellner (1996, example 2.6.1 and 2.10.4). Following the ar-
gument in (see Chernozhukov et al., 2013, p. 2263), G = {(Λ(F1) −
F2) λ[F1]Λ[F1](1−Λ[F1])P(Xq) : q = 1, ..., dx} is a Lipschitz transformation of
VC classes. The Lipschitz coefficient is bounded by const||X|| and envelope
function const||X||. Further, the envelope function is square integrable.
By Example 19.9 in der Vaart (2000), G is Donsker. As any Donsker class
is also Glivenko-Cantelli (Kosorok, 2008, p. 19), condition 2 is fulfilled
too. Condition 4. As β → β0, Λ(β) → Λ(β0) and λ(β) → λ(β0) for all
t ∈ T . Thus, supt∈T P(ψβ,t − ψβ0,t)2 → 0. Condition 5. Again, using the
infinity norm, the sample analogue of equation (1.A.2) can be shown to
converge to 0 almost surely. To see this, note that




] a.s.−→ yi(t) as n → ∞. As ψβ,t is Donsker and thus
Glivenko-Cantelli, theorem 10.13 part (viii) in Kosorok (2008, p. 187) yields
that P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ∑ni=1 ξiξ̄ ψβ̂◦n,t∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ > η|Xn) a.s.−→ 0 which is equivalent to the de-
sired statement in the second part of the condition.29 Condition 6. This
condition is verified by the fact that Ψ(β, t) : M × Θ 7→ Θ meets the
conditions in Lemma E.1 and E.2 in Chernozhukov et al. (2013, p. 2254).
Table 1.3 lists the parametric forms of the link functions introduced in
Assumption 2. Note that ∂
∂(b′,t)Ψ(b, t) = [J(b, t), R(b, t)]. By the dominated




being uniformly bounded on b ∈ Rdx, all these
link functions satisfy this condition (see Chernozhukov et al., 2013, p. 2263).
■
29Note that the definition of the multiplier bootstrap is slightly different than the boot-
strap theorem 10.13, but it does not change the conclusions (Kosorok, 2008, p. 244).
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1.A.2 Explicit Forms of the Link Functions
The following table entails the parametric forms of J(b, t) and R(b, t) for the
link functions introduced in section 1.3. These are defined as ∂
∂(b′,t)Ψ(b, t)
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1.B Simulation
1.B.1 Misspecification
As outlined above, copula models are at risk to be misspecified. Consid-
ering a Gumbel, Frank and Joe copula specification, the same simulation
study as in section 1.4 is performed. The data size is set to 1’000 observa-
tions to get comparable results. For the nonparametric copula estimator,
the CMSE using a Gaussian kernel is compared to same criterion using a
Triangular or Epanechnikov kernel. Apart from the logistic link function,
the MDR estimator is computed using a probit or C-log-log link function.
Note that the choice of the kernel for the nonparametric copula as well as
the choice of the link function for the MDR procedure do not correspond
to a classic misspecification problem. Rather, they serve as robustness
checks. Overall, the results for unconditional copula model and the MDR
estimator are only marginally affected by the respective choices. However,
the MDR estimator clearly provides the best fit. Further, the results in Table
1.5 show that the assumption on the copula itself is important. Apart from
the Frank copula which seems to perform slightly better than the correctly
specified model, misspecification may scale the prediction error up to a
factor of 12. The nonparametric estimator performs worse with Triangular
or Epanechnikov kernels. There, the error may be about 6 times larger than
with the Gaussian kernel.
1.B.2 Scaling P(X)
Considering a richer set of covariates may improve the performance of the
MDR estimator. The data generating process outlined in section 1.4 is too
simplistic to serve as example in this case. Thus, I introduce YS2 which is









1 2 · Φ(2x)− 1
2 · Φ(2x)− 1 1
))
.
It suffices to introduce further non-linearity in X. Any DGP fulfilling this
condition would produce similar results. A grid of 25× 25 threshold is used.
I extend the matrix P(X) by considering indicators for quintiles (model (2)
in Table 1.6) and centiles (3) of X, interaction of those with a linear term ((4)
and (5), respectively) and by additionally adding polynomials up to the
10th degree ((6) and (7)). Table 1.6 provides the estimation results for YS2
considering all different P(X). Overall, the performance may be improved
1.B. SIMULATION 31
by a factor up to 56. Note that in cases with a small number of observations,
large P(X) may overfit and thus provide less accurate results.
1.B.3 Bandwidth Simulation
Using a grid of 15 × 15 values in .01 to .99, the DGP’s defined in section 1.4
are estimated with varying bandwidths. Note that I use two different sets
of bandwidths for the reduced and complex DGP, respectively. Mainly, the
reason is that the CMSE in the case of Y2 is seemingly unaffected by large
changes in the bandwidth. This can be seen in Table 1.7. Depending on the
datasize, a bandwidth between 0.005 and 0.2 yields the best results. Thus, I
chose to use a bandwidth of 0.125 for the models estimated in section 1.4.
Table 1.4: IMSE for Copula and DR models, No Variance Correction
Obs. Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100 IMSE 0.0139 0.0120 0.0049 0.0035 0.0049
100 IVAR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004
100 IBIAS 0.0139 0.0120 0.0046 0.0034 0.0045
1000 IMSE 0.0074 0.0060 0.0025 0.0023 0.0033
1000 IVAR 0.0000 0.0001 0.0021 0.0021 0.0022
1000 IBIAS 0.0074 0.0059 0.0003 0.0002 0.0011
10000 IMSE 0.0035 0.0026 0.0035 0.0038 0.0032
10000 IVAR 0.0001 0.0002 0.0035 0.0038 0.0029
10000 IBIAS 0.0035 0.0023 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003
Notes: The values represent averages over 10’000 replications. (1): Unconditional Normal
Copula Model, (2): MDR including only a constant, (3): Nonparametric Copula Model, (4):
Parametric Normal Copula Model, (5): MDR. The statistics are averages over the 25 × 25
cells.
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Table 1.5: IMSE for Copula and DR models under Misspecification
Model Specification IMSE IVAR IBIAS
Unconditional Copula Model Correctly Specified 41.4469 0.0008 41.4461
Gumbel 45.1472 0.0009 45.1464
Frank 41.7315 0.0008 41.7306
Joe 44.2828 0.0009 44.2819
Parapemtric Copula Model Correctly Specified 3.3107 0.0157 3.2950
Gumbel 40.1012 0.0048 40.0964
Frank 1.6616 0.0186 1.6430
Joe 40.0975 0.0045 40.0930
Non-Parametric Copula Model Gaussian 1.7201 0.0171 1.7030
Triangular 10.1170 0.0241 10.0929
Epanechnikov 8.1835 0.0226 8.1609
Distribution Regression Logit 0.5023 0.0153 0.4870
Probit 0.2103 0.0158 0.1945
Cloglog 0.7792 0.0140 0.7651
Notes: The values represent averages over 1’000 replications. All models are estimated
using 1’000 observations and a grid of 25 × 25 values.
Table 1.6: Scaling P(X)
Obs. Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
100 IMSE 2256.7626 34.6436 129.2788 9386.1790 9374.2562 10980.7354 10973.5831
100 IVAR 0.0830 0.0118 0.0260 0.2215 0.2835 0.3968 0.4748
100 IBIAS 2256.6796 34.6319 129.2528 9385.9575 9373.9727 10980.3386 10973.1083
1000 IMSE 157.4353 4.2129 1.8942 7.4140 4.6762 59.4052 62.9836
1000 IVAR 0.0328 0.0306 0.0517 0.0573 0.0683 0.3034 0.3826
1000 IBIAS 157.4025 4.1823 1.8425 7.3567 4.6079 59.1019 62.6009
10000 IMSE 33.8279 4.3682 5.2847 7.1530 7.0639 0.6019 0.6332
10000 IVAR 0.8384 0.0474 0.1024 0.0938 0.1221 0.4061 0.4413
10000 IBIAS 32.9894 4.3207 5.1823 7.0592 6.9418 0.1958 0.1919
Notes: The values represent averages over 100 replications. P(X) includes the following.
(1): Only a constant and a linear term for X, (2): (1) and indicators for each quintile of X,
(3): (1) and indicators for each centile of X, (4): (2) and all interactions of the quintiles with
a linear term of X, (5): (3) and all interactions of the centiles with a linear term of X, (6): (4)
and polynomials up to the 10th degree, (7): (5) and polynomials up to the 10th degree.
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Table 1.7: Bandwidth Simulation, X ∼ N(0, 1)
Bandwidth Non-Parametric Copula Parametric Copula
Datasize 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
0.05 1070.3448 20.3472 0.0372 20.4180 0.3523 0.0334
0.1 1173.8093 4.3634 0.0363 20.1498 0.1637 0.0328
0.15 836.7580 2.8825 0.0353 16.2091 0.1514 0.0315
0.2 803.0485 0.9678 0.0340 11.3948 0.1690 0.0297
0.25 784.6399 0.0636 0.0326 10.5589 0.2052 0.0277
0.3 739.1424 0.1354 0.0310 10.3940 0.2617 0.0258
0.35 667.7641 0.1515 0.0294 10.4526 0.3354 0.0240
0.4 578.9029 0.1539 0.0278 10.7782 0.4259 0.0225
0.45 77.2748 0.1614 0.0263 10.6378 0.5024 0.0214
0.5 49.4032 0.2882 0.0250 10.3061 0.6284 0.0208
Notes: The values represent averages over 1000 replications.
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1.C Application Results
Table 1.8: Descriptive Statistics, Individuals living in Couples
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Labor Income (CHF) 72603 66587 69004 0 3000000 43,886
Age 45 46 11 18 65 43,886
Number of Years of Education 14 12 3 9 21 43,886
Number of Children in the HH .88 0 1.1 0 8 43,886
Female .49 0 .5 0 1 43,886
Chronic Disease .33 0 .47 0 1 43,886
Self-rated Health (1: well, 5: bad) 1.9 2 .62 1 5 43,886
Hospital Days over the last year .85 0 5.3 0 330 43,886
Living in a Center .53 1 .5 0 1 43,886
Received DI Benefits .019 0 .14 0 1 43,886
Started Receiving DI Benefits .011 0 .11 0 1 43,886
DI Benefits (CHF) if > 0 17587 18000 8727 90 32600 840
Notes: This table only includes observations, for which all variables of both spouses are
non-missing.
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Table 1.9: Differences within Couples
Main Earner Second Earner
Mean SD Mean SD
Labor Income (CHF) 104143 (79067) 41063 (35806)
Age of Individual 46.9 (10.3) 42.9 (11.8)
Number of Years of Education 14.5 (2.95) 13.5 (2.95)
Female .168 (.374) .812 (.39)
Chronic Disease .319 (.466) .336 (.472)
Self-rated Health (1: well, 5: bad) 1.9 (.604) 1.94 (.642)
Hospital Days over the last year .721 (4.68) .969 (5.91)
Received DI Benefits .0159 (.125) .0224 (.148)
Started Receiving DI Benefits .0113 (.106) .0114 (.106)
DI Benefits (CHF) if > 0 17247 (9251) 17829 (8336)
Notes: The number of observations is 21’943. This table only includes observations, for
which all variables of both spouses are non-missing.
Table 1.10: Disability Main Earner, All Statistics
No DIB Low DIB Avg. DIB High DIB
(CHF) (CHF) (CHF) (CHF)
Mean ME 98748 -11969⋆ -68341⋆ -63276⋆
(831) (16069) (3897) (10116)
Median ME 93731 -14692⋆ -51731⋆ -51731⋆
(686) (10664) (8986) (14475)
SD ME 55214 26607⋆ -22037⋆ -19275⋆
(1590) (25424) (4920) (6878)
Mean SE 39156 -66 -15020⋆ -15591⋆
(633) (7408) (3703) (5397)
Median SE 36400 -7812⋆ -16900⋆ -20848⋆
(879) (4832) (7722) (6912)
SD SE 33322 6079 -7433⋆ -5433⋆
(458) (9286) (2694) (2810)
Cov 6.6e+08 1.3e+09⋆ -9.9e+08⋆ -7.9e+08⋆
( 5.0e+07) ( 1.5e+09) ( 1.8e+08) ( 3.2e+08)
Corr 0.361 0.26 -0.737⋆ -0.486⋆
(0.017) (0.403) (0.239) (0.514)
Notes: N = 21’943. The stars represent significance on the 5%-level. The standard errors
are reported in brackets and have been estimated using a bootstrap technique with re-
placement and 500 draws.
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Table 1.11: Disability Second Earner, All Statistics
No DIB Low DIB Avg. DIB High DIB
(CHF) (CHF) (CHF) (CHF)
Mean ME 98748 86780⋆ 30407⋆ 35473⋆
(831) (16081) (3891) (10017)
Median ME 93731 79039⋆ 42000⋆ 42000⋆
(686) (10731) (9083) (14535)
SD ME 55214 81821⋆ 33178⋆ 35940⋆
(1590) (25480) (4477) (6665)
Mean SE 39156 39090⋆ 24136⋆ 23565⋆
(633) (7534) (3811) (5444)
Median SE 36400 28588⋆ 19500⋆ 15552⋆
(879) (4940) (7793) (6866)
SD SE 33322 39401 25888⋆ 27888⋆
(458) (9311) (2678) (2895)
Cov 6.6e+08 2.0e+09⋆ -3.2e+08⋆ -1.3e+08⋆
( 5.0e+07) ( 1.5e+09) ( 1.7e+08) ( 3.1e+08)
Corr 0.361 0.621 -0.376⋆ -0.126⋆
(0.017) (0.403) (0.242) (0.518)
Notes: N = 21’943. The stars represent significance on the 5%-level. The standard errors
are reported in brackets and have been estimated using a bootstrap technique with re-
placement and 500 draws.
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Table 1.12: Treatment Effects, All Statistics, No Health Covariates
Disability Main Earner Disability Second Earner
T=0 T=1 TE T=0 T=1 TE
Mean ME 97664 50652 -47012⋆ 97263 83713 -13550⋆
(1402) (7997) (1417) (8897)
Median ME 91000 43900 -47100⋆ 90695 73315 -17380⋆
(887) (8691) (832) (8505)
Var ME 3.3e+09 2.8e+09 -5.0e+08⋆ 3.3e+09 3.3e+09 -3.1e+07⋆
(3.7e+08) (1.0e+09) (3.8e+08) (1.0e+09)
Mean SE 36117 24521 -11596⋆ 36148 17697 -18451⋆
(705) (4155) (710) (5709)
Median SE 32110 15689 -16421⋆ 33000 6300 -26700⋆
(1207) (5455) (1268) (5234)
Var SE 9.9e+08 7.5e+08 -2.4e+08⋆ 9.9e+08 6.4e+08 -3.5e+08⋆
(4.1e+07) (1.9e+08) (4.1e+07) (3.4e+08)
Cov 7.4e+08 6.2e+08 -1.2e+08⋆ 7.5e+08 4.8e+08 -2.7e+08⋆
(6.9e+07) (3.3e+08) (7.0e+07) (4.7e+08)
Corr 0.41 0.42 0.02⋆ 0.41 0.33 -0.08⋆
(0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.21)
Notes: N = 21’943. The stars represent significance on the 5%-level. The standard errors
have been estimated using a bootstrap technique with replacement and 100 draws.
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Figure 1.2: Bivariate Distribution of Labor Earnings
(a) No DIB (b) Low DIB
(c) Average DIB (d) High DIB
Notes: The 3D Figures present the bivariate CDF of spouses labor supply. Each one of the
panels refers to a counterfactual distribution when all individuals would receive (a) no
DIB, (b) low DIB, (c) average DIB and (d) high DIB.
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Notes: The histogram presents 30 distinct bins and the density has been estimated using a
Gaussian kernel. The top 1% of both distributions is not plotted to improve readability.
Figure 1.4: Distribution of DI Benefits and Quantile Effects





















































































Notes: For all panels, the x-axis represents the quantiles of labor earnings. The left panel
presents the deciles of DI benefits only for the recipients, N = 423 for main earners and
N = 250 for the second earners. In extension to the results in Table 1.2, the middle
panel provides the difference of the quantile functions implied by the counterfactual
distributions. The right panel descriptively presents these quantile effects divided by the




joint with Blaise Melly
Abstract
When researchers aim to estimate the effect of explanatory variables on du-
ration, the most popular approach is the Cox proportional hazard estimator.
This estimator is very flexible concerning the baseline hazard but restricts
the covariates’ effect to be constant over time. Distribution regression is
a generalization of the Cox model that naturally allows the coefficients
to change with time. Typically, survival times are censored, making the
inclusion of time-varying effects challenging. This paper introduces a novel
censored distribution regression estimator based on maximum likelihood
estimation (CDR-MLE) that overcomes this difficulty. We assume that
the censoring time is independent of the event time conditional on the
covariates, which is the standard type of censoring in the literature. The
CDR-MLE estimator is numerically identical to the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor when the covariates include only a constant and converges to the Cox
coefficients when the coefficients are time-constant. It consistently esti-
mates the conditional survival distribution for discrete, continuous, and
mixed duration. We show weak convergence of the censored distribution
regression coefficient process and the conditional distribution process to
centered Gaussian processes. In addition, we complement the literature by
providing undiscovered links to an existing estimator. Simulation studies
show the good finite-sample properties of the CDR-MLE estimator. Finally,
we apply our estimator to unemployment duration data and find that a
Acknowledgements: We would like to acknowledge the financial support from the
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longer benefit duration has little effect on short unemployment spells but a
strong and significant effect on long-term unemployment.
2.1 Introduction
A policy intervention that reduces long-term unemployment (i.e., the upper
tail of the distribution) is often more appreciated than an intervention
that shifts the distribution’s lower tail, even if both interventions’ average
effects are identical. In this example, like in many others, it is essential
to assess the distributional effects of policy variables on durations. The
most popular approach in the field is the Cox (1972) proportional hazard
estimator, which assumes that the covariates’ effects are homogeneous.
Consequently, researchers can only address average effects on durations.
In this paper, we promote two novel estimators that generalize the Cox
model. In particular, the estimated regression coefficients converge to the
same value when the coefficients are time-constant, but they capture the
underlying heterogeneity when the effects vary over time.
Censoring is an ubiquitous phenomenon in duration data. In the ab-
sence of covariates, the standard estimator of the survival function was sug-
gested by Kaplan and Meier (1958). This estimator imposes independence
between the censoring times and the event times. Under this assumption, it
can be interpreted as the maximum likelihood estimator in the unrestricted
model. Throughout this paper, we will assume standard censoring in the
presence of covariates, i.e., that the censoring times are independent of the
event times conditional on the covariates.
As noted by McCullagh (1980) and Doksum and Gasko (1990), the Cox
proportional hazard model implies that a binary regression with a com-
plementary log-log link function can estimate the conditional distribution
function. We extend this idea by estimating not one but many binary re-
gressions. In particular, we suggest estimating a binary regression at each
threshold of the outcome. This estimation strategy is known as distribu-
tion regression and presents a natural generalization of the homogeneous
proportional hazard model. Accordingly, it allows testing the validity of
the Cox model. In the absence of censoring, the distribution regression
estimator is well behaved without further adjustments. In the presence of
censoring, we will introduce weighted pseudo-observations in the spirit
of Efron (1967). The resulting estimator is numerically identical to the
unconditional Kaplan-Meier estimator if the only regressor is a constant
and equals the Kaplan-Meier estimator within cells if the model is fully
saturated. Thus, our estimator is also a strict generalization of the Kaplan-
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Meier estimator in the presence of covariates. In both cases, unconditional
or conditional on covariates, our estimator can be applied without modi-
fication to discrete, continuous, and mixed discrete-continuous outcomes.
As each of the binary regressions is estimated by maximum likelihood, we
refer to this novel estimator as CDR-MLE, where CDR stands for censored
distribution regression.
Most closely related, Peng and Huang (2007) consider the same model
and suggest an estimator assuming a martingale structure of the data. In
contrast to the CDR-MLE estimator, their strategy falls short of handling
discrete or mixed outcomes. As duration data frequently incorporates such
outcome variables, we extend their existing estimator to accommodate all
types of durations. We will refer to the resulting estimator as the CDR-
Martingale estimator. Note that the asymptotic results follow analogously
to the initial estimator, which is why we abstract from the proofs in this
paper. With our modification, the novel estimator becomes numerically
identical to the Kaplan-Meier estimator in saturated models. In this regard,
it closely matches the properties of the CDR-MLE estimator. To assess their
qualitative equivalence, we compare the performance of both estimators
in various simulation studies. Thus, in addition to introducing the CDR-
MLE estimator, we complement the literature by linking concepts and
consolidating them into a unified framework.
The estimation strategy of the CDR-MLE estimator adopts the concepts
of distribution regression as follows. We start estimating the conditional
cumulative distribution function (CDF) recursively from the lower tail of
the distribution. While no observation has been censored before the sur-
vival time we consider, the conditional CDF can be estimated consistently
via standard binary regressions. After we have crossed the first censored
observation, we redistribute the weight of the censored observations to
two pseudo-observations, one below the threshold and one above it in
the spirit of Efron (1967). Then we can run a standard weighted binary
regression. The weights are functions of the previously estimated binary
regressions, requiring estimating the regressions recursively starting from
the bottom. For discrete outcomes, the weights are also functions of the
binary regression results at the threshold. Therefore, we suggest iterating
the procedure at each threshold until convergence.
Our CDR-MLE estimator is a Z-estimator with an estimating equation
that generalizes the ‘self-consistency’ expression for the Kaplan-Meier es-
timator. We use empirical process arguments to show consistency and
weak convergence of the CDR coefficient process. By the functional delta
method, it follows that the conditional distribution function process is also
consistent and converges to a mean-zero Gaussian process. Using these
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results, we can test functional hypotheses and compute uniform confidence
bands using resampling procedures. In particular, using a complementary
log-log link function, we can address the validity of the Cox proportional
hazard model by testing if the coefficients are constant across time.
The cost of the CDR model’s flexibility is the high-dimensionality of
the coefficients and the difficulty to interpret their value, except for the
homogeneous reference case of the Cox model. However, these coefficients
ultimately determine the conditional and unconditional distribution func-
tion of the outcome. Thus, we suggest reporting more intuitive parameters
such as the quantile functions of conditional, unconditional, or counterfac-
tual distributions. In the application, we illustrate the advantage of such
functionals. In particular, we report the quantile treatment effect function,
which is the difference between the quantile function that we would ob-
serve if everyone had a long period of benefits and the quantile function
that we would observe if everyone had a short period of benefits.
We perform simulation studies to analyze the finite-sample performance
of both CDR estimators. Already in samples of moderate size, the asymp-
totic results describe the behavior of the estimators well. Further, our
simulations suggest that the CDR-MLE and CDR-Martingale estimator pro-
vide qualitatively equivalent results. When the effects are homogeneous,
as expected, the CDR estimator is less precise than the Cox estimator, but
the difference remains moderate. Taking the average variance of the CDR
estimator from the 10th to the 90th quantile of the outcome, we find an
increase of 11% compared to the Cox model. When the effects are heteroge-
neous, the Cox model’s bias quickly dominates the CDR estimator’s slightly
higher variance. In particular, the higher bias causes the mean square error
to increase by a factor of five already in moderate sample sizes.
An application illustrates the usefulness CDR. We examine how an
increase in potential benefit duration (PBD) affects unemployment spells.
Theoretical search models predict that job search behavior varies through-
out unemployment, implying heterogeneous effects of longer PBD. In
particular, faced with the upcoming exhaustion of benefits, individuals
intensify their efforts to find a job. Our results suggest that, on average, a
longer PBD of 9 months decreases the likelihood of finding a job by 5%,
which is equivalent to an increase of roughly 2.5 weeks in duration. The
effect is much more substantial for the long-term unemployed. For these in-
dividuals, a longer PBD increases duration by up to 14 weeks. Our findings
are in line with the suggested time-varying behavior of job seekers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss
previous work with a particular focus on methods suggested to analyze
heterogeneous effects of covariates on duration data. In Section 2.3 we
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define the model that we study, state the assumptions, and show that the
parameters are identified. In Section 2.4 we derive the theoretical properties
of the estimator. Finally, in Section 2.5 we provide the results of the Monte
Carlo simulations, and in Section 2.6 the results of the application to real
data.
2.2 Related work
The CDR estimators at hand simplify (i) to the Kaplan-Meier estimator in
the absence of covariates, (ii) to distribution regression in the absence of
censoring, and (iii) to the Cox estimator in the absence of heterogeneity.
Thus, we discuss these three strands of literature. In addition, we also
discuss the censored quantile regression and the additive hazard models,
which are two alternative methods to estimate heterogeneous effects of co-
variates on the conditional distribution of a duration. We refer the reader to
Peng and Huang (2007) for an extensive discussion of the CDR-Martingale
estimator and focus on the novel CDR-MLE estimator in the following.
Given the good properties of the Kaplan-Meier estimator, Beran (1981)
suggested a nonparametric conditional version of this estimator using
either a nearest neighbor or a kernel approach. Dabrowska (1987) and
Dabrowska (1989) established uniform consistency and weak convergence
of these estimators. The obvious drawback of this local approach is the low
rate of convergence and the curse of dimensionality when the covariates’
dimension is large. We avoid this drawback and obtain
√
n-consistent
estimators at the price of imposing a semiparametric model similar to the
Cox model.
Distribution regression, as defined in Chernozhukov et al. (2013), con-
sists of the application of a sequence of binary regressions to estimate
the whole conditional distribution of an outcome given covariates. This
approach has already been suggested by Williams and Grizzle (1972) for
ordered outcomes. Foresi and Peracchi (1995) apply this procedure to
estimate the conditional distribution of a continuous outcome at a finite
number of thresholds. Chernozhukov et al. (2019) show that distribution
regression nests all generalized linear regression model and apply it to
count data. One advantage of distribution regression is that it handles
continuous, discrete, or mixed dependent variables without any special
adjustment.
Survival data are typically censored. If the censoring point is the same
for all observations, distribution regression is still consistent below the
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censoring point without modification.1 However, the censoring time in
survival analysis is typically random and observed only for censored ob-
servations. Jung (1996) is the first to consider the estimation of distribution
regression with random censoring. He assumes that the censoring times
are independent of the covariates. This allows him to estimate the distribu-
tion of the censoring time with the unconditional Kaplan-Meier estimator.
In a second step, the coefficients can be estimated with binomial regres-
sions weighted by the inverse probability of censoring. Scheike and Zhang
(2007) and Scheike et al. (2008) suggest a very similar approach. Sant’Anna
(2016) and Delgado et al. (2019) suggest estimators based on integrals of the
multivariate Kaplan-Meier estimator of Stute (1993). All these approaches
assume that the censoring times and the event times are unconditionally
independent. The covariates are not allowed to affect the distribution of
the censoring variable. As a consequence, in a fully saturated regression
model, these estimators are not equal to the Kaplan-Meier estimator within
the cells. In contrast, we assume standard censoring, i.e., the censoring
times and the event times are independent conditionally on the covariates.
Our estimator is numerically equal to Kaplan-Meier within the cells for
fully saturated models.
Instead of modeling the conditional distribution of the duration given
covariates, we could model the conditional quantile function. This ap-
proach has first been suggested by Koenker and Geling (2001) and Koenker
and Bilias (2001) and has been extended to random censoring by Portnoy
(2003) and Peng and Huang (2008). In a nonparametric framework, it does
not matter if we model the quantile or distribution function. In parametric
settings, the difference between these models consists of the way hetero-
geneity is allowed. With quantile regression, two observations at the same
conditional quantile are assumed to have the same coefficients. With dis-
tribution regression, two observations at the same duration are assumed
to have the same coefficients. In general, it is not clear what approach is
more desirable. We can note, however, that quantile regression does not
allow for a time-varying hazard rate. It means that quantile regression does
not generalize the Cox model while distribution regression does it. Also,
the linearity assumption for the conditional quantiles underlying quantile
regression is highly implausible for discrete data. For instance, the linear
proportional hazard model does not have linear conditional quantiles.
1This is the case in the application of Chernozhukov et al. (2013), where wages are
censored from below by the minimum wage. The same logic applies if earnings are
top-coded.
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2.3 Model, Identification and Estimator
Let Y∗ denote the scalar outcome variable of interest, typically a duration,
and X the k × 1 vector of covariates that includes a constant. In our ap-
plication in Section 2.6 we are in particular interested in the effect of the
maximum duration of unemployment benefits on the length of unemploy-
ment spells. The conditional distribution of Y∗ given X = x evaluated at a
threshold y can be expressed as FY∗|X(y|x) = E[1(Y∗ ≤ y)|X = x], where
1(·) is the indicator function. Accordingly, we can estimate the conditional
distribution at one point with a traditional binary regression. We assume
that the link function is known:





for all y ∈ (0, yU] and x ∈ X ,
where Λ(·) is a known link function, β(y) a k × 1 vector of unknown coefficients,
yU a deterministic constant, and X the support of X.
For duration data, the complementary log-log link function, Λ(x′β(y))
= 1 − exp(−exp(x′β(y), is of particular interest. The Cox proportional haz-
ard model implies assumption 5 with this link function and the restriction
that the slope coefficients (all the elements of β(y) except the intercept)
are not a function of y. Thus, the DR model generalizes the Cox model
by allowing the effect of the covariates to change over time. Other link
functions are also of interest too. Bennett (1983) shows that the proportional
odds model implies an homogenous DR model with a logistic link function.
Peng and Huang (2007) show that the additive hazard model of Aalen
(1980) is equivalent to the DR model with the exponential link function
Λ(x′β(y)) = exp(−x′β(y)).
The DR model is flexible in the sense that, for any given link function,
we can approximate the conditional CDF arbitrarily well by using a rich
enough set of transformations of the original covariates. In the extreme case
when the covariates are all discrete and X is fully saturated, the estimated
conditional distribution is numerically equal to the empirical DF in each
cell of X for any monotonic link function.
Knowledge of the function y 7→ β(y) implies knowledge of the entire
conditional distribution of Y given X. Thus, we can calculate the covariates’
effect on the conditional mean or any conditional quantiles of Y. In addition,
we can obtain the unconditional distribution of Y by integrating over the
covariates as suggested in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). In particular, this
procedure allows estimating counterfactual distributions that we would
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observe if we would change the covariates’ distribution. For instance, in
our application, we estimate the distributions that we would observe if
all individuals received unemployment benefits either during a long or
short period. The difference between these two counterfactual distributions
summarizes the effect of a policy change.
Let C denote the censoring time. Because of right censoring we do
not observe Y∗ but Y = min(Y∗, C). δ = 1(Y∗ ≤ C) = 1(Y = Y∗) is an
indicator variable for being not censored.
Assumption 6 (random sample). We observe {xi, yi, δi}ni=1, a random sample
of size n from (X, Y, δ).
Without further assumption, we cannot identify the conditional distri-
bution of Y∗. For instance, if censoring is informative (i.e. a function of Y∗
even after conditioning on X), the best we can hope to achieve are bounds
for the distribution. In this paper, we assume that censoring is conditionally
uninformative:
Assumption 7 (standard censoring).
Y∗ ⊥ C|X
This assumption is sometimes called standard random right censoring
or conditionally independent censoring. It is less restrictive than assuming
unconditional independence because it allows the distribution of C to be a
function of X.
Before considering this assumption’s implications, it is interesting to
mention that simpler estimators exist if we make stronger assumptions. For
instance, if the censoring time is fixed and observed, which corresponds
to the assumption made in Powell (1986), then the standard DR estimator
can be applied to estimate the conditional distribution up to y = C. This
stands in contrast to quantile regression, which requires a different (and
considerably more complex) estimator.
If C is not fixed but is always observed, the conditional distribution
of Y∗ at y can be estimated by running a standard distribution regression
on the subsample for which C > y. This estimator is consistent under
assumption 7.
If C is random but unconditionally independent of Y∗, the distribution
of the censoring time can be consistently estimated by the (unconditional)
Kaplan-Meier estimator. In a second step, we can estimate the conditional
distribution of Y∗ simply by reweighting the dependent variable of the
binary regression by the probability of being censored. This is similar to
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inverse probability weighting for missing data. This estimator has been
suggested by Jung (1996), Scheike and Zhang (2007), and Scheike et al.
(2008).
Our problem is more complex: we cannot identify the distribution of C
in a preliminary step. We suggest two estimators based on two different
interpretations of the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Both simplify numerically
to the Kaplan-Meier estimator when X contains only a constant. The first
estimator generalizes the “redistribution of mass to the right” approach of
Efron (1967). The second one exploits the martingale approach introduced
in survival analysis by Aalen (1975).
2.3.1 Redistribution of Mass to the right
We want to identify FY∗|X(y|x) = E[1(Y∗ ≤ y)|X = x]. There are three
types of observations. First, observations with δi = 1 do not cause any
complication because y∗i = yi is observed in this case. Second, observations
with δi = 0 and yi ≥ y appear more complicated at the first sight but, even
if we do not observe y∗i , we know that y
∗
i > y for these observations, which
is all what we need to estimate the CDF at y.2 Third, observations with
δi = 0 and yi < y are truly problematic because we don’t know if y∗i is
below or above y. However, Assumption 7 implies that
Pr[y∗i ≤ y|δi = 0, yi ≤ y, X = xi] =
FY∗i |X(y|xi)− FY∗|X(yi|xi)
1 − FY∗|X(yi|xi)
≡ w(y, yi, xi)
(2.3.1)
It follows that we can replace each observation with δi = 0 and yi < y with
two weighted pseudo-observation: one below y with a weight w(y, yi, xi)
and another above y with a weight 1 − w(y, yi, xi). We then run a binary
MLE on the expanded sample.
2We use the standard convention that δi = 1(y∗i ≤ ci), which implies that y∗i is strictly
larger than y if it is censored at y.
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More formally, note that
FY∗|X(y|x) = E[1(Y∗ ≤ y)|X = x]
= E[1(Y∗ ≤ y) · δ + 1(Y∗ ≤ y) · (1 − δ)|X = x]
= E[1(Y ≤ y) · δ + 1(Y∗ ≤ y) · 1(Y ≤ y) · (1 − δ)|X = x]
= E
[








1(Y ≤ y) ·
(







where the third equality from the observation rule and the fact that 1(Y∗ ≤
y) =⇒ 1(Y ≤ y), and the fourth from equation (2.3.2). The expression
on the right-hand side is a function of FY∗|X(Y|x) but only for values of Y
below y. This suggests a recursive algorithm that starts at the bottom of the
distribution. Note that FY∗|X(y|Xi) appears on the left- and right-hand side
of 2.3.2. If we solve the sample analog of the equation recursively when X
contains only a constant, we obtain exactly the Kaplan-Meier estimator.
With covariates, we suggest estimating recursively FY∗|X(y|x) with the
MLE of a weighted binary regression model. If the weights w(y, x) were









i log(1 − Λ(x′ib)) (2.3.3)
with
w1i = δi · 1(yi ≤ y) + (1 − δi) · 1(yi ≤ y) · w(y, yi, xi)
w0i = δi · 1(yi > y) + (1 − δi) · 1(yi ≤ y) · (1 − w(y, yi, xi))
+ (1 − δi) · 1(yi > y)
Note that the observations with δi = 1 or with yi > y enter normally into
the likelihood while the observations with δi = 0 and yi ≤ y enters with two
weighted pseudo-observations. This estimator can be easily implemented
with standard software for binary regression.
The weights w(y, yi, xi) are actually not known. With the semiparamet-
ric assumption 5, these weights can be expressed as
w(y, yi, xi) =
Λ(x′i β(y))− Λ(x′i β(yi))
1 − Λ(x′i β(yi))
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Since the weights only appear as multiplied with 1(yi ≤ y), we need only
to estimate the weights for observations with yi ≤ y. We estimate the
coefficients sequentially, starting from the bottom of the distribution. Thus,
we already have an estimator for β(yi) that we denote by β̂(yi). To estimate
β(y), when the outcome is continuous, we can use the last previously
estimated coefficients, which we denote by β̂(y−). By continuity of the
DR coefficient process, this provides a consistent estimator. When the
outcome is discrete, we start from the weights obtained with β̂(y−). Using
these weights, we obtain a first estimate β̃(y) by maximizing the weighted
likelihood. Then we obtain new weights using this new estimate, and we
iterate until convergence.
Let t1 < t2 < ... < tM ≤ yU be all observed failure times below yU.
The empirical CDR coefficient process is a right-continuous step function
that jumps only at these values. The estimated CDF of Y∗ is zero for all
y < t1.3 Algorithm 1 provides the detailed steps for the discrete case. In
the continuous case, we can skip the while-loop in lines 6 to 10.
Algorithm 1 CDR-MLE algorithm
1: Initialize w(y, yi, xi) = 0 for i = 1, ..., n.
2: Initialize β̃ = (−∞, 0, 0, ..., 0).
3: for j = 1, 2, ..., M do
4: Obtain β̂(tj) by maximizing the log likelihood log(L(tj)) in 2.3.3.





for i such that yi < tj and
δi = 0.
6: while ∥β̃ − β̂(tj)∥ > tol do
7: β̃ = β̂(tj)
8: Obtain β̂(tj) by maximizing the log likelihood log(L(tj)) in 2.3.3.





for i such that yi < tj
and δi = 0.
10: end while
11: β̂MLE(tj) = β̂(tj)
12: end for
This algorithm can be seen as a distribution regression analog of the
quantile regression estimator of Portnoy (2003). He exploits the strategy
to redistribute the weights of the censored observations to two pseudo-
3Equivalently, we can drop the observations censored below t1 because they do not
contain any information of the conditional distribution of Y∗.
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observations. As discussed in Section 2.2, quantile regression is not well
suited for discrete outcomes. Thus, Portnoy (2003) considers only this
case and does not need to iterate until convergence. Our method for
discrete outcomes also bears some similarities with the Buckley and James
(1979) approach to censored linear regression. They have a similar problem
because the correction depends on the true coefficients of the regression.
They also solve this problem iteratively under convergence.
2.3.2 Martingale-based Approach
Peng and Huang (2007) consider the same model as we do but only for
continuous durations. They propose to utilize the martingale structure
of randomly right-censored data to construct an estimator. Since one of
the advantages of DR (e.g., compared to quantile regression) consists of
dealing with discrete data, we extend their framework and propose a new
estimator that accommodates continuous, discrete, and mixed outcomes.






1 − FY∗|X(s − |xi)
(2.3.4)
where the integral is defined as a Stieltjes integral regardless of whether
FY∗|X is absolutely continuous or not. FY∗|X(s − |xi) denotes the left-hand
limit of FY∗|X(s|xi). For discrete distributions, dFY∗|X(s|xi) = FY∗|X(s|xi)−
FY∗|X(s−|xi) = P(Y∗ = s|X = xi). For continuous distributions, dFY∗|X(s|xi)
= fY∗|X(s|xi)ds. The fraction corresponds to the conditional (discrete or
continuous) hazard rate. Mi(y) is a martingale process and has expectation
zero conditional on X, see for instance Fleming and Harrington (2011) or
Aalen et al. (2008).













Peng and Huang (2007) suggest an estimator that is the sample analog
of 2.3.5. Instead, we suggest an estimator base on 2.3.4. The difference
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is minimal for continuous outcomes, but this modification is necessary
to accommodate mass-points. Interestingly, our modified estimator is
numerically equal to the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which is not the case for
the Peng and Huang (2007) estimator.
Remember that t1 < t2 < ... < tM ≤ yU are all observed failure times
below yU. Let x(1), x(2), ..., x(M) be the associated covariate vectors. In the
presence of mass points, we take the sum of the covariates with an outcome
equal to the corresponding value, i.e. x(m) = ∑i:yi=tm xi · δi. We estimate the
CDR process sequentially:
Algorithm 2 CDR-Martingale algorithm






2: for j=2,...,M do











Peng and Huang (2007) derive the large-sample properties of their martin-
gale estimator when the dependent variable is continuous. A similar proof
strategy can be used to derive similar results for our modified martingale
estimator. Note that the bootstrap should be recommended in both cases
because the analytical estimation of the asymptotic variance is generally
difficult.
We now study the large-sample behavior of the CDR-MLE estimator.
Assumption 8. The vector X is uniformly bounded: sup
i
∥xi∥ < ∞
Assumption 9. The link function Λ : R 7→ (0, 1) is invertible, twice continu-
ously differentiable, and its first derivative λ(·) is bounded away from zero.
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Λ(x′i β(y))(1 − Λ(x′i β(y)))
1(yi ≥ y)xix′i
]
is bounded away from zero uniformly over y ∈ (0, yU].
Assumption 11. Either the support of Y∗ consists of a finite subset of R or it
is a compact interval in R. In the later case, the conditional density fY∗|X(y|x)
exists, is uniformly bounded away from zero and from above, and is uniformly
continuous in (y, x) in the support of (Y∗, X).
Assumption 8 is almost always met in practice. Assumption 9 puts
additional restrictions on the link function. It is satisfied by all traditional
link functions, e.g. by the complementary log log, logit, and probit link
functions. Assumption 10 is an identification condition that imposes in-
vertibility of the first-order derivative of the estimating equation. More
intuitively, it excludes linearly dependent regressors among the surviv-
ing population. Assumption 8 imposes some regularity condition on the
conditional density function when the outcome variable is continuous.
For the moment we have been able to derive the asymptotic distribution
of the DR-MLE only with a stronger assumption to initialize the algorithm.
To deal with the bottom of the distribution, we assume that there is no
censoring below some threshold yL:
Assumption 12. When the outcome is continuous, there exists yL > 0 such that
Pr(δi = 1|y∗i ≤ yL) = 1.
We need this assumption only for continuous outcomes. Portnoy (2003)
makes a similar assumption for quantile regression. It is probably possible
to avoid this assumption by adapting the proof strategy in Peng and Huang
(2007) or Peng (2012).
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1-10, as n → ∞, the CDR coefficient process,√
n(β̂MLE(y) − β(y)) weakly converges to a mean-zero Gaussian process for
y ∈ [yL, yU].
Proof sketch. Consider first the range y ∈ (0, yL). Note that without censor-
ing the estimator simplifies to the distribution regression estimator studied
in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). Our assumptions imply their assumptions
when P(δ = 1|Y ≤ y) = 1. It follows by their Corollary 5.3 that the
CDR coefficient process converges to a mean-zero Gaussian process on
y ∈ (0, yL).
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For the remaining threshold, our estimator maximizes the objective
function in (2.3.3), which is the MLE of a weighted binary regression. If
we knew the weights, the results in Chernozhukov et al. (2013) could be
trivially extended. The issue is that we have estimated these weights in
a previous regression such that the asymptotic distribution will involve a
product integral of the process.
The first-order derivative of the likelihood function in (2.3.3) can be
expressed as
φy,β(Y, X, δ) =
δ · 1(Y ≤ y)
Λ(X′β)
λ(X′β)X
− δ · 1(Y > y)
1 − Λ(X′β)λ(X
′β)X
− (1 − δ) · 1(Y ≥ y)
1 − Λ(X′β) λ(X
′β)X
+ (1 − δ)1(Y < y)Λ(X
′β)− Λ(X′ β̂MLE(Y))
1 − Λ(X′ β̂MLE(Y))
λ(X′β)X
Λ(X′β)
− (1 − δ)1(Y < y) 1 − Λ(X
′β)
1 − Λ(X′ β̂MLE(Y))
λ(X′β)X
1 − Λ(X′β)
The CDR-MLE estimator is the Z-estimator that satisfies ∥Ψ̂(β̂MLE(y), y)∥ =
0, where Ψ̂(β, y) = 1n ∑
n
i=1 φy,β(yi, xi, δi). Note that the population analog
is Ψ(β, y) = E[φy,β(yi, xi, δi)] = 0. Under the assumptions made, the class
of functions φy,β(Y, X, δ) is Donsker: the class of indicator variables is
Donsker, λ(·) is bounded and differentiable, 0 < Λ(X′β) < 1 and X is
bounded.4
4It is in principle possible that the denominator 1 − Λ(X′β) is equal to zero. However,
in this case, both numerators Λ(X′β)− Λ(X′β(Y)) and 1 − Λ(X′β) as well as 1(Y > y)
are also equal to zero. Thus, the denominator can take a value of zero only when the
whole term does matter. To simplify the notation we define 00 = 0.
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δi · 1(yi > y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β(y)))2
+
(1 − δi) · 1(yi ≥ y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β(y)))2
+
(1 − δi) · 1(yi < y)
Λ(x′i β(y))
2
Λ(x′i β(y))− Λ(x′i β(yi))
1 − Λ(x′i β(yi))
+
(1 − δi) · 1(yi < y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β))2
1 − Λ(x′i β(y))
1 − Λ(x′i β(yi))
+
(1 − δi)1(yi < y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β(yi)))Λ(x′i β)
+
(1 − δi)1(yi < y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β(yi)))(1 − Λ(x′i β))
)]
Note that J(y) is invertible by Assumption 10.
Ψ(β, y) is a function β̂MLE(ỹ) for ỹ < y. The derivative of Ψ(β, y) with
respect to β̂MLE(ỹ) is




− (1 − δi)1(yi < y)
(1 − Λ(x′i β(ỹ)))Λ(xiβ(y))
+ (1 − δi)1(yi < y)
Λ(x′i β(y))− Λ(x′i β(ỹ))
(1 − Λ(xiβ(ỹ)))2Λ(x′i β(y))
− (1 − δi)1(yi < y)
1 − Λ(x′i β(y))
(1 − Λ(x′i β(ỹ)))2(1 − Λ(xiβ(y)))
)]
For ỹ < yL, by corollary 5.3 in Chernozhukov et al. (2013), β̂MLE(ỹ) admits
asymptotically the linear representation
√






φy,β(y)(yi, xi, δi) + op(1)
For large values of ỹ, we apply sequentially Lemma E.1 in Chernozhukov
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φy,β(y)(yi, xi, δi) +
∫ y
0
∆y,ỹ φỹ,β(ỹ)(yi, xi, δi)dỹ
)
+ op(1)
The result of the theorem follows.
■
2.5 Simulations
Subsequently, we address the finite sample performance of the CDR esti-
mators introduced in the preceding sections. As outlined earlier, we expect
that the two CDR estimators will provide asymptotically equivalent results.
We present the results based on both approaches to assess whether this
holds across different data generating processes (DGP) and sample sizes.
Our focus lies on the performance across three different DGPs, which differ
regarding a single regressor’s effect. In particular, by imposing various
degrees of effect heterogeneity, we will address the bias-variance trade-off
when allowing for time-varying coefficients. For this purpose, we will
compare the CDR estimators to the Cox model that serves as benchmark
case in the following.
In the following, we will directly model the regression coefficients β(y).
The underlying CDF will have the form of FY|X(y|X) = 1− exp(− exp(X′β(y))
where X includes a constant and potentially many regressors. We gen-
erate the sample distribution of Yi by drawing a uniform random vari-
able, ui, for each observation and setting Yi to the lowest value at which
FY|X(y|X) < ui. Prespecifying β(y) allows us to govern the outcome distri-
bution’s shape without assuming a functional form of the baseline hazard.
To obtain our benchmark results, it suffices to take the simple case in which
X only includes a constant and a uniformly distributed regressor xu. To
address how time-varying effects affect performance, we will vary the
effect of xu: (i) βxu(y) = 0 for all y, (ii) βxu(y) = −1 + 2/T · y and (iii)
βxu(y) = −2 + 4/T · y where T denotes the maximum value of the out-
come. The effect of the constant will vary only marginally to ensure an
equal fraction of censored observations across all DGPs. Figure 2.5 in the
Appendix illustrates how the outcome and the corresponding censoring
variable are distributed. We expect all models to provide unbiased esti-
mates in case (i). Yet, as the true coefficients become more heterogeneous,
we will necessarily observe a bias in the Cox models results’. On the other
58 CENSORED DISTRIBUTION REGRESSION
hand, we expect the CDR estimators to be unbiased in all DGPs but at the
price of a higher variance. Our primary goal will be to assess the extent of
this classical trade-off.
For all simulations, a fraction of 25% of the observations is censored. The
censoring distribution is allowed to depend on xu. This corresponds to the
standard assumption regarding censoring, i.e. conditional independence.
Further, T, the maximum duration, is set to 20. The results do not depend
on the level of T; a simulation with T=100 can be found the in table 2.3
Appendix. The results of this section are based on four different sample
sizes n = {250, 1000, 4000, 16000} with 1000 Monte Carlo experiments each.
Finally, note that all results are obtained using 48 cores and the parallel
package in R.
First, we evaluate the estimated conditional CDF (CCDF). For this pur-
pose, we define a grid of quantile values for xu and Y at which the CCDF
is evaluated. The grid consists of 25 equidistant points between the 10th
and 90th quantile of xu and Y, respectively. To obtain a conclusive measure
of performance, we average the mean squared error (MSE), the standard
deviation (SD), and the absolute bias across all cells specified by the grid.
Table 2.1 reports the resulting statistics multiplied by 100. Let us consider
the three DGPs separately. In the benchmark case of DGP 1, where xu does
not affect Y, the Cox model performs best. The CDR estimators obtain a
slightly higher MSE due to a more significant dispersion reflected by the
standard deviation. Expectedly, all models get unbiased estimates. Com-
paring the magnitude of the standard deviation and the bias, we observe
that the former is much more important. Note that for all DGPs, the two
CDR estimators provide almost identical estimates. Some deviances do
occur at the very tails of the distribution. In the case of the present DGPs,
the CDR-Martingale estimator seems to perform marginally better. Yet,
the differences remain minimal indicating that the two approaches are
asymptotically close.
Next, we consider the DGPs incorporating heterogeneous coefficients.
As with DGP 1, the CDR model’s standard deviation is about 10% higher
than the one in the Cox model for all models. In contrast, the Cox model’s
estimates are biased once we allow for time-varying effects. Trading off this
biasedness against the CDR model’s modestly higher standard deviation,
the results suggest that we prefer to have an unbiased estimate. For instance,
based on DGP 2, the CDR-MLE estimator’s standard deviation is roughly
11% larger than with the Cox model (n=4000). In contrast, the Cox models’
bias is 98% higher, which increases the mean squared error by a factor of
five. In relative terms, the bias accounts for 85% of the Cox models MSE in
the same case. This underscores the higher relevance of the bias too. For
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Table 2.1: Average MSE, Bias and SD of the CCDF (multiplied by 100)
Cox CDR-MLE CDR-Martingale
n MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias
DGP 1: βxu(y) = 0
250 0.1171 3.3545 0.0904 0.1529 3.8064 0.1102 0.1559 3.8325 0.1082
1000 0.0310 1.7286 0.0518 0.0394 1.9374 0.0527 0.0393 1.9352 0.0528
4000 0.0078 0.8659 0.0234 0.0100 0.9737 0.0298 0.0100 0.9734 0.0296
16000 0.0020 0.4407 0.0087 0.0025 0.4907 0.0117 0.0025 0.4907 0.0119
DGP 2: βxu(y) = −1 + (2/T) · y
250 0.1685 3.4058 1.7131 0.1540 3.8339 0.0979 0.1538 3.8324 0.0885
1000 0.0796 1.7309 1.7191 0.0388 1.9256 0.0559 0.0387 1.9229 0.0530
4000 0.0560 0.8706 1.7132 0.0099 0.9701 0.0298 0.0099 0.9689 0.0306
16000 0.0507 0.4407 1.7218 0.0025 0.4864 0.0094 0.0025 0.4862 0.0093
DGP 3: βxu(y) = −2 + (4/T) · y
250 0.2370 3.3760 2.6846 0.1544 3.8302 0.1192 0.1549 3.8336 0.1084
1000 0.1520 1.7198 2.7263 0.0386 1.9203 0.0435 0.0384 1.9154 0.0399
4000 0.1289 0.8684 2.7226 0.0100 0.9727 0.0303 0.0099 0.9700 0.0317
16000 0.1240 0.4377 2.7340 0.0025 0.4861 0.0090 0.0025 0.4855 0.0086
Notes: Throughout, a fraction of 25% of the observations were censored where censoring was
allowed to be a function of the regressor. For the outcome as well as for the regressor, a grid of 25
quantiles ranging from .1 to .9 has been used. For each of these 252 cells, the MSE, bias and variance
were computed separately. The table represents the averages over all cells for 1000 replications. In
the case of time-varying coefficients βxu(y) has been chosen such its average over T roughly equals
βxu from DGP 1.
small data sizes, the difference between the MSE of the two models remains
small. The reason herefore is that in these cases, the standard deviation
accounts for most of the MSE. Based on table 2.1, we conclude that the CDR
estimator’s unbiasedness comes at a relatively low cost in the form of a
higher standard deviation. Thus, in a case where we suspect time-varying
effects to be prevalent, we prefer to use the CDR estimator.
Note that by construction, deviations from the underlying CDF are
lower at the tails of the distribution. To account for this, table 2.2 in the
Appendix reports a corrected version of the statistics from table 2.1. In par-
ticular, we divide the MSE, standard deviation, and bias by FY|X(y|X)(1 −
FY|X(y|X)), i.e., the variance at the respective point of the grid. Note that
this correction is done before averaging across all entries of the grid. In
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terms of the bias-variance trade-off, the results in table 2.1 suggest that the
above insights remain unchanged. The flexibility of the CDR estimators
pays off as, in relative terms, the difference between the two models be-
comes slightly more substantial. More precisely, the CDR-MLE estimator
reduces the Cox models MSE by 51% without the correction and by 55%
using the correction (DGP 2, n = 4000). This indicates that the CDR estima-
tor outperforms the Cox model by an even larger margin at the tails of the
distribution.














































































(f) Mart., Y = QY(.75)
Notes: The figure presents the estimated coefficients based on 1000 draws from DGP 2
with n = 4000 and T = 20. The dashed black line marks the true values of βxu(y) at the
respective value of Y.
In the next step, we assess the distribution of the estimated coefficients.
As suggested above, we expect the CDR models’ regression coefficients
to be asymptotically normal. In figure 2.1, we present the estimated co-
efficients at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of Y for the CDR-MLE and
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the CDR-Martingale estimator. All panels of figure 2.1 suggest that the
coefficients are roughly normally distributed around the true value, which
is in line with the asymptotic distribution. Further, the two estimators seem
to match closely in terms of the distribution of β̂xu(y). In particular, the
variance and shape of the distribution are almost identical. Taken together,
figure 2.1 provides further evidence that the two estimators are closely
related.




















































































































































Notes: The figure illustrates the average absolute bias multiplied by 100 for the CDR-MLE,
CDR-Martingale and the Cox estimator. The data size is kept constant at n = 4000.
Finally, let us consider the estimated coefficients across the distribu-
tion of the outcome. Considering that in our DGPs, the regression coeffi-
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cients are a linear function of time, we expect that the Cox model is biased
strongest at the tails. Figure 2.2 describes the average absolute bias mul-
tiplied by 100 as a function of the outcome. The three panels of Figure
2.2 refer to the three different DGPs. In the benchmark case incorporat-
ing time-constant effects, all estimators provide unbiased estimates. As a
consequence, the absolute biases are close to zero. The results based on
the two remaining DGPs suggest that the Cox model’s bias is largest at
the bottom of the distribution. Further, the Cox model’s bias is a linear
function of time because the true coefficients increase linearly. As the Cox
model coefficients represent a weighted average of the true time-varying
effects, the bias decreases until the true coefficients equal the estimated
ones. Then, again, the bias rises. Considering the two CDR estimators, we
observe that they differ only at the top of the outcome’s distribution. The
CDR-Martingale estimator performs slightly better, which is in line with
our earlier findings from table 2.1. The difference between the CDR estima-
tors is minimal, again confirming our expectation that the two approaches
are asymptotically equivalent.
2.6 Application to Unemployment Duration
The optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) systems has been a fo-
cus of economic research because of its relevance for welfare. For instance,
Lalive et al. (2015) find that UI policies affect equilibrium outcomes for all
market participants, not only the workers eligible to receive UI benefits.
Among the many instruments available to policy-makers, setting the po-
tential benefit duration (PBD) is a frequently used tool to guard incentives.
Typically, the PBD depends on age and on how long individuals have been
paying insurance premiums. The present application analyzes how an
increase in PBD affects unemployment duration. In particular, we will
focus on whether the effect varies over the unemployment spell.
From a microeconomic perspective, optimal UI faces a well-known
insurance-incentive trade-off involving moral hazard (Chetty, 2006). More
precisely, UI benefits (i) allow for consumption smoothing (ii) but reduce job
searching incentives. The former may be especially important for liquidity-
constrained households as without financial support, these individuals
cannot smooth consumption (Chetty, 2008; Landais, 2015). As a conse-
quence, individuals are heterogeneously affected by UI policies. Apart
from differences across individuals, there is a second type of heterogeneity
involved: Typically, factors determining the probability of finding a new
job have time-varying effects. For instance, numerous studies have found
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that job search behavior depends on reservation wages, the generosity
of benefits, or individual beliefs. As suggested by Krueger and Mueller
(2016), reservation wages decline throughout unemployment, increasing
the likelihood of accepting job offers. Marinescu and Skandalis (2021) find
that job seekers intensify their attempts to find a job prior to benefit exhaus-
tion which supports that individuals’ efforts are too low because of moral
hazard. Finally, Mueller et al. (2021) provide evidence showing that beliefs
about the likelihood of being reemployed are subject to an optimistic bias.
In particular, the bias is more substantial for long-term unemployed and
not corrected downward over time. According to this finding, individuals
soon reaching the PBD may suddenly realize that they will no longer get
benefits. Taken together, we expect that, on average, an increase in PBD
leads to higher unemployment spells. Further, we suspect that closer to
the exhaustion of PBD, individuals are more likely to find a job as they
adapt their target wages and intensify their efforts. Consequentially, being
granted a longer PBD would have the most substantial effect at the very
top of the durations’ distribution.
In the following, we analyze the distributional effects of an increase in
PBD in Switzerland. We exploit that above 24 years of age, individuals are
granted a PBD of 18 instead of 9 months.5, 6, 7 Adopting a similar discon-
tinuity at an age threshold, Lalive (2007) finds that a longer PBD of 170
weeks increases effective duration by 15 weeks for men.8 As suggested by
Johnston and Mas (2018), the same logic applies to cuts in unemployment
durations too. The authors analyze a cut introduced by a new law and find
that a 1-month reduction of maximal duration reduces the unemployment
spell by 1.8 weeks. Evidence on the distributional effects of longer PBD
is scarce. Melly and Lalive (2020) study the quantile treatment effects of
longer PBD based on data from Lalive (2007) and find positive and in-
creasing effects on duration. Yet, in their case, censoring is not an issue
5The law introducing this cut-off entered into force as from the 1st of April 2011 (see
Bundesgesetz über die obligatorische Arbeitslosenversicherung und die Insolvenzentschädigung).
We will consider data for unemployment spells starting after this date only.
6If individuals turn 25 during unemployment, they automatically switch regime and are
granted a PBD of 18 months. As a consequence, the age at the beginning of unemployment
is decisive: individuals younger (older) than 24 years and three months get a PBD of 9
months (18 months).
7Note that the PBD is set to 4 months for individuals that have not been paying
contributions into the UI for more than one year. As this holds irrespective of age, it does
not affect the estimation based on the cut-off at 24 years and three months.
8The same effect is much stronger for women resulting in a longer duration of 110
weeks. This effect is partly due to another incentive: to enter a favorable social security
scheme later on.
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which enables the use of standard distributional methods. Relatedly but
studying a different effect, Delgado et al. (2019) examine the diversity of UI
benefits’ effect on unemployment duration. The results indicate that higher
benefits have a U-shaped impact, i.e., the benefits increase duration most
for average durations. Further, taking net wealth as a proxy for liquidity,
the authors argue that the effects are more substantial for individuals facing
liquidity constraints.
We use cross-sectional data from the Swiss State Secretariat for Eco-
nomic Affairs (SECO) on all individuals registered at a regional employ-
ment agency irrespective of whether they receive benefits. We consider
individuals that start being unemployed after the 1st of April 2011 and
are no longer unemployed on the 1st of May 2018. Further, we restrict
our estimation sample to include only singles at the age of 19 to 28 at the
start of unemployment. The resulting estimation sample captures 437,909
observations. Note that the observed UI duration is right-censored as some
individuals (i) renounce from help and UI benefits (14 % of the data), (ii) do
not obey the rules of the regional employment agency (10%), (iii) go abroad
(1%) or drop out because of other unkown reasons (14%).
To assess how PBD effects unemployment spells, we will estimate the
model in equation (2.6.1) using the CDR-MLE estimator. We model the
conditional distribution of unemployment spells as
FY|X(y|x) = Λ(x′β(y)), (2.6.1)
where Λ(·) denotes the complementary log-log link function, y is the du-
ration of unemployment, and X includes a constant and the following
covariates: a treatment indicator for a being older than 24 at the start of
unemployment, a linear and quadratic term for age at the start, gender,
nationality, education, experience and whether the mother tongue is Ger-
man.9 All of these regressors are predetermined and can therefore not
change during unemployment. Our estimated effects have a causal inter-
pretation if individuals below and above the threshold are comparable.
As we include a linear and quadratic term for age at the start of unem-
ployment, we account for average differences between younger and older
individuals. Table 2.4 in the Appendix compares individuals above and
below the threshold. The descriptive statistics suggest that the two groups
are comparable, which supports our identification strategy.
9Nationality included as a dummy variable for being Swiss; education is grouped
in three categories: mandatory school only, secondary school or tertiary education; and
experience is measured in four categories: no, less than one year, one to three years or
more” than three years of experience.
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Considering the results, we first focus on the coefficient of our treatment
variable. As the CDR-MLE estimator is a strict generalization of the propor-
tional hazards model, we will present both models’ estimated coefficients.
This allows us to address the heterogeneity of the treatment effect directly.
The coefficients estimated by CDR are difficult to interpret in the presence
of time-varying effects. To ease interpretation, we complement our analysis
by addressing the treatmentâ€™s unconditional effect too. Following the
approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2013), we can recover the full distribu-
tion of unemployment spells. In particular, we compute the distribution
of spells that only depends on our treatment variable, abstracting from
all covariates’ effects. We first compute the unconditional distribution of
unemployment spells for both the treated and non-treated, FY⟨D=0⟩(y) and
FY⟨D=1⟩(y), where D = 1 indicates being older than 24. This is done by
first modifying the covariate distribution to have all entries of the treat-
ment variable equal to zero or one, XD=0 and XD=1, respectively. Next, we





Intuitively, the resulting counterfactual FY⟨D⟩(y) can be interpreted as the
distribution of spells if everyone was treated (non-treated). Most impor-
tantly, note that FY⟨D⟩(y) no longer depends on the control variables. Tak-
ing the left inverse of FY⟨D⟩(y), we obtain the quantile functions for both
the treated and non-treated. Finally, we define the quantile treatment
effect (QTE) as the difference between the two quantile functions, i.e.,
∆QE(τ) = QY⟨D=1⟩(τ)− QY⟨D=0⟩(τ).
Figure 2.3 reports the regression coefficients for both the Cox model
and the CDR model. Longer durations imply a lower hazard, reflected in
a negative regression coefficient. Thus, we expect to observe a negative
coefficient throughout the distribution. The vertical, dashed lines represent
the two different values of PBD: 39 and 78 for weeks for individuals below
or above the threshold, respectively. The Cox estimates suggests that being
above the threshold when laid off increases unemployment duration on
average. More precisely, the results indicate that the treatment decreases
the likelihood of getting a job by roughly 5% (exp(−.05) = .95, i.e., the
hazard is reduced by 5%). The estimates of the CDR-MLE model point
towards the same direction. Yet, we observe an evident and negative trend
once spells are higher. At the bottom of the distribution, PBD does not
affect the likelihood of finding a job. In contrast, the long-term unemployed
experience significantly higher durations when treated. Accordingly, the
long-term unemployed below the threshold are increasingly likely to find
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Figure 2.3: Effect of longer PBD: Coefficients

























Notes: The vertical lines correspond to the PBD for the non-treated and treated, i.e., 39 and
78 weeks. The x-axis captures the distribution of unemployment durations from the 1st to
the 99th quantile. All confidence bands are based point-wise standard errors.
a job once they are close to reaching their PBD. Based on the evidence
mentioned above, this behavior is consistent with (i) intensified search,
(ii) lower target wages, (iii) or short-sightedness if individuals had too
optimistic beliefs.
Finally, we turn to the QTE presented in figure 2.4. The results suggest
that for the lower half of the distribution, PBD has no relevant effect on
duration. As we move upwards, we observe that the QTE rises to 14 weeks
at the very top of the distribution. Thus, individuals in the top 20% of
the distribution (spell > 40 weeks) experience a substantial increase in
unemployment duration if treated. This supports our previous findings
from the regression coefficients only. We conclude that a higher PBD
increases unemployment spells on average, with the effect being much
more substantial for the long-term unemployed. Our finding contributes
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to a large body of studies focusing on the impact of UI policies. We leave
it for future research to address the implications for welfare. For instance,
incorporating time-varying effects into models like the ones in Landais
(2015) or Lalive et al. (2015) may provide additional insights.
Figure 2.4: Effect of longer PBD: Quantile Treatment Effect














Notes: The x-axis captures the distribution of unemployment durations from
the 5st to the 95th quantile. All confidence bands are based point-wise standard
errors.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce an estimator (CDR-MLE) that deals with time-
varying effects in the context of duration data. Our approach is based on
distribution regression and represents a generalization of the famous model
introduced by Cox (1972). Typically, handling censored observations is chal-
lenging in the case of heterogeneous effects. We overcome this difficulty by
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introducing pseudo-observations as weights when recursively estimating
the conditional distribution. This estimation procedure applies to discrete
and mixed outcomes as well as continuous ones - an attractive feature in
applied work. Further, we allow for dependence between regressors and
the censoring mechanism, i.e., the literature’s standard assumption. In
our main results, we establish consistency and asymptotic normality of
the CDR-MLE estimator. In addition to these novel results, we highlight
links to an existing estimator introduced by Peng and Huang (2007). In its
original form, this estimator applies to continuous outcomes only. We ex-
tend their estimator to accommodate mixed and discrete outcomes. In this
regard, we complement the literature by linking ideas and incorporating
them into a unified framework.
In the presence of heterogeneous effects, estimates based on Cox’s
proportional hazard model are biased. In contrast, the CDR-MLE estimator
is unbiased at the cost of moderately higher variance. With respect to this
trade-off, our simulation study results suggest that the bias dominates
already for reasonable degrees of heterogeneity. In small samples, too, the
CDR-MLE estimator achieves good finite sample performances. Further, we
compare the CDR-MLE estimator’s performance to the modified estimator
based on Peng and Huang (2007). The results suggest that both CDR
estimators are qualitatively equivalent.
We apply the CDR estimator to analyze how potential benefit dura-
tion (PBD) affects unemployment duration. Search models predict that
individuals adapt their behavior over the unemployment spell, implying
heterogeneous effects of PBD. Our results suggest PBD increases duration
on average but much pronounced towards the top of the durations distribu-
tion. This result is in line with individuals intensifying their search efforts
and adapting reservation wages once faced with the upcoming exhaus-
tion of benefits. Thus, we can document the heterogeneity of an essential
empirical effect likely to be missed by standard approaches using CDR.
The set-up of distribution regression would allow for numerous exten-
sions. For instance, the CDR-MLE estimator could be adapted to capture
the case of fixed effects or instrumental variables. Similarly, one could
address the challenges of big data. To date, there is no formal result on
the equivalence of the CDR-MLE and the CDR-Martingale estimator. Peng
(2012) has obtained an analog result in the case of quantile regression. It
seems to be a promising route for future research to address this task.
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2.A Simulation Results


















































































(f) DGP 3, C
Notes: The figure presents the distribution of Y and the corresponding censoring dis-
tribution for all DGPs. The densities have been obtained using a sample of 100’000
observations.
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Table 2.2: Corrected Average MSE, Bias and SD of the CCDF (multiplied by
100)
Cox CDR-MLE CDR-Martingale
n MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias
DGP 1: βxu(y) = 0
250 0.6236 18.3887 0.6123 0.8457 21.2406 0.6930 0.8786 21.5161 0.6952
1000 0.1641 9.4450 0.3334 0.2169 10.7781 0.3020 0.2160 10.7603 0.3025
4000 0.0411 4.7152 0.1258 0.0546 5.3884 0.1610 0.0546 5.3860 0.1600
16000 0.0106 2.3989 0.0527 0.0138 2.7174 0.0742 0.0138 2.7169 0.0758
DGP 2: βxu(y) = −1 + (2/T) · y
250 0.9369 18.7320 10.4827 0.8385 21.4144 0.6861 0.8376 21.4081 0.5947
1000 0.4654 9.5042 10.5176 0.2092 10.6988 0.3143 0.2081 10.6729 0.2916
4000 0.3398 4.7732 10.4711 0.0531 5.3725 0.1636 0.0529 5.3621 0.1661
16000 0.3113 2.4142 10.5044 0.0133 2.6946 0.0614 0.0133 2.6926 0.0610
DGP 3: βxu(y) = −2 + (4/T) · y
250 1.3601 18.5639 16.5036 0.8363 21.4017 0.8074 0.8483 21.5098 0.7049
1000 0.9119 9.4650 16.6842 0.2087 10.7217 0.2515 0.2070 10.6789 0.2203
4000 0.7890 4.7708 16.6519 0.0534 5.4055 0.1724 0.0529 5.3824 0.1767
16000 0.7627 2.4049 16.6983 0.0133 2.7046 0.0621 0.0133 2.6975 0.0592
Notes: Throughout, a fraction of 25% of the observations were censored where censoring was
allowed to be a function of the regressor. For the outcome as well as for the regressor, a grid of 25
quantiles ranging from .1 to .9 has been used. For each of these 252 cells, the MSE, bias and variance
were computed separately. The table represents the averages over all cells for 1000 replications.
In the case of time-varying coefficients βxu(y) has been chosen such its average over T roughly
equals βxu from DGP 1. All averages are divided by Fy|X(y|X)(1 − Fy|X(y|X)) to account for
lower average errors at the tails.
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Table 2.3: Continuous Case (T = 100): Average MSE, Bias and SD of the
CCDF (multiplied by 100)
Cox CDR-MLE CDR-Martingale
n MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias MSE SD Bias
DGP 1: βxu(y) = 0
250 0.1206 3.4013 0.1078 0.1576 3.8633 0.1246 0.1646 3.9267 0.1293
1000 0.0314 1.7395 0.0548 0.0400 1.9516 0.0540 0.0399 1.9501 0.0543
4000 0.0079 0.8705 0.0220 0.0101 0.9793 0.0291 0.0101 0.9791 0.0290
16000 0.0020 0.4420 0.0076 0.0026 0.4930 0.0105 0.0026 0.4930 0.0106
DGP 2: βxu(y) = −1 + (2/T) · y
250 0.1684 3.4027 1.7107 0.1550 3.8418 0.1002 0.1550 3.8413 0.0947
1000 0.0798 1.7379 1.7206 0.0392 1.9349 0.0681 0.0391 1.9327 0.0647
4000 0.0560 0.8711 1.7170 0.0099 0.9710 0.0293 0.0099 0.9699 0.0298
16000 0.0506 0.4408 1.7257 0.0025 0.4879 0.0090 0.0025 0.4876 0.0088
DGP 3: βxu(y) = −2 + (4/T) · y
250 0.2430 3.4427 2.7160 0.1589 3.8929 0.1205 0.1591 3.8929 0.1140
1000 0.1546 1.7314 2.7409 0.0394 1.9375 0.0740 0.0393 1.9340 0.0700
4000 0.1312 0.8725 2.7432 0.0101 0.9790 0.0312 0.0101 0.9769 0.0321
16000 0.1264 0.4412 2.7536 0.0025 0.4906 0.0094 0.0025 0.4899 0.0090
Notes: Throughout, a fraction of 25% of the observations were censored where censoring was
allowed to be a function of the regressor. For the outcome as well as for the regressor, a grid of 25
quantiles ranging from .1 to .9 has been used. For each of these 252 cells, the MSE, bias and variance
were computed separately. The table represents the averages over all cells for 1000 replications. In
the case of time-varying coefficients β(t) has been chosen such its average over T equals β from
DGP 1.
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2.B Application Results
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment and Con-
trol Group
All Control Treated
Female 0.43 0.42 0.43
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Swiss 0.70 0.73 0.66
(0.46) (0.44) (0.47)
German Speaking 0.44 0.46 0.41
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Experience <1Y 0.18 0.21 0.16
(0.39) (0.41) (0.36)
Experience 1Y - 3Y 0.37 0.39 0.34
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Experience >3Y 0.35 0.27 0.44
(0.48) (0.44) (0.50)
Secondary School 0.72 0.80 0.64
(0.45) (0.40) (0.48)
Tertiary School 0.11 0.02 0.20
(0.31) (0.15) (0.40)
Obs. 437909 233683 204226
Notes: Treatment and control group refers to individuals older (younger)
than 24 years of age at the start of unemployment.
Chapter 3
Physician Induced Demand and
Financial Incentives
Evidence from Large-Scale Fee Changes
joint with Tamara Bischof
Abstract
This paper analyzes how physicians adapt their provision of medical ser-
vices when their financial incentives change. We exploit a plausibly ex-
ogenous and large-scale reform to the reimbursement system constituting
a natural (quasi-)experiment. We find that physicians are not immune
to monetary incentives. Conceptually, physicians may substitute across
services or increase their aggregate supply in response to the new scheme.
Our rich dataset allows us to isolate both channels carefully. We find that
providers increase (decrease) the volume of services that became relatively
more (less) attractive. The results vary considerably by the extent of the in-
come loss. Further, physicians supply more services and treat more patients
if they lose a substantial share of their revenue. We quantify the relative
importance of the two response channels in terms of total healthcare costs.
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In the short run, the volume expansion channel is far more important than
the aggregate effect of changes in substitution patterns. Finally, we evaluate
the reform in light of the officially announced saving target and propose
improvements for future policy interventions.
3.1 Introduction
The cost for the health sector has dramatically risen in recent years for
the OECD countries. For instance, between 2007 and 2017, healthcare
spending in terms of GDP increased from 12.4 to 17.1% for the US and
9.7 to 12.3% for Switzerland (OECD, 2019). Many experts call for cost-
containment measures on the supply side to complement existing measures
on the demand side (e.g. deductibles, co-payments). Most prominently,
fee-for-service (FFS) is often thought to drive costs (McClellan, 2011, for a
recent overview). Policymakers share this view: For instance, reforms of
Medicare are based on the assumption that physicians offset half of their
revenue losses due to fee reductions by increasing volume.1 The empirical
evidence on this topic, however, is mixed.
The purpose of this paper is to study how financial incentives affect
physician behavior in terms of volume and type of medical services. The pa-
per aims to disentangle and compare two response channels: the response
due to changes in relative prices of medical services and the response due
to changes in physician income.
We explore the effects of a large-scale fee change that is plausibly exoge-
nous, by using rich physician-and-service level data from mandatory health
insurance. In Switzerland, providers of ambulatory care are reimbursed
under a nationally uniform fee-for-service (FFS) schedule called TARMED.
In 2018, a reform of TARMED led to change in the fees which provides
an ideal setting to analyze how financial incentives affect the supply of
medical services. First, the regulator announced the new fees on relatively
short notice, so the changes to the reimbursement system were arguably
exogenous from the perspective of individual physicians. Second, in a
fee-for-service system, the marginal procedure is fully reimbursed thus
offering providers a financially rewarding response margin (as opposed
to prospective payment systems). Third, fee changes have direct conse-
1The Health Care Financing Administration, commissioned to implement Medicare,
assumes a fifty percent volume offset in their calculations, so that physicians are expected
to increase their service volume after a fee reduction to halve their revenue loss. (cf.
Codespote et al., 1998; Congressional Budget Office, 2007). See also the discussion in
Reinhardt (1999).
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quences on physician income because many physicians occupy a dual role
of medical professional and entrepreneur (in 2014, 84% were (co-)owners;
Hostettler and Kraft, 2018). Fourth, anecdotal evidence suggests that at
least some physicians changed their treatment in response to the reform
(swissinfo, 2018).
Using a flexible fixed effect regression approach, we identify the effect of
fee changes on volumes of specific services and thus describe the way that
financial incentives affect substitution across services (substitution channel).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first attempt to
address substitution patterns across the full set of medical services charged
by a physician.
We find that fees affect how physicians substitute across services; namely,
they increase volumes for services that became relatively more attractive,
and reduce the supply of services with above-average fee cuts. Specifically,
a fee increase by 4% above the physician-specific average raises the vol-
ume of the corresponding service by 1%. This behavior is consistent with
profit-maximization.
Because the fee changes are unevenly distributed across medical special-
ties, we can additionally explore how the effect differs by the extent of the
income loss. For example, radiologists lose a large chunk of their revenue
(median of -13%), whereas other specialties are net winners. Indeed, the
substitution pattern described above varies by how much revenue is at
stake: This behavioral margin seems especially crucial for medical special-
ties that only experience moderate revenue losses or eventually benefit,
such as general practitioners (GPs). In contrast, we find little evidence for
substitution for doctors who lose a large fraction of their revenue (and thus,
income).
Medical professionals may also react through a second channel; fee cuts
translate to income losses, which may be (partly) recouped by providing
more care. We label this the volume expansion channel. Service expansion
may occur along two lines: treating more patients or increasing the service
intensity per patient. We find evidence for such expansion, especially for
providers that lose revenue. For each additionally lost revenue percent,
physicians who lose revenue increase consultations by up to 2.6% and
total service volume by roughly 0.5%. The volume expansion channel
proofs especially relevant for the group that was found to have only a weak
substitution response in the first analysis. These results suggest that for
physicians who encounter a substantial income loss, increasing overall
supply may be more important than substituting across services.
In addition to neatly separating the two response channels, we are
able to quantify their relative importance.The main driver in terms of
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total healthcare costs is the volume expansion channel. A 5% revenue
loss increases supply by roughly 3%. On the other hand, the substitution
channel has little effect on costs. To some extent the negligible cost effect of
substitution may be due to short-run restrictions on the physicians’ service
mix. The ability to address the relevance of the two channels allows us to
draw valuable policy implications. Specifically, tying the fees to a service’s
value may leave healthcare costs unaffected in the short run, while possibly
increasing quality.
Our findings tie to a body of literature studying how physicians react to
incentives besides patient needs. For instance, previous research provides
convincing evidence that obstetricians perform more C-sections when fer-
tility declines (Gruber et al., 1999; Gruber and Owings, 1996), and that
cardiac surgeons intensify treatment when they lose revenue (Yip, 1998).
Our paper most closely relates to the empirical literature studying the effect
of variation in fees (Brekke et al., 2017; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014; Gruber
et al., 1999; Rice, 1983; Yip, 1998).2 Recently, Clemens and Gottlieb (2014),
leveraging a large geographic consolidation in Medicare fees, find that a
2% increase in reimbursement rates leads to a 3% increase in healthcare
provision. Similarly, we address the issue of expanding aggregate supply
and contribute by extending the scope of our analysis to a wide set of
services and closely examining the ensuing substitution patterns.
This line of research closely links to the literature on physician induced
demand (PID), pioneered by Evans (1974). Under the PID hypothesis,
physicians influence demand for medical services against the best interest
of their patients (McGuire, 2000). McGuire and Pauly (1991) provide a
widely used theoretical framework to study the PID phenomenon in Fee-
for-Service (FFS) systems.3 In their model, providers react to fee reductions
by substituting supply towards more favorable services (substitution ef-
fect), and by increasing their overall healthcare supply (income effect, only
present when physicians seek an income target). An empirical investigation
of the strength of the income effect then provides evidence regarding the
presence of PID versus profit-maximizing agents. The interpretation of
2The earlier empirical literature mostly focused on variations in the physician density
(Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986; Fuchs, 1978; Stano, 1985, subject to critique by Dranove
and Wehner, 1994; Gruber and Owings, 1996). Recently, similar approaches are used to
study the effect of market concentration and competition (Dunn and Shapiro, 2018). More
recently, there is a focus on the variation in the information asymmetry between medical
professional and patient (Currie et al., 2011; Domenighetti et al., 1993; Gottschalk et al.,
2020; Johnson and Rehavi, 2016; Schmid, 2015). See Chandra et al. (2011); McGuire (2000)
for overviews.
3Other theoretical models are developed in Fuchs (1978); Zweifel et al. (1997).
3.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 77
our results is loosely based on the theoretical model, and our methodology
is similar to Yip (1998), who aims to account for the substitution and the
income effect in studying how the provision of cardiac surgeons react to a
large fee change in Medicare. She finds that physicians with the highest
income reduction increase the volume of an intensive procedure the most.
By extending her work, we aim to isolate the two effects. Our methodology
improves on her approach by using a more diverse population, a wider set
of services, and a richer dataset.
More broadly, the paper relates to the literature on agency. As already
pointed out by Arrow (1963), physicians act as agents for their patients,
who delegate treatment decisions to their doctors. If physicians act as
perfect agents, monetary incentives should play no role in determining
treatment, as physicians assist their patients in demanding the optimal
quantity of services. However, if physicians react to financial incentives,
say, by substituting highly reimbursed services for low-cost care, they no
longer act as perfect agents. By studying how physicians react to a large
reshuffling of their financial incentives, we add empirical evidence to this
important literature. Our results may be informative to other settings with
imperfect agents.
Finally, our results are of direct interest to policy makers. Reimburse-
ment systems are periodically updated and should incorporate research
insights to optimally construct fee structures that contain costs while main-
taining quality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 dis-
cusses the institutional background and the payment reform of 2018. Our
dataset is described in Section 3.3, and Section 3.4 provides descriptives.
The empirical strategy is explained in Section 3.5, Section 3.6 presents and
discusses the results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
The Swiss healthcare system is characterized by mandatory healthcare
insurance (MHI) that covers a comprehensive and standardized basket of
medical services. MHI accounts for the bulk of healthcare expenditures in
the ambulatory sector. Insurance is organized according to the principles
of managed competition (Enthoven, 1978). Individuals may choose among
a number of insurance plans offered by private insurance providers. The
basic plan for adults features a deductible of CHF 300 (≈USD 300) and
free physician choice. In return for a premium reduction, individuals
may opt for a higher deductible or the inclusion of managed care features.
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Health plans may be changed during an annual open enrolment window
in November.
Ambulatory care has traditionally been provided by independent single
practices. Providers are reimbursed on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis (see
Subsection 3.2.1). Most physicians are self-employed or work in small
practices. In recent years, more group practices have emerged along with
an increased importance of ambulatory clinics in hospitals that offer ambu-
latory services. Still, in 2014, 84% of ambulatory practitioners (co-)owned
their current practice (Hostettler and Kraft, 2018). Despite the fact that most
individuals enjoy free provider choice, the majority report having a regular
GP (De Pietro et al., 2015).
3.2.1 Provider Reimbursement
Ambulatory services covered by mandatory health insurance are reim-
bursed under a universal fee-for-service (FFS) schedule.4 Since 2004, fees
are regulated on a national level in the TARMED fee schedule. The schedule
contract is subject to collective negotiations involving the so-called tariff
parties5. Fees for the roughly 4,500 services vary by physician specialty and
region.
Similar to Medicare, medical services are ranked on a relative value
scale (Taxpunkte) and conversed to a monetary value by multiplying with
a geographic adjustment factor (Taxpunktwert).6 Specifically, for service s,
supplied in region r, a provider with specialty i may charge the following
fee:
fee(CHF)s,i,r = relative value unitss,i × geographic adjustment factorr
(3.2.1)
The relative value units of a service compensate the resources required for
providing the service. First, medical work with the patient (Medizinische
4Note that exceptions prevail for patients insured with HMO plans. In these cases,
insurance companies negotiate contracts with provider networks to arrange reimburse-
ment of medical services. These contracts often include bonus payments or capitation
mechanisms. Some physician networks may accept (partial) financial responsibility for
the full clinical pathway of their patients (including inpatient care). Schmid et al. (2018)
and De Pietro et al. (2015) offer further information. We abstract from individual contracts
in this paper.
5Collective negotiations take place between the payer and the provider side. The supply
side is represented by the Swiss Medical Association (FMH) and the Swiss Association of
Hospitals (H+). The demand side is represented by two organizations representing the
MHI insurance companies (santésuisse and curafutura).
6This factor varies by canton. Switzerland is a federal state consisting of 26 cantons. In
2017, these factors ranged from 0.82 (Schwyz, Zug) to 0.97 (Jura).
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Leistung), and, second, the infrastructure, practice expenses, and overhead
costs (Technische Leistung). The two components are explained in more
detail in Appendix 3.A.
3.2.2 2018 Reform
Our analysis uses a large-scale change to the fee schedule that changed
relative prices for physicians in 2018. Usually, the so-called tariff parties
negotiate this national schedule. In 2018, the Federal Council intervened
because the regulations for the current schedule expired and the involved
parties had failed to negotiate a new contract. The reform affects the
remuneration of services by changing fees, changing the composition of
certain services, or retiring services.7 In the end, fees were lowered for
most services; the reform decreased the average fee by 14% (from CHF 400).
Importantly, fees were also increased for some 30% of services8 (accounting
for 54% of total revenue in 2017), most notably consultation-related fees.9
Figure 3.1 illustrates the fee changes.10 From a physician’s perspective, the
revision changed relative prices and, depending on the specialty, affected
a substantial part of practice revenue.11 The new fees were announced
only three months in advance, thus taking many physicians by surprise.
Consequently, the 2018 Tarmed revision constitutes a natural experiment of
reimbursement in a fee-for-service system that allows an in-depth analysis
of how physicians respond to changes in financial incentives.
7Overall, services making up for a share of 27% of total revenue are affected by composi-
tional changes. These changes entail five broad categories: First, splitting services into a
finer set of services that are very similar to the old ones. These services are included in
our models as they are tractable over time. Second, similarly, services were split into new
services which are not comparable to the old service. Third, changes in the billable time of
services with a Minutage (i.e. 5-minute intervals replacing 15-minute intervals). Fourth,
introduction of Minutage for services. Fifth, changing the restrictions on the combination
and repeated charges for a single service within a period of time (i.e. a maximum of four
times per day). See Appendix 3.B for more details.
8Fee increases are mostly due to a harmonization of the scaling factor that compensates
for the duration of medical training.
9Fee IDs 00.0010, 00.0020 and 00.0030.
10Note that the figure does not account for the importance of a service in terms of, say,
revenue. Rather, all services are weighted equally to get a comprehensive picture of the
fee changes.
11As a news article states (swissinfo, 2018): “At the end of January [2018], surgeons in
Geneva went on a partial strike to protest against the lowering of tariffs (TARMED) for
outpatient fees, managed by the Federal Office of Public Health. The surgeons refused
to perform certain surgeries like carpel tunnel hand operations. This kind of action was
unprecedented in Switzerland”.
80 PHYSICIAN INDUCED DEMAND AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES









0 2 4 6 8 10
logP











-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0
∆logP
Fee Change (98% plotted)
Note: Both figures are based on the estimation sample. To increase readability, the right
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Overall, services making up for a share of 27% of total revenue are
affected by compositional changes. These changes entail five broad cate-
gories12, which are described in further detail in Appendix 3.B.
3.2.3 Exogeneity of the Fee Changes
We argue that the fee change was exogenously determined. There are sev-
eral justifications to this. First of all, the fee changes do not correlate with
the lagged changes in service volumes (see Appendix Figure 3.6). Thus, the
federal government did not systematically reduce the fees for services that
grew in size. Several technicalities of the revision process further support
this claim. Physicians were not directly involved in the process determining
the new fees. Thus, they had no opportunity to guard important services
strategically from fee cuts. Moreover, the revision consists of several dif-
ferent interventions such that physicians could not perfectly anticipate
12First, splitting services into a finer set of services that are very similar to the old ones.
These services are included in our models as they are tractable over time. Second, similarly,
services were split into new services which are not comparable to the old service. Third,
changes in the billable time of services with a Minutage (i.e. 5-minute intervals replacing
15-minute intervals). Fourth, introduction of Minutage for services. Fifth, changing the
restrictions on the combination and repeated charges for a single service within a period
of time (i.e. a maximum of four times per day).
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how their practice would be affected. Finally, the original TARMED fee
schedule is based on pricing models that are intellectual property of the
physicians’ association. The federal government was not granted access
to them.13 Therefore, the new fees are not based on the same observables
that determined the previous fees in the first place. We conclude that the
fee changes are plausibly exogenous from the perspective of individual
physicians.
3.3 Data
We use billing data from MHI in Switzerland for the period from 2015
to 2018.14 The data, based on individual insurance claims, is aggregated
on a physician-and-service level. It covers all physicians working in the
outpatient sector who bill for MHI, excluding staffed physicians in hospi-
tals.15 We further aggregate all information on a quarterly frequency to
achieve a physician-service level panel dataset. Using quarterly intervals
is attractive because it reduces both noise and the computational burden.
Further, there are fewer seasonal patterns. The dataset is best described
by starting with the main variables: the quantities and the fees. Volumes
are measured by how often a physician billed a service in a given quarter.
Additionally, we observe how many patients a physician sees per quarter.
The data distinguishes 42 medical specialties that were diversely affected
by the fee changes. In the analysis, we will separately estimate the effects
for the 12 largest specialties in terms of revenue16 to account for potential
heterogeneity. Taken together, they account for more than 80% of total
revenue. An attractive characteristic of the data at hand is that it covers
patients of virtually all health insurance companies in Switzerland.
13FOPH (2017, p. 10)
14We additionally have access to data for 2014. We exclude these data points from the
analysis because of an earlier revision in October 2014. This reform aimed at redistributing
revenue from specialists to GPs. We thus start our sample period in the last quarter of
2015. The quantities of 2014Q1 to 2015Q3 are only used to predict future quantities for the
revenue decomposition model in Section 3.5.
15Outpatient services provided by hospital staff account for roughly 35% of total am-
bulatory costs under MHI. We exclude the hospital sector because information is not
available on an individual physician level. Rather, the information in our data reflects an
aggregate measure of decisions by several staffed doctors. Including them would thus
conflate our estimates of individual behavior.
16In terms of revenue, the 12 largest specialty groups are GPs, psychiatrists, group
practices, ophthalmologists, OB-GYNs, radiologists, pediatricians, medical practitioners,
cardiologists, dermatologists, gastroenterologists and otorhinolaryngologists (ordered by
revenue).
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In order to increase the reliability of our analysis, we limit our sample
to continuously practicing physicians17 (excluding 17.5% of total revenue
from 2015 to 2018) and exclude potentially erroneous data points. This
includes services charged at highly unreasonable prices18 (0.5%). Further,
we restrict our analysis to services that can clearly be tracked across the
different versions of the fee schedule. As discussed in Section 3.2 and
Appendix 3.B, a number of services underwent major changes that render
before-and-after comparisons unfeasible. We exclude these compositional
changes (10.8%)19 and retired services (0.2%). We will refer to the remaining
data as estimation sample.
3.4 Descriptives and Graphical Evidence
This section provides descriptive statistics for the estimation sample used
in the ensuing causal analysis. These are complemented by first graphical
evidence of the reform in Subsection 3.4.1.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics and some additional characteris-
tics of our estimation sample from 2015 to 2018. In 2017, the last year before
the reform, the sample consists of 13,051 physicians and 2,105 different
services. It is important to point out that individual service composition
is much narrower in scope: the average physician charges only 36 distinct
services in a quarter. Notably, this number varies considerably across spe-
cialties, ranging from as few as six different services for psychiatrists to as
many as 82 for radiologists. The average physician in our data charges a
volume of 4,667 services and gains a revenue of CHF 90,239 per quarter.
On average, a physician has 769 consultations per quarter.
A first descriptive analysis confirms the observation that costs rise
over the years, which is consistent with an underlying trend of increasing
healthcare expenditures OECD (2019). Quarterly revenue per physician
increases from CHF 85,656 in 2015 to 90,239 in 2017 (see Table 3.1). In
aggregate, this corresponds to a cost increase of 14% (from CHF Mio. 1,031
17We exclude physician-quarters if the revenue of the current or the preceding quarter
lies below CHF 20,000 (25% of average quarterly revenue). Further, we excluded all
observations of a physician if she had four or more quarters with total revenue below CHF
20,000. Finally, all observations of a physician were left out if she experienced extreme
changes of her revenue in two or more quarters.
18In practice, we exclude physicians whose average prices deviate more than 10% from
the official fees, or who deviate more than 50% from the fee at least once.
19Note that this value is lower than in Section 3.2 as the largest category of services
affected by compositional changes is tractable over time and is thus still included in our
models.
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per quarter in 2015). The empirical analysis will have to account for this
positive trend. We discuss the cost evolution in more detail in Subsection
3.4.1.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, Quarterly Means
2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of Quarters 1 4 4 4
Physician Statistics
Revenue (CHF) 85,656 85.725 90,239 91,919
(135,588) (139,849) (150,878) (152,306)
Quantity 4,492 4,484 4,667 4,784
(5,769) (5,854) (6,203) (6,916)
Consultations 708 792 769 837
(722) (790) (779) (919)
BITE 0.010
(0.044)
Distinct Services 36 36 36 36
Aggregate Statistics
Cost (Million CHF) 1,031 1,074 1,178 1,198
Predicted Cost (Million CHF) 1,262
Number of Physicians 12,031 12,528 13,051 13,036
Distinct Services (overall) 2,112 2,109 2,105 2,170
Observations 432,739 1,784,300 1,862,569 1,879,592
Notes: Panel A of this table reports quarterly means for physicians in our estimation
sample. Panel B reports aggregate statistics for the estimation sample. Standard deviations
in parentheses.
3.4.1 Graphical Evidence
This subsection provides first descriptive evidence of the effects of the
policy change. For this purpose, we momentarily extend the scope of our
analysis to the entire ambulatory sector covered by MHI, therefore going
beyond our estimation sample described above. Specifically, the following
discussion includes hospital staff and physicians who may have stopped
or just started practicing over the course of our observation period. We
describe how aggregate costs evolve and compare them to the announced
84 PHYSICIAN INDUCED DEMAND AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
policy target of saving 0.47 billion.20
We start by discussing how costs in the ambulatory sector evolve. Figure
3.2 shows total outpatient costs reimbursed by MHI for the years 2014 to
2019 (solid red line). Mirroring the previous discussion of Table 3.1, Figure
3.2 shows that overall medical costs grow over time. Ignoring this positive
time trend would bias the estimated effects of the policy intervention.
Additionally, it is evident from Figure 3.2 that the data is cyclical: Am-
bulatory costs usually peak in the first quarter, followed by a through in
the third quarter. This variation reflects an underlying seasonality in the
prevalence of diseases such as the flu, which is amplified by missing visits
during summer vacations.21 We will account for such cycles by including
physician-quarter fixed effects.
In the next step, we get a first notion of the policy’s effect. To account
for the high degree of cyclicality and the trend present in the data, we
first build a simple counterfactual. We predict physician-specific service
volumes based on pre-reform data under the assumption that quantities
grow at the same rate for all physicians in the same specialty.22 Multiplying
by the pre-reform fees and aggregating over all physicians yields a notion
of how medical costs would have evolved without the reform (dashed blue
line). Comparing realized costs (solid red) to our counterfactual suggests
that medical costs dropped considerably after the reform.
We suggest that part of this cost reduction is due to adjustments in
physician behavior after the reform. Of course, part of the cost reduction
is purely mechanical. After all, the reform reduced the average fee. In
fact, the mechanical reduction only accounts for a relatively small share of
the reduction: Multiplying counterfactual volumes by the new fees gives
an indication of how costs evolved had physician behavior remained at
predicted levels (subject to time trends and cyclicality). These costs (dashed
pale blue) lie above the realized cost, suggesting that the cost reduction
20For the sake of completeness, Figure 3.8 in Appendix 3.F shows the same figure based
on our estimation sample only. The general idea is comparable.
21A vast literature in public health and epidemiology shows increased mortality in
winter months (e.g. Anderson and Bell, 2009; Wilkinson et al., 2004). It is natural to assume
that this excess mortality coincides with increased utilization of medical services in the
same period. Further, a literature in epidemiology shows that the incidence of several
(infectious) diseases is highly seasonal. For example, in the northern hemisphere the
seasonal flu occurs in the winter time (Dowell and Ho, 2004) and Chickenpox in spring
(London and Yorke, 1973), thus a large share of both disease falling to the first quarter.
Further, cold weather increases respiratory and heart problems, leading to increased
utilization of primary care (Moineddin et al., 2008), and icy conditions increase the number
of falls and accidents.
22Details on the predictions can be found in Appendix 3.D.
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Note: The figure shows aggregate quarterly revenue for the outpatient sector covered
by MHI. The dashed vertical lines mark the TARMED reforms. The figure is based on
cleaned data including irregularly working physicians, hospitals and services affected by
compositional changes.
is not purely mechanical but rather an additional reduction in costs due
to behavioral changes.23 This finding is somewhat puzzling. For instance,
our interpretations runs contrary to the Medicare prediction of volume
extension after fee cuts.
Did the policy attain the target of saving 0.47 billion? A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests so. Actual costs lie below those predicted
by a counterfactual that exactly achieves the saving target (dashed orange
line), thus saving at least the announced target sum. To sum up, Figure 3.2
suggests that physicians responded to the reform beyond the purely me-
chanical effect. We will analyze their behavior empirically in the following
sections.
23Interestingly, the discrepancy is most substantial in the first quarter of 2018, which
could indicate that physicians need some time to adapt to the new fees optimally.
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3.5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis aims to identify how physicians react to the exoge-
nous fee changes presented in Section 3.2.2. As mentioned earlier, there
are at least two potential channels for physicians’ response to fee changes:
The so-called substitution effect and the income effect. The former is a
volume increase (decrease) for services that became relatively more (less)
attractive, and the latter is a volume increase of all services to achieve a
targeted income. The remainder of this section explains how we isolate and
analyze the two channels.
Measuring the bite of the reform. To analyze either channel, it is crucial
to first measure how physicians are affected by the revision. Similar to Yip
(1998)24, we define a reform BITE variable for each physician - measuring
the expected revenue loss related to the reform25:
BITEi,t =
∑Ss (Pi,s,18Qi,s,17t − Pi,s,17Qi,s,17t)
∑Ss (Pi,s,17Qi,s,17t)
. (3.5.1)
For physician i in quarter t:, Qi,s,y,t represents the volume of service s in year
y at fee Pi,s,y. BITE measures the expected percentage change in practice
revenue based on pre-reform volume for each physician and quarter. A
negative value thus indicates an (expected) income loss. In our view, our
measure improves on earlier work by precisely estimating how revenue
would change if quantities remained fixed. According to theoretical con-
siderations in McGuire and Pauly (1991), physicians targeting a level of
income would expand their total supply when they lose revenue in order
to maintain their target income. In our setting, this prediction translates to
a volume expansion when BITE gets increasingly negative.
BITE ranges from -0.47 to 0.35, which highlights how widely the re-
form’s impact on revenue varies between physicians. Absent any adaptions
in behavior, physicians can expect a reduction of revenue by 47% while
others would expect a 35%-gain in revenue. For the largest 12 specialties
(in terms of revenue), the average (0.014) lies below the median (0.034),
24Yip (1998) proposes a weighted average of the fee changes. The weights are computed
as the average quantities right before and after the treatment. In fact, our measure in (3.5.1)
highly correlates with an alternative specification in the style of Yip (1998) (correlation
coefficient 0.71).
25Note that we want to build a comprehensive measure of how physicians are affected.
Therefore, we also include services affected by compositional changes to build this vari-
able.
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which implies that there are fewer losers than winners, and that losers are
more strongly affected in absolute terms. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix
3.E show summary statistics for the variable by medical specialty.
3.5.1 Substitution Across Services
How does the (relative) provision of different services respond to changes
in their relative prices? We identify the substitution pattern by compar-
ing relative changes in service quantities within a physician and quarter.
Formally, this relative change is modeled by including a physician-quarter
fixed effect in the regression model. The underlying rationale is that fee
changes for the same service may have different consequences for physi-
cians who differ in their practice style, even if they practice in the same
specialty. In turn, the analysis abstracts from explicitly modeling the effect
of fee changes on a physician’s overall service volume.26 Our baseline
specification of the model is as follows:
∆lnQi,s,t = β0 + β1∆lnPs,y + γs + δi,t + ϵi,s,t, (3.5.2)
where Qi,s,t is the volume of service s provided by physician i in quarter t,
Ps,y represents the corresponding fee in year y, and ∆ denotes the difference
to the prior-year quarter.27 Using the first difference of the logarithms
of the outcome as well as our main regressor is attractive for two main
reasons. First, the log-transformation facilitates comparison despite the
large variance across services and physicians. Second, comparing to the
prior-year quarter nets out quarter effects. We further include two fixed
effects in our baseline specification: A service fixed effect (γs) that takes
care of service-specific trends, and, as already motivated above, a physician-
quarter fixed effect (δi,t) that allows for comparing relative changes within
a physician and quarter. Note that the physician-quarter fixed effect (δi,t)
picks up the BITE variable and thus helps to isolate the substitution effect.
Our coefficient of interest, β1, will (for small changes) approximate the
percentage point change in service volume when the relative fee changes
by one percentage point.28
26In fact, our preferred specification does not allow for the concurrent modeling of both,
as average changes are picked up in the physician-by-quarter fixed effect.
27Note that the fee schedule mandates an upper limit for the fees. Technically, physicians
are allowed to charge lower fees, which introduces individual-specific variation. In
practice, we take care of this by using the average fee charged by a physician before and
after the reform. We omit the i subscript for the fees for the sake of readability.
28To be precise, β1measures how a change in the log gross growth rate of Pi,s,y affects
the log gross growth rate of Qi,s,t. For small changes of Qi,s,t and Pi,s,y, the coefficient
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Our estimate of β exploits variation across time and between services. In
order to claim that β identifies the causal effect of ∆lnPs,y on ∆lnQi,s,t in
Equation (3.5.2), we need to establish that ∆lnPs,y is unrelated to ϵi,s,t. More
precisely, we need a conditional independence assumption (CIA) of the
following form:
E[ϵi,s,t|∆lnPs,y, γs, δi,t] = E[ϵi,s,t|γs, δi,t]
Under the CIA, no relation remains between ∆lnPs,y and ϵi,s,t once ac-
counted for service-specific trends and physician-quarter fixed effects. Be-
cause the model is estimated in first differences we additionally account
for observed and unobserved time-constant service characteristics (such
as treatment duration, technological requirements) and physician charac-
teristics (such as a physician’s practice style, her pool of patients, or local
healthcare market conditions). While the CIA is fundamentally untestable,
we argue that it is likely to hold. As argued in Subsection 3.2.3, the nature
of the fee changes was difficult to anticipate for the physicians and they
were not directly involved in the negotiations. Taken together, we account
for a great deal of dynamics by first differencing and introducing a linear
service trend (γs) as well as quarterly fixed effects on the physician level
(δi,t). Thus, it is unlikely that the fee changes are linked to unobserved
time-varying characteristics in equation (3.5.2). Note that the identification
of the causal effect of ∆lnPs,y is based on variation over time and variation
across services. This renders the identification strategy robust against con-
temporaneous events as it is rather the physician’s distribution of services
that identifies the treatment effect.
The baseline model in Equation (3.5.2) is appealing for several reasons.
First, it represents the only way to isolate the substitution effect neatly.29 To
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to draw conclusions about
the substitution pattern shutting other response channels. Further, another
attractive property is that the coefficient of interest, β1, has the flavor of an
approximates net growth rates. Recall that the gross growth rate of Qi,s,t with respect to
the prior-year quarter is Qi,s,tQi,s,t−4 whereas the net growth rate subtracts 1 from the gross
growth rate.
29The physician-quarter effect makes it a model of relative fee changes for each physician,
which we ultimately want to estimate. In principle, the effect of ∆lnPi,s,t and BITEi could
be estimated in one regression by dropping the physician-quarter fixed effect. However,
the same value of ∆lnPi,s,t could have very different implications, say, because for a
physician all other fees may have increased or decreased.
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elasticity.30 Finally, the estimation model presented in Equation (3.5.2) ties
to the previous literature (e.g. Yip, 1998), thus ensuring comparisons. To
the best of our knowledge, no previous paper has modelled substitution
effects across such a broad range of services, and for such a heterogeneous
group of physicians. We thus contribute novel evidence to the literature.
To ensure that we capture the appropriate effect of the fee variable
(∆lnPi,s,t), we additionally consider more flexible specifications such as
introducing polynomials of the fee (up to order five) and interacting with
an indicator for a fee decrease. We use the physician-and-service-specific
revenue of the prior-year quarter as weights for all regression models. More
precisely, we use the logarithm of the revenue to be consistent with our
main outcome and treatment variables. All standard errors are clustered
on the physician-quarter level.
As discussed in the first part of this section and illustrated by Tables
3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix 3.E, the bite of the fee reform varies considerably
across medical specialties. Thus, in the next step, we consider if, in turn,
heterogeneous substitution patterns arise. Formally, we let β1 in Equation
(3.5.2) vary for the 12 largest specialties and group the results by the spe-
cialty’s median BITE.31 Generally speaking, the incentives and possibilities
to substitute may depend on a number of factors. Most importantly, we
expect physicians who have lost a large share of their revenue to respond
more strongly for two reasons. First, markedly lower fees imply a decrease
in revenue. Because this increases the marginal utility of revenue under a
range of utility functions,32 physicians have ample incentives to expand the
volume of services with a higher financial return. Such behavior manifests
in substitution from ”losing” to ”winning” services in terms of the relative
fee. Second, experiencing a severe reduction in revenue is correlated with a




















31Taken together, these physicians account for more than 83% of all revenue. The in-
cluded specialties are GPs, psychiatrists, group practices, ophthalmologists, OB-GYNs,
radiologists, pediatricians, medical practitioners, cardiologists, dermatologists, gastroen-
terologists, and otorhinolaryngologists (ordered by revenue).
32This claim holds for standard utility functions as outlined in McGuire and Pauly
(1991).
33Figure 3.9 in Appendix 3.F provides evidence for this claim.
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thus incentives, have changed more strongly.
Besides the possibly amplifying effect of the income BITE, there are
constraints on how physicians can optimize their service mix. An apparent
one is the number of distinct services a physician uses: Having fewer dis-
tinct services limits the substitution possibilities. Further, the fee schedule
limits how often certain services can be charged per patient and consul-
tation. It seems likely that expanding service quantities is harder when
such limitations restrict a larger part of a physician’s practice.34 We use the
revenue-share of limited services as a rough proxy for the ease of substi-
tuting. Because the variable is constant for each physician and quarter, the
physician–quarter fixed effect (δi,t) in Equation (3.5.2) picks it up.
3.5.2 Total Healthcare Supply
In a second step, we focus on a second response channel: volume expansion.
Several earlier studies (e.g. McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Yip, 1998) found that
physicians with the sharpest income decline show the most pronounced
reactions. Thus in a second analysis, we examine how a physician’s total
healthcare supply responds to income changes. This is a non-trivial exercise
for two reasons. First, the raw quantities of the services are not directly
comparable across services and physicians. Thus, they cannot simply be
summed up to get a measure of total supply. Second, services exhibit
different time trends, which renders the analysis of any aggregate delicate,
as it remains unclear how these trends should be averaged. We tackle these
issues by proposing two complementary identification strategies.
In a first step, we argue that the number of office visits constitute an
appropriate measure of a physician’s healthcare supply. Thus, we regress
the change in consultations in a given quarter on the individual, quarterly
BITEi,t, and a physician fixed effect. We let the coefficient vary for medical
specialties with a median revenue loss (negative BITE), indexed by m ∈ M.
∆lnCi,t = β0 + β1BITEi,t + ∑
m∈M
β1,m Im × BITEi,t + δi + ϵi,t. (3.5.3)
In contrast to the model of the previous section, the identification strategy
of this approach purely relies on variation over time. Essentially, we assume
that, once accounted for the average and the trend of a physician’s number
of consultations, BITEi,t is unrelated to any time-varying unobservables,
i.e. E[ϵi,t|BITEi,t, δi] = E[ϵi,t|δi]. The assumption seems plausible because,
34Figure 3.10 in Appendix 3.F summarizes the number of services, the fraction of
revenue restricted by limitations, and the median value of BITE for the largest specialties.
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again, the fee changes were difficult to anticipate from a physician’s per-
spective. Thus, a correlation of BITEi,t with time-varying characteristics
seems unlikely. For most specialties this claim is supported by the means
of Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.F, as pre-reform consultation growth does not
seem to depend on BITEi,t. Unfortunately, for psychiatrists, gynaecologists,
and medical practitioners, pre-reform growth rates of consultations seem
to correlate with the value of BITEi,t. Thus, the model in (3.5.3) encounters
an endogeneity problem for these medical specialties. This undermines
the identification of β1 in (3.5.3) and makes the estimation of the model for
these specialties infeasible. We thus refrain from estimating the model for
these three specialities.
Further, it seems implausible that an unobserved but contemporaneous
event (heterogeneously) affected the number of consultations, and was at
the same time correlated with BITEi,t. For instance, consider an unexpected
shift in the consumer’s demand for medical services from 2017 to 2018. It
would need to be the case that this shift is correlated with BITEi,t which
is unlikely to hold as consumers are weakly affected by the reform due to
their limited payment obligations.
Identifying β1 and β1,m in equation (3.5.3) relies on sufficient variation
of BITEi,t within the specialties.35 Table 3.2 suggests that physicians may
be very heterogeneously affected by the reform even within specialties.
Thus, we argue that there is enough variation to identify β1 and β1,m.
We expect only the physicians affected by a substantial revenue reduc-
tion to exhibit income-targeting behavior. Besides, consultations have been
growing at different rates for these specialties. Thus, it is important to
estimate a fully saturated model. Comparing to the substitution model
in (3.5.2), it is apparent that the model in Equation (3.5.3) builds on fewer
observations because the units of observation are providers instead of
providers-and-services.
The second approach is motivated by a prediction of the PID hypothesis
(McGuire and Pauly, 1991). The PID states that physicians fully offset
any income loss by increasing service volume. For this purpose, we will
decompose the observed revenue change from 2017 to 2018 into two parts:
First, a mechanical change that measures by how much revenue changes due
to the fee adjustments, holding the supply level fixed. Second, a behavioral
change measuring how revenue changes because the provision of services
adapts (holding prices fixed). Note that individual physicians can not
influence the first part. They may react, however, by, say, performing
35Technically, this is only true for the specialties in M. We identify β1 through the pool
of all physicians not belonging to M which further adds exploitable variation.
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additional examinations, which the second part would pick up. Relating
the two measures provides an estimate as to how much physicians offset
lost income. Thus, the PID prediction (coefficient of -1) will be testable. In
practice, we will base the measures on cost predictions that account for
specialty-specific trends and cyclicality. More precisely, we use specialty-



































ln∆Ri measures how the revenue in 2018 compares to what was expected
for a physician based on previous quantities (levels and trends) and the
old fees. The first term of the decomposition identifies how much of ln∆Ri
is due to a change in service volume (behavioral change). Similar to the
BITE variable, the second term (mechanical change) captures how revenue
(mechanically) changes due to changing prices. Compared to the BITE,
the mechanical change additionally accounts for specialty-specific trends
in service volumes. Again, the variable further improves on the original
definition of BITE by Yip (1998) by using quantity predictions that are
unaffected by physicians’ responses to the reform. The predictions for the
quantities in 2018 are based on the assumption that service-specific growth
rates are constant across all physicians of the same specialty. Further, owing
to the data’s high cyclicality, we use average quarterly differences36 and not
linear trends for the predictions. Appendix 3.D describes the predictions
in further detail. Applying these counterfactuals allows linking revenue
changes directly to (mechanical) changes in fees and (behavioral) changes
in quantities. If physicians target an income level, they would choose
their volumes in a way that fully offsets the revenue loss due to the fee
changes and, in turn, effectively reduce the change in revenue to zero.
Thus, regressing behavioral change on mechanical change provides an answer
to whether this is the case or not.
The decomposition in Equation (3.5.4) constitutes a sophisticated com-
parison to quantify the correlation between the two components of rev-
enue change on the right-hand side of Equation 3.5.4. We account for the
36Average change in quantity for all first, second, third, and fourth quarters.
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physician’s average revenue through first differencing and for the trend in
revenue by considering the predictions Q̂i,s,18. Note that, in contrast to the
previous models, we do not identify a causal effect in this estimation. The
model is only estimated for one time period. Therefore, we cannot account
for unobserved time-varying characteristics on the physician level. This is,
it is infeasible to estimate an analogue of δi,t or δi in equations (3.5.2) and
(3.5.3). Thus, we regard the revenue decomposition results as a descriptive
supplement to the previous models. Finally, because the analysis is con-
ducted using only one observation per physician, we perform a median
regression to ensure that the results are robust to outliers (Hao and Naiman,
2007).
Both models in this subsection aim at quantifying how physicians adapt
their overall healthcare supply once their projected revenue is altered by the
reform. Beyond accounting for physician-specific trends, we want to add
further credibility by including covariates approximating the ease of substi-
tution and the pool of patients.37 Both may limit how flexibly physicians
can adjust their overall supply. More precisely, we include the number of
distinct services charged by a physician. The reasoning being that regularly
prescribing a larger variety of services likely increases substitution possi-
bilities. In turn, physicians charging many different service may rather
substitute than increase their overall supply. Further, we account for how
much of a physician’s revenue is due to treating patients who are young
(below 36), female, morbid (hospital stay in the previous year) and/or have
a low deductible. Ultimately, the patient pool may also restrict the ease of
labor supply expansions. Finally, a high physician density (per specialty
and canton) is likely to increase a consumers’ choices and therefore limits
the market power of the physician. This would make it more difficult to
extend labor supply. Note that in the case of the decomposition exercise,
we additionally include specialty fixed effects for all physicians m ∈ M.
3.6 Results and Discussion
3.6.1 Substitution across Services
Appendix Table 3.4 shows our baseline estimates of the causal effect of
relative fee changes on changes in relative service volume. The magnitude
of the effect is sizeable, with a coefficient of 0.253. In other words, when
37Note that in equation (3.5.3) we explicitly for physician trends in consultations while
in equation (3.5.4) this is implicitly addressed by considering the predictions for the
quantities Q̂i,s,18
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the fee of a service increases by 2% more than the average, its volume will
increase by around 0.5%. Figure 3.3 illustrates the result. The figure shows
the predicted change in service volume based on Equation (3.5.2) in brown.
The results show that physicians expand (reduce) the quantity of services
for which the fee has become relatively more (less) attractive. Here, losing
or gaining attractiveness is measured relative to the weighted38 average
fee change for every physician since we include physician-quarter fixed
effects.
We estimate two additional models that allow for potentially differ-
ent substitution responses for services with above- and below-average
fee changes. The results, pictured in orange (kink) and red (quadratic
fit), suggest that physicians respond more strongly to above-average fee
changes, implying that they rather increase financially favorable services
than reduce unattractive ones. We conclude that it is sensible to estimate a
flexible model and thus will only present results from the quadratic fit in
the remainder of this section. The estimates are robust to a range of more
flexible specifications discussed in Section 3.5.39
In terms of the direction of the effects, our results confirm earlier find-
ings, but are slightly smaller in magnitude (Gruber et al., 1999). Compar-
isons need to be taken with a grain of salt since earlier studies estimated
substitution between two different markets (Yip, 1998) or for only two
different services (Gruber et al., 1999) and are thus not directly comparable.
Nevertheless, the described substitution pattern is in line with theoreti-
cal models (McGuire and Pauly, 1991). The results present compelling
evidence that physicians behave rationally and maximize their revenue.
Potentially, physicians may maximize profits against the best interests of
their patients and thus cause a welfare loss, for example by providing
excessive care beyond the medically optimal level. However, the model
does not allow a welfare statement, since the optimal level of care remains
unobserved.
Heterogeneity. We next analyze how substitution patterns vary be-
tween different medical specialties whose revenue is differently affected
by the reform. We thus interact the fee variables in (3.5.2) with a dummy
for each of the 12 largest specialties. The results using the quadratic fit are
illustrated in Figure 3.4 (and Appendix Table 3.5). To increase readabil-
ity, the figure groups specialties by how strongly their revenue is affected.
Specifically, we distinguish three groups based on the median BITE: negative
38The observations are weighted by their prior-year quarter log revenue.
39Estimation of specifications with higher-order polynomials yield qualitatively similar
results. The remainder of the paper thus focusses on models including terms up to
second-order polynomials.
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Note: The figure shows the predicted quantity change by fee change based on the
estimated fee parameter(s) β1 from three specifications: a linear term in the fee variable,
complemented by an interaction of the fee with an indicator variable for a fee decrease
(kink), or a quadratic term (quadratic). Observations are weighted with the prior-year
quarter log revenue. The density represented in this graph is the pdf of the centered fee
changes, weighted with the same weights used for the regression models.
bite (radiologists, cardiologists, gastroenterologists)40, no bite (psychiatrists,
group practices, otorhinolaryngologists, OB-GYNs, dermatologists), and
positive bite (GPs, pediatricians, medical practitioners, ophthalmologists).
The broad implication of the preceding model remains: physicians increase
the quantity of services in cases where the fee has relatively increased. This
is particularly true for providers who benefit from the reform (right part of
the figure). However, the other two subfigures reveal that the specialties
differ regarding the strength of the substitution response.
In the (largely) non-affected group (middle panel), the general picture
still holds. However, psychiatrists show an opposite pattern, reflecting a
seemingly irrational substitution pattern, with volume increases of rela-
tively less attractive services. Possibly, this puzzling result arises due to
constraints: psychiatrists only choose from six distinct services in the first
place, and nearly all of them are limited (accounting for 98% of revenue).
40Bite takes on the lowest median values for radiologists (-0.130), cardiologists (-0.094),
and gastroenterologists (-0.099).
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Further, none of the relevant services charged by psychiatrists seem to
be substitutes.41 Being virtually unable to substitute, psychiatrists could
potentially respond by expanding their aggregate supply of healthcare.
Subsection 3.6.2 will tackle this issue.
Lastly, we turn to the group that loses revenue due to the reform (left
subfigure). Cardiologists respond with a pronounced substitution behav-
ior. This result is in line with our expectation that physicians react more
strongly when they lose a larger share of their revenue. Further, Figure 3.4
illustrates that service volumes of radiologists and gastroenterologists are
much less sensitive to fee changes, and therefore exhibit a less pronounced
substitution response. The stark contrast of this result to the previous dis-
cussion raises the question if physicians who lose a large chunk of their
income respond differently. It is possible that once a certain threshold is
met, physicians care much less about relative prices but rather expand
volumes across all services, irrespective of the fee changes. If this is the
case, our results will not pick it up. Therefore, we relate volume and BITE
directly in the following section.42
3.6.2 Total Healthcare Supply
The previous subsection established that physicians who suffer a financial
loss substitute the least. Likely, the second channel is more important: an
overall supply expansion. Among the heavily affected group, only cardi-
ologists substitute weakly according to the expected pattern. However,
radiologists, cardiologists, gastroenterologists and potentially psychiatrists
may respond by increasing their total supply. Generally, volume can be
41Two services generate about 90% of psychiatrist revenue: 02.0020 and 02.0210, (both
charging for therapy in five-minute intervals). While these positions are similar in scope,
they differ in the practitioner. By law, MHI does not reimburse psychotherapists (without
a medical degree) in independent practices. In order to be eligible for reimbursement, they
need to be employed by a psychiatrist who files the claims on their behalf and supervises
them. This regulation directly concerns the substitution possibilities for the two positions
mentioned above. Specifically, 02.0210 can only be charged by employed psychotherapists
(without a medical degree). Hence, the two positions are prescribed by two different
medical professionals. This makes substitution across services difficult. A psychiatrist can
only increase the volume of 02.0210 by shifting his workload to employees (or employing
new psychotherapists). While this substitution is, of course, possible in reality, modeling
substitution across suppliers lies outside the scope of this paper.
42Similar to psychiatrists, radiologists are restricted in their choices by facing numerous
limitations (97% of their revenue). Cardiologists and gastroenterologists face almost no
restrictions (26% and 13% of their revenue, respectively) and charge a moderate number
of distinct services (25 and 34). Thus, these reasons may only partly explain the weak
substitution response.
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Note: The figure shows the predicted quantity change by fee change for the twelve
largest specialties. Predictions are based on the quadratic specification from Figure 3.3: the
model includes a quadratic term for ∆lnP that also varies for the twelve largest specialties.
Observations are weighted with the prior-year quarter log revenue. Higher order terms do
not alter the interpretation. The substitution pattern is shown for 90% of the fee changes
within the physician specialty.
expanded along two margins: Increasing the number of consultations or
charging more services per visit. Based on theoretical considerations in
McGuire and Pauly (1991), we expect only physicians whose income is
substantially reduced to increase their aggregate supply. Further, and in
an extension to the theoretical model, we expect a volume increase for psy-
chiatrists. As mentioned above, they constitute a group with very limited
substitution possibilities so that their only margin is a supply change. In the
following, we show and discuss estimation results for the aforementioned
groups (negative median BITE and psychiatrists43) and compare them to a
benchmark group consisting of all other medical specialties.44
Figure 3.5 presents point estimates and standard errors for the main
coefficients from the two models laid out in Subsection 3.5.2: The coefficient
of BITE in the consultation model in Equation (3.5.3) in dark blue, and the
coefficient of mechanical change from the revenue decomposition model
based on Equation (3.5.4) in light blue. A negative coefficient indicates that
large revenue losses are (partially) offset by an increase in consultations or
aggregate supply and thus provides evidence for income targeting. Note
43Note that for psychiatrists, the consultation model is not run due to the endogeneity
concerns discussed in Subsection 3.5.2.
44As mentioned in Section 3.5, psychiatrists, medical practitioners, and OB-GYNs are
excluded because of endogeneity concerns.
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Note: This Figure shows the slope coefficients of the models outlined in Subsection 3.5.2
(point estimates and 95% confidence intervals). Observations are weighted with either the
prior-year quarter log revenue (consultation model) or the prior-year log revenue (revenue
decomposition model).
that the standard errors are larger in the revenue decomposition model
due to fewer observations (one observation per physician). The full set of
results is shown in Appendix Tables 3.6 and 3.7.45
First of all, Figure 3.5 illustrates that physicians respond differently de-
pending on whether they gained or lost due to the reform. We first discuss
the benchmark group with an unaffected or even increased revenue. For
physicians in this group, BITE takes on a median value of about 0.03. Our
results suggest that these physicians increase consultations in response
to the (modest) revenue gain. The estimated coefficient corresponds to a
1.09% increase in consultations when the expected revenue (measured by
BITE) increases by one percentage point. Considering the revenue decom-
position exercise, the mechanical change has no effect on aggregate supply
45Robustness and sensitivity checks of those models include a set of regressions where
we control for covariates. Specifically, we include quarterly physician data on the number
of distinct services, the cantonal physician density, and the revenue share of services
that face some limitations. Further, we account for differences in the patient groups by
including the revenue shares of the following groups: women, young (below age 36),
morbid (hospital stay in the previous year), low deductible (CHF 300). The qualitative
implications for both models remain the same. However, for the revenue decomposition
model, including covariates alters the statistical significance because the estimation model
only includes one observation per physician.
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for these physicians. These results speak against the literal target income
hypothesis. Not a surprising finding, since the (literal) income-targeting
hypothesis is generally deemed unlikely to hold for physicians who gain
revenue (McGuire and Pauly, 1991).46 Rather, the observed pattern may be
explained by two competing explanations. On the one hand, the pattern is
consistent with revenue maximization, as the increased fees increase the
marginal return to labor, which would manifest in a positive coefficient
of BITE in the consultation model. This is exactly what we observe for
physicians in the benchmark category. On the other hand, the pattern may
result from substitution. Because the reform increased consultation fees47,
office visits gained attractiveness relative to other services. Therefore what
we see in Figure 3.5, i.e. seeing more patients but not expanding aggregate
supply, may reflect a substitution behavior.
Next, we turn to the group with a negative BITE. Revenue losses in-
duce cardiologists and gastroenterologists to expand both their number of
patients and their total supply. The coefficients of the consultation model
translate to an increase of up to 2.6% in the number of patients when BITE
decreases by 1%-point. Aggregate supply measured by behavioral change is
less responsive but increases by 0.51% and 0.83%, respectively, if mechanical
change decreases by 1%. This result provides evidence for income-targeting
behavior. In contrast, radiologists do not increase their service volumes.
A possible reason for this difference is that a radiologist’s practice mostly
relies on referrals by other providers. Thus, radiologists have fewer options
to increase their supply. Another explanation could be that they have one
of the highest quarterly revenues among all physicians in which case a
standard utility function implies that the marginal benefit of revenue is
lower.48 Thus, a comparable reduction in revenue does not lead to the same
response as revenue matters less for overall utility. However, radiologists
increase the number of patients they see, which likely corresponds to an
increase in labor supply. Therefore, and similar to psychiatrists’ limited
scope for substitution, radiologists may be constrained with respect to the
services they charge per patient.
Finally, psychiatrists expand the quantities of their services (coefficient
46In principle, physicians who benefit from the reform (positive BITE) could reduce their
supply. This behavior is consistent with the literal target income hypothesis of McGuire
and Pauly (1991). However, this behavior is generally regarded as highly unlikely even by
the authors. Thus, we do not expect a negative coefficient for physicians with a positive
BITE.
47Service IDs: 00.0010, 00.0015, 00.0020.
48The median quarterly revenue of radiologists is about CHF 380,000. Among the largest
12 specialties, the second highest value is CHF 225,000 for group practices.
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of the revenue decomposition model: -1.08). As described in Subsection
3.6.1, psychiatrists exhibit a puzzling substitution pattern that favors less
attractive services. Taken together, the results suggest that psychiatrists
provide more healthcare and consequently partially offset their revenue loss.
Again, this observation is consistent with the income-targeting hypothesis
and thus with physician-induced demand.
3.6.3 Which Channel is More Important?
So far, we have found evidence for both a substitution response and an
adjustment of overall healthcare supply.Which response is more important
in terms of healthcare costs? We can’t directly answer this question using
the results described above. The underlying estimation models differ in the
observation unit and outcome variable (see Section 3.5). To better compare
the two effects, we employ a unified decomposition model, similar to
Equation (3.5.4). In a nutshell, the model attributes changes in revenue to
(i) fee changes, (ii) labor supply changes, and (iii) a modified service mix.
Appendix 3.C introduces the extended decomposition model.
In line with our main findings, the results suggest that physicians in-
crease expand volumes (via labor supply) in response to a substantial
revenue loss. Physicians who suffer from a 5% (mechanical) revenue loss in-
crease their supply by roughly 3%. Contrastingly, the substitution response
does not translate to a substantial effect on revenue. After all, physicians
may be constrained by their pool of patients, their chargeable set of services,
or the newly introduced rules and limitations.49 We conclude that, at least
in the short run, the increase in total healthcare supply (volume expansion)
is most relevant in terms of revenue, and thus, healthcare costs.
Taken together, we observe four results. First, in response to a large-
scale fee change, physicians substitute across services to optimize their
revenue. Second, physicians respond differently depending on whether
they gained or lost revenue. Being hit harder by the reform, most physicians
tend to increase their aggregate supply rather than to substitute between
services. Third, the ability to substitute may depend on other factors such
as the number of services a physician regularly charges, and whether these
services are close-enough substitutes. Finally, in terms of overall costs,
the healthcare supply channel matters most. This result confirms earlier
49Note that this result does not contradict the previous findings related to the sub-
stitution channel. As we included fixed effects into the regression model in (3.5.2), we
are essentially comparing relative changes in quantities. Yet, the average changes may
be substantial. Adding to this, it is a priori unclear how to conceptualize an aggregate
measure of the substitution response.
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findings by Burkhard et al. (2019) who find that the volume change is
more important than substitution in explaining cost differences between
physicians who sell drugs from a practice pharmacy and others who are
only prescribing the medicine.
3.6.4 Limitations
Our results are subject to a number of limitations. Most importantly, the
dataset does not allow conclusions regarding patient health. Consequently,
we form no statement if and how patient health is affected by the changes in
the service mix described in Subsection 3.6.1 or by the changes in treatment
intensity described in Subsection 3.6.2. Further, as in any empirical study
of physician behavior, the optimal level of care remains fundamentally
unobserved.
Moreover, we need to exclude a subset of medical services due to data
constraints. These services, mostly affected by compositional changes are
not directly comparable to pre-reform services. Therefore, the substitution
analysis in Subsection 3.6.1 does not include the full variety of available
services. However, the excluded services only make up around 10.8% of to-
tal revenue, and we therefore do not expect a large impact on the estimated
results. Excluding the services potentially biases our results if they are sys-
tematically differently substituted, which we do not expect. Similarly, we
observe physician behavior within the scope of MHI. For the ambulatory
sector, MHI accounts for the vast majority of health expenditures. Still,
services not covered by MHI may be alternative substitution options that
remain unobserved to us.50
3.6.5 Policy Implications
Our results provide compelling evidence that financial incentives affect
treatment decisions. First, we find substitution across the board. Second,
the response varies considerably by the extent of revenue at risk. These
findings have important implications for the optimal design of remunera-
tion systems. Health policy is frequently confronted with the task of finding
better ways to contain ever-growing healthcare costs while maintaining
quality. Most regulators mandate regular updates of the provider payment
systems, which offer frequent opportunities to incorporate new evidence
50In multipayer markets, fee changes may also spill over to both prices and volumes of
other payers (e.g. Clemens and Gottlieb, 2017, for the US). Our setting features a single
payer so that no outside option persists.
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on the provision of medical services. We argue that these periodic updates
should also consider economic insights into the responses to financial in-
centives. Our findings suggest that aggregate supply increases if a sizeable
part of revenue is lost. We thus conclude that gradual fee changes are
preferable since strong and costly responses due to the income loss can be
avoided.
Changes in relative fees may lead to potentially undesirable substitution
between services. In principle, the regulator could shut the substitution
channel. Reducing all fees by the same factor keeps relative prices un-
changed. Careful considerations may additionally keep the supply exten-
sion at a minimum by keeping the income effect small. Of course, this is a
rather technical argument, because in practice, many other factors influence
the decision on fee adjustments. Perhaps a more realistic approach in this
direction is trying to identify a medical specialty’s most relevant set of
services and keep their relative fees relatively constant.
Further, from a long-term perspective, many countries discuss more
large-scale reforms of the payment system, for example, by abandoning
FFS or by combining it with other models, like capitation. In this context,
our findings suggest that the regulator could make use of the described
substitution pattern. Instead of purely setting prices based on the cost of
providing a service, the regulator could increase fees for high-value services
and thus incentivize physicians to provide more of them. Equivalently, fees
for services that are of low medical value could be reduced (see Chandra
et al., 2011; Chernew et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2014). Implementing
such policies is in line with the recent wave of educational campaigns that
propose a reduction of clinically unnecessary medical tests, treatments,
and procedures.51 Thus, implementing a reformed system that exploits
the substitution responses described in our analysis is a promising avenue
to reduce inefficiencies in healthcare provision. Because we find only a
negligible effect of the substitution channel on total health care costs, our
results suggest that such a reform may be cost-neutral in the short run.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper addresses physician responses to an exogenous and large-scale
revision of medical service reimbursement. As shown in previous work,
there are two potential types of responses: shifts in aggregate healthcare
51www.choosingwisely.org. Similar campaigns have been launched in Canada, the
Netherlands, England, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Wales
and Denmark.
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supply and substitutions between services. The present analysis is able to
isolate the two channels and provides evidence on the relevance of both.
More precisely, our results contribute in four ways. First, they suggest
that physicians increase their supply when their aggregate revenue drops,
thereby confirming existing findings. Further, physicians substitute from
relatively less to more attractive services. Third, substituting between
services is only relevant for physicians whose revenue was not reduced
substantially. In cases with a marked revenue loss, physicians increase
aggregate supply and thus are likely to seek an income target. This behavior
is consistent with physician-induced demand. Finally, in terms of overall
costs, the adjustment in aggregate supply is the main driver of changes in
revenue.
Concerning the policy itself, our calculations suggest that the saving
target of 0.47 billion was achieved in the first post-reform year. Our results
on the substitution behavior suggest that adapting the fee structure may
have (unintended) consequences for the service mix provided by physicians.
Potentially, such effects may be adverse, for instance, when patients are
undertreated or receive adverse overtreatment. Understanding the role of
limitations posed on specific services constitutes a promising avenue for
further research.
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3.A Calculation of Relative Value Units
This section describes the calculation of the TARMED’s relative value units
in more detail. The relative value units of a service are the sum of two
components that account for the medical and the technical component of
providing a service. Equation (3.A.1) illustrates this. The two components
are described in the following.
relative value unitss,i = MSs,i + TSs,i (3.A.1)
Medical component of relative value unit. The medical component MSs
reimburses medical work with the patient. The relative value units for the
medical component is determined by six parameters.
MSs =
re f erence income × dignity f actori
annual work load × productivitys
× Scalingi × MinutageMs + (assistances) (3.A.2)
• reference income = CHF 207,000
• dignity factor 0.905-2.2625 (pre-reform), 0.985 (post-reform), reim-
burses education and qualification, depends on specialty
• annual workload = 115,200 minutes
• productivity 45%-100%, depends on service (more specifically on the
functional unit, Sparte, e.g. doctors office, types of OP).52 The parame-
ter measures the share of billable time. Basically: the time spent with
patients as a percentage of total annual work time. Example: 0.85 for
consultations.
• Scaling Factor. Adjusts for the different training durations. Scal-
ing factor of 1 for all specialties except 0.93 for medical practitioner
(praktischer Arzt). (Before 2018: 1 for all specialties) (shorter).
• medical assistance: only where applicable, depends on service
• Minutage is the (normative) time necessary to provide the service.
Calculations based on cost models (GRAT, KOREG, ROKO for physi-
cian practices, INFRA for hospitals)
52A functional unit is an area of a practice where a certain bundle of services is provided.
Each unit is characterized by a specific infrastructure (space, fixed and mobile equipment)
and by a certain number of non-medical staff.
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Technical component of relative value unit. The technical component
TSs reimburses the infrastructure and practice expenses that are necessary
for providing a certain service. Relative value units are based on two
parameters.
TSs = cost per minutes × MinutageTs (3.A.3)
• Costs per minute account for direct and indirect costs for infras-
tructure, material, wages (non-medical staff) etc. per minute. The
numbers are based on cost models (GRAT, KOREG, ROKO for physi-
cian practices, INFRA for hospitals). The costs per minute vary by
functional unit (Sparte), e.g. operation, consultation in doctor’s office
etc.
• Minutage measures the necessary time to provide a service. Numbers
are determined in the same cost models.
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3.B Compositional Changes
The TARMED reform changed the composition of a number of services.
We summarize these compositional changes by the five categories described
below. Each type is illustrated by a specific example and by the respective
revenue share.
(1) Splitting services into finer, comparable sets. This intervention splits a
given service into a set of new services, targeted at a specific patient popu-
lation (e.g. children, elderly). The most important service in this category
is ”Konsultation, jede weiteren 5 Min.” (service ID 00.0020). Starting from
2018Q1, physicians have to indicate the age group of their patient. This
intervention forces physicians to report in more detail. As this is rather af-
fecting the administrative burden and not the nature of the service it seems
reasonable that these services are comparable over time. Thus, services
falling into this category are included in our estimations. These services
account for 14.1% of aggregate revenue between 2015Q4 and 2018Q4.
(2) Splitting services into finer, non-comparable sets. This category con-
tains only one service, ”Glaskörperbiopsie für zytologische Diagnostik u/o intrav-
itreale Injektion” (service ID 08.3350). This service was divided into two new
services both taking care of one part of the original biopsy. Thus, the sum
of the new services cannot be compared to the old service. This category
accounts for 0.5% of aggregate revenue between 2015Q4 and 2018Q4.
(3) Changing the Minutage. For a number of services, the actual time
necessary to provide the service can be charged in fixed time intervals.
One intervention changed the length of these intervals. Most prominently,
this intervention affected the service ”Ärztliche Leistung in Abwesenheit des
Patienten (inkl. Aktenstudium), pro 5 Min.” (service ID 00.0140). This used
to be a rather vague service compensating the time a physician worked
in the absence of the patient. The federal government decided to split the
service into 24 new, and finer, services, as well as to change the Minutage
interval from five to one minute. As a result, physicians need to report
more precisely. It is reasonable to assume that this change aims at holding
the physicians (more) accountable for what they charge when patients
are not present. The 24 new categories are hardly comparable to the old
service. Thus, these types of services are excluded from the regressions.
This category accounts for 6.4% of aggregate revenue between 2015Q4 and
2018Q4.
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(4) Introduction of Minutage. This measure aimed at how services are
charged. Starting from 2018Q1 physicians have to report how long it took
them to provide the services affected by this change. Most prominently,
this concerns ”Kleine Untersuchung durch den Facharzt für Grundversorgung”
(service ID 00.0410). (Additionally, this service was also split into a finer set.
Therefore, it is also affected by the first type of changes, discussed above.)
The introduction of Minutage changes the nature of the services and thus
makes the comparability over time infeasible. These services account for
5.6% of aggregate revenue between 2015Q4 and 2018Q4.
(5) Changing restrictions. This category contains only one service, ”In-
struktion von Selbstmessungen, Selbstbehandlungen durch den Facharzt, pro 5
Min.” (service ID 00.0610). For this service, an additional limitation was
introduced: The service can be charged at most three times per visit. In-
cluding this service into our estimation would result in biased estimates
as physicians are potentially restricted regarding their substitution behav-
ior, post-reform. (Additionally, this service was also split into a finer set.
Therefore, it is also affected by the first type of changes, discussed above.)
This category accounts for 0.6% of aggregate revenue between 2015Q4 and
2018Q4.
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3.C Assessing the Importance of the Substitution
and the Volume Expansion Channel
The two models outlined in Section 3.5 identify the two types of potential
responses to changes in prices: the substitution channel and the volume
expansion channel. Because the models differ with respect to their observa-
tion unit and their outcome variable, we cannot directly compare them to
understand which channel is more important in terms of overall costs. To
serve this purpose, this section introduces a revenue decomposition similar
to Equation (3.5.4). In essence, we decompose the change in log revenue
for physician i from year y − 1 to year y into three components: the change
in revenue due to (i) a modified service mix (substitution), (ii) a new level
of labor supply (volume expansion), and (iii) the change in fees (purely
mechanical). Equation (3.C.1) formalizes this decomposition.


















































































Ri,y measures physician i’s revenue in year y, due to charging volume Qi,s,y
of service s at fee Ps,y. Q̃i,s,y is a counterfactual volume, adjusted for the
growth in work hours (see description below). This model is more general
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than Equation (3.5.4) because it is defined for all years. In contrast, equation
(3.5.4) is only defined for the revenue change from 2017 to 2018.
Note that we have introduced two counterfactual revenues. First, ∑Ss Pi,s,y ·
Qi,s,y−1 measures the (artificial) revenue in year y, holding all service vol-
umes fixed at prior-year levels. Second, ∑Ss Pi,s,yQ̃i,s,y constitutes the rev-
enue in year y holding physician’s service mix53 fixed at the prior-year level
(adjusted for the average growth of her labor supply). In an intermediate
step, Q̃i,s,y multiplies the previous year’s volume by the growth rate of a
physician’s annual working hours WHi, i.e.:54




The fee schedule provides a time estimate for 90% of all services, allowing
us to reconstruct the annual working hours. The measure is highly corre-
lated with revenue (correlation of 0.98), arguably making working hours a
good measure of overall supply.
In terms of interpretation, the mechanical change inherits the intuition
of the Revenue Decomposition Model in Equation (3.5.4): It measures by
how much revenue changes due to the fee adjustments, holding the supply
level fixed.55 Intuitively, the volume expansion channel reflects how a change
in total working hours (as a proxy for total supply) translates to revenue
(holding the service mix fixed). Finally, the substitution channel measures
the difference in revenue due to changes in the physician’s service mix. If a
physician adapts the volume of all services by exactly the same factor, the
substitution channel will always be zero.56 In other words, the substitution
channel captures all volume changes not stemming from an overall shift in
labor supply.
53Let shares = Qs∑s Qs measure the share of service s in physicians i’s practice in year y.
We define the service mix as the set of shares∀s. It can be interpreted as the share of labor




and give us a notion on the composition of a physician’s supplied services.
54Note that we can not use a revenue-based growth measure as this would be affected
by the new fees.
55Note that the definition differs somewhat from the definition used earlier in the paper
(see the Revenue Decomposition Model in Subsection 3.5.2. Specifically, Equation (3.C.1)
does not adjust for different trends in volumes across physicians and services. The reason
is
56Note that this is a rather rough way to conceptualize an aggregate measure of how
strongly physicians substitute. Nevertheless, a quantifiable measure is sufficient to com-
pare substitution to aggregate supply changes.
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Figure 3.7 in Appendix 3.F shows the overall change in revenue from
2017 to 2018, the volume expansion channel and the substitution channel by the
deciles of the mechanical change. First, Subfigure (a) shows how physician
revenue changed from 2017 to 2018. This corresponds to the left hand side
of Equation (3.C.1). The revenue change is shown as a function of the me-
chanical change (also according to Equation (3.C.1)).57 The subfigure again
illustrates that physicians did in fact respond to the fee reform. Absent any
behavior changes, the solid line would coincide with the 45-degree line,
because the mechanical change would translate one-by-one to (realized)
revenue. Except for the mechanical changes above 2%, revenue change
lies above the 45-degree line, thus, physicians in these groups successfully
mitigate the income losses due to the reform.
Subfigure (b) shows the three parts that compose total revenue change in
Equation (3.C.1). The results suggest that mechanical revenue losses are
mitigated through the volume expansion channel, especially at the lower
end of the mechanical change distribution. A 5% (mechanical) revenue
loss increases supply by roughly 4%. In contrast, the substitution channel’s
aggregate effect is close to zero and invariant to the mechanical change. We
conclude that only the aggregate supply channel is relevant in terms of
total healthcare costs.
Does this result imply that the substitution channel is negligible? Not
necessarily. The substitution patterns described in Subsection 3.6.1 do
not manifest in increased costs in the short term. However, it may be
that the quality of healthcare provision is affected. It is a priori unclear in
which direction. The substitution channel may provide a possibly cost-
neutral opportunity to improve healthcare quality by increasing the relative
financial attractiveness of high-quality procedures (see Chandra et al., 2011;
Chernew et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2014). Analyzing this avenue is left to
future research.
57Note that while this is an exact decomposition, we preferred to estimate a fractional
polynomial regression with degree 2 to approximate the relation.
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3.D Prediction of Physican-Specific Service Vol-
umes
We predict physician-specific service volume based on pre-reform obser-
vations. In a first step, the aggregate average change in quantity was
computed for service s and physician speciality g. In a second step, a
percentage prediction for every service and physician speciality pair was
computed. Finally, it is assumed that physicians within the same speciality
share the same percentage changes of their quantities.






∆Qg,s,j+4k j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
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3.E Additional Tables
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Quarterly BITE by Medical Specialty (Top 12)
Mean SD Median IQR Min Max N
Losers
Radiologists −0.111 0.056 −0.129 0.057 −0.210 0.019 430
Gastroenterologists −0.100 0.034 −0.099 0.036 −0.222 0.030 668
Cardiologists −0.090 0.035 −0.094 0.047 −0.216 0.038 1, 270
Psychiatrists −0.030 0.010 −0.036 0.014 −0.093 0.048 7, 275
Total −0.046 0.036 −0.037 0.010 −0.222 0.048 9, 643
Midrange
OB-GYNs 0.019 0.012 0.020 0.011 −0.094 0.046 3, 718
Dermatologists 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.028 −0.101 0.045 1, 317
Group practices 0.009 0.059 0.029 0.032 −0.472 0.051 1, 112
Oto-Rhino Laryngologists 0.024 0.018 0.030 0.016 −0.096 0.043 1, 114
Total 0.018 0.027 0.022 0.017 −0.472 0.051 7, 261
Winners
Medical Practitioners 0.031 0.011 0.032 0.011 −0.094 0.052 2, 698
Ophthalmologists 0.006 0.075 0.034 0.007 −0.473 0.042 2, 319
Pediatricians 0.040 0.013 0.043 0.006 −0.095 0.051 3, 059
GPs 0.043 0.011 0.046 0.005 −0.130 0.095 15, 609
Total 0.038 0.028 0.044 0.010 −0.473 0.095 23, 685
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the quarterly BITE variable by medical specialty
for the estimation sample. N is physicians × quarter.
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∆ ln P 0.253∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.031) (0.020)




R2 0.095 0.090 0.095
adj. R2 0.090 0.085 0.090
N Phys × Quarter 155,481 155,481 155,481
N 28,687,618 28,687,618 28,687,618
Notes: The table shows estimates for the substitution model.
The outcome variable is ∆ ln Q in all columns. All models
additionally include a constant, service fixed effects, and
physician-by-quarter fixed effects. Observations are weighted
with the prior-year quarter log revenue. Standard errors are
clustered at the physician-and-quarter level in parentheses,
*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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∆ ln P 0.452∗∗∗ (0.048)
× Dermatologists 0.413∗∗∗ (0.124)
× OB-GYN −0.122 (0.072)
× Psychiatrists −1.660∗∗∗ (0.181)
× Ophthalmologists 0.133 (0.104)
× Oto-Rhino Laryngologists −0.072 (0.154)
× Pediatricians 0.233∗ (0.110)
× Radiologists −0.498∗∗∗ (0.115)
× GPs 0.149∗∗ (0.058)
× Cardiologists 0.593∗∗∗ (0.133)
× Gastroenterologists −0.478∗∗∗ (0.101)
× Medical Practitioners −0.215 (0.126)
× Group practices −0.130 (0.086)
(∆ ln P)2 0.503∗∗∗ (0.149)
× Dermatologists 2.305∗∗ (0.847)
× OB-GYN 0.806 (0.469)
× Psychiatrists −5.404∗∗ (1.960)
× Ophthalmologists −0.239 (0.162)
× Oto-Rhino Laryngologists 1.631 (1.055)
× Pediatricians −1.047 (1.231)
× Radiologists −0.401 (0.398)
× GPs −0.085 (0.167)
× Cardiologists 1.354∗∗∗ (0.405)
× Gastroenterologists −0.617∗∗∗ (0.170)
× Medical Practitioners −0.487∗∗ (0.177)
× Group practices −0.440∗∗ (0.169)
R2 0.096
adj. R2 0.091
N Phys × Quarter 155,481
N 28,687,618
Notes: The table shows estimates for the substitution
model (quadratic fit) where the fee parameters vary for the
twelve largest medical specialties. The outcome variable
is ∆ ln Q in all columns. All models additionally include
a constant, service fixed effects, and physician-by-quarter
fixed effects. Observations are weighted with the prior-
year quarter log revenue. Standard errors clustered at the
physician-and-quarter level in parentheses,
*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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BITE (quarterly) 1.090∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
BITE × Radiologists −1.345∗∗∗ −1.205∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027)
BITE × Cardiologists −2.171∗∗∗ −2.006∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
BITE × Gastroenterologists −2.601∗∗∗ −2.445∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026)
Covariates (Prior Year Quarter):
Limited Services(Revenue Share) −0.425∗∗∗
(0.013)
# Distinct Services −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)
Female (Revenue Share) 0.203∗∗∗
(0.013)
Young (Revenue Share) −0.194∗∗∗
(0.007)
Morbid (Revenue Share) −0.056∗∗∗
(0.010)







adj. R2 0.246 0.259
N Physician 9,973 9,973
N Physician × Quarter 870,354 870,354
Notes: The table shows estimates for the consultation model.
Observations are weighted with the prior-year quarter log rev-
enue. All models include physician fixed-effects. The covariates
in column (2) measure prior-year-quarter levels of the num-
ber of distinct services, the cantonal physician density, and the
revenue share of services that face some limitations. Further,
the models account for differences in the patient groups by in-
cluding the revenue shares of the following groups: women,
young (below age 36), morbid (hospital stay in the previous
year), low deductible (CHF 300). Standard errors clustered at
the physician-and-quarter level in parentheses, *** p < 0.001 **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Mechanical Change −0.008 −0.168∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.039)
Mechanical Change × Psychiatrists −1.080∗∗∗ −1.284∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.295)
Mechanical Change × Radiologists 0.051 0.118
(0.181) (0.191)
Mechanical Change × Cardiologists −0.511∗ −0.087
(0.222) (0.229)
Mechanical Change × Gastroenterologists −0.831∗∗ −0.508
(0.255) (0.263)
Limited Services (Revenue Share) −0.076∗∗∗
(0.013)
# Distinct Services −0.000
(0.000)
Female (Revenue Share) 0.013
(0.012)
Young (Revenue Share) 0.066∗∗∗
(0.008)
Morbid (Revenue Share) 0.133∗∗
(0.043)















Notes: The table shows median regression estimates for the revenue decompo-
sition model. Observations are weighted with the prior-year log revenue. The
covariates in column (2) measure prior-year levels of the number of distinct
services, the cantonal physician density, and the revenue share of services
that face some limitations. Further, column (2) accounts for differences in
the patient groups by including the revenue shares of the following groups:
women, young (below age 36), morbid (hospital stay in the previous year),
low deductible (CHF 300). Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.001 **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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3.F Additional Figures










-2 -1 0 1 2
∆log(Q)
Year-Service Pair (2016, 2017) Linear Fit, weighted
Note: The figure shows pre-reform changes in service volumes and relative fee changes for
each service. The linear fit uses prior-year revenue weights.
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Volume Expansion Channel 95% CI
Substitution Channel 95% CI
(b) Revenue Decomposition
Note: The figure illustrates how physician revenue changed from 2017 to 2018 and relates
it to the mechanical revenue change due to the reform. The solid lines in both subfigures
show (counterfactual) revenue changes by values of mechanical change estimated by
a fractional polynomial regression of degree 2. Subfigure (a) shows the mean revenue
change from 2017 to 2018, corresponding to the left hand side of Equation (3.C.1), by
decile of mechanical change. Subfigure (b) illustrates the decomposed revenue changes
according to Equation (3.C.1).
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2015q3 2016q3 2017q3 2018q3
Quarter
Actual Costs Prediction Old Fees
Prediction New Fees Target .47 Millions
Note: The figure shows aggregate quarterly revenue for the outpatient sector covered
by MHI. The dashed vertical lines mark the TARMED reforms. Data is based on the
estimation sample.
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Percentile of BITE
Mean BITE Mean Standard Deviation of Fee Change
Note: The figure shows the average BITE by the percentiles of BITE (dark blue line). The
light blue line is the standard deviation of BITE within each percentile.
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Note: This figure is based on the estimation sample. The color scheme follows Figure 3.4




































































































0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentiles of BITE
Oto-Rhino Laryngologists
Mean BITE Cons Growth Quadratic Fit
Note: The figure shows average BITE, consultation growth and the quadratic fit by
percentiles of BITE for the 12 largest specialties for the pre-reform period.
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